Archive

Archive for the ‘aviation’ Category

New From the GAO

September 18, 2014 Comments off

New From the GAO
Source: Government Accountability Office

Reports

1. Inspectors General: Improvements Needed in the Office of Inspector General’s Oversight of the Denali Commission. GAO-14-320, September 18.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-320
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665909.pdf

2. Secure Flight: TSA Should Take Additional Steps to Determine Program Effectiveness. GAO-14-531, September 9.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-531
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665677.pdf

3. Secure Flight: TSA Could Take Additional Steps to Strengthen Privacy Oversight Mechanisms. GAO-14-647, September 9.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-647
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665674.pdf

4. VA Health Care: Actions Needed to Address Higher-Than-Expected Demand for the Family Caregiver Program. GAO-14-675, September 18.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-675
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665929.pdf

5. Large Partnerships: With Growing Number of Partnerships, IRS Needs to Improve Audit Efficiency. GAO-14-732, September 18.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-732
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665887.pdf

6. Depot Maintenance: Accurate and Complete Data Needed to Meet DOD’s Core Capability Reporting Requirements. GAO-14-777, September 18.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-777
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665916.pdf

Testimonies

1. Healthcare.gov: Information Security and Privacy Controls Should Be Enhanced to Address Weaknesses, by Gregory C. Wilshusen, director, information security issues, before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. GAO-14-871T, September 18.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-871T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665878.pdf

2. Secure Flight: Additional Actions Needed to Determine Program Effectiveness and Strengthen Privacy Oversight Mechanisms, by Jennifer Grover, acting director, homeland security and justice, before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-14-796T, September 18.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-796T

Press Release

1. GAO Names New Members to PCORI Methodology Committee. September 18.
http://www.gao.gov/press/pcori_methodology_comm2014sep18.htm

Reissue

1. Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Action Needed to Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts. GAO-14-507, September 15.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-507
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665787.pdf

About these ads

New From the GAO

September 12, 2014 Comments off

New From the GAO
Source: Government Accountability Office

Reports

1. Missouri River Flood and Drought: Experts Agree the Corps Took Appropriate Action, Given the Circumstances, but Should Examine New Forecasting Techniques. GAO-14-741, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-741
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665762.pdf

2. Air Traffic Control System: Selected Stakeholders’ Perspectives on Operations, Modernization, and Structure. GAO-14-770, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-770
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665784.pdf

Press Release

1. Team of Independent Auditors Gives GAO “Clean Opinion” on its Quality System. September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/press/pr_clean_opinion_sep_2014.htm

Reissue

1. Federal Rulemaking: Agencies Included Key Elements of Cost-Benefit Analysis, but Explanations of Regulations’ Significance Could Be More Transparent. GAO-14-714, September 11.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-714
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665744.pdf

On September 12, 2014, this product was revised to correct the statement in the Highlights referencing the period July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2013.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft and War in the Public Relations Domain

September 11, 2014 Comments off

Remotely Piloted Aircraft and War in the Public Relations Domain (PDF)
Source: Air & Space Power Journal

Many of the RPA articles, opinions, and interviews produced over the last decade are either based on false premises (option a) or employ a logical fallacy of analogy (option c); therefore, many of their conclusions are invalid. This article does not attempt to show that most of the writing on RPAs over the last decade contains fallacies of some kind. Rather, it recognizes the ease with which sincere people can commit such errors as a result of the epistemic problem inherent in any discussion of RPA operations.

The argument, then, begins by asserting that such a problem exists and suggesting that it has three causes. First, enemy forces (here referring specifically to al-Qaeda and the Taliban) have an effective public relations (PR) campaign against RPAs. Second, the United States conducts an ineffective PR campaign in support of RPAs. Third, RPA operations are necessarily concealed by security classifications and national security precautions. The article expounds upon the significance of these causes and provides evidence for them—evidence that will demonstrate not only the three causes but also the reality of the epistemic problem. Its conclusion offers two ways that individuals can mitigate the dilemma and one means by which the US government can rectify it.

Airport Terminal Incident Response Planning

September 10, 2014 Comments off

Airport Terminal Incident Response Planning
Source: Transportation Research Board

TRB’s Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) Report 112: Airport Terminal Incident Response Planning summarizes the development and use of a tool that creates and maintains integrated incident response plans that address hazards in and around airport terminals.

The Airport Terminal Incident Response Plan (TIRP) tool, available on the CD-ROM that accompanies the report, assists in the development of a response plan to help mitigate the impact of events on terminal users. In addition to the TIRP tool, the report contains a user’s guide that provides a step-by-step process of generating incident response plans.

Preliminary report Crash involving Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200 flight MH17 Hrabove, Ukraine – 17 July 2014

September 9, 2014 Comments off

Preliminary report Crash involving Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200 flight MH17 Hrabove, Ukraine – 17 July 2014 (PDF)
Source: Dutch Safety Board
From press release:

Flight MH17 with a Boeing 777-200 operated by Malaysia Airlines broke up in the air probably as the result of structural damage caused by a large number of high-energy objects that penetrated the aircraft from outside. This is mentioned in the preliminary report on the investigation into the crash of MH17 that has been published today by the Dutch Safety Board. There are no indications that the MH17 crash was caused by a technical fault or by actions of the crew.

The cockpit voice recorder, the flight data recorder and data from air traffic control all suggest that flight MH17 proceeded as normal until 13:20:03 (UTC), after which it ended abruptly. A full listening of the communications among the crew members in the cockpit recorded on the cockpit voice recorder revealed no signs of any technical faults or an emergency situation. Neither were any warning tones heard in the cockpit that might have pointed to technical problems. The flight data recorder registered no aircraft system warnings, and aircraft engine parameters were consistent with normal operation during the flight. The radio communications with Ukrainian air traffic control confirm that no emergency call was made by the cockpit crew. The final calls by Ukrainian air traffic control made between 13.20:00 and 13.22:02 (UTC) remained unanswered.

The pattern of wreckage on the ground suggests that the aircraft split into pieces during flight (an in-flight break up). Based on the available maintenance history the airplane was airworthy when it took off from Amsterdam and there were no known technical problems. The aircraft was manned by a qualified and experienced crew.

Protecting Civilian Flights from Missiles – CRS Insights

August 6, 2014 Comments off

Protecting Civilian Flights from Missiles – CRS Insights (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. State Department Foreign Press Center)

On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, a Boeing 777 en route from Amsterdam, the Netherlands, to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, crashed over eastern Ukraine after apparently being struck by a surface-toair missile. The event has renewed congressional interest in protecting civilian aircraft from missiles, a topic of considerable interest in the context of protection against terrorist threats and risks to aircraft operated in conflict zones.
…..
It is unlikely that a DIRCM system would have offered protection against the attack that brought down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, as this incident appears to have involved a radar-guided missile. The DHS missile-protection effort did not focus on protections against radar-guided missiles, as these are rarely possessed by terrorists and insurgent groups. There are only two known cases of civilian aircraft encounters with radar-guided surface-to-air missiles. On July 3, 1988, a radar-guided missile launched by the USS Vincennes, a U.S. Navy cruiser operating in the Persian Gulf, brought down Iran Air Flight 655. On October 4, 2001, a Siberia Airlines Tupolev 154 was shot down over the Black Sea near Crimea during a Ukrainian military exercise.

Possible Missile Attack on Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 – CRS Insights

August 6, 2014 Comments off

Possible Missile Attack on Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 – CRS Insights (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. State Department Foreign Press Center)

On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), a Boeing 777 bound from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, crashed in eastern Ukraine.

MH17’s position was shown on live aircraft tracking websites using the airliner’s automated dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) signal. Its final reported position was near the Russia-Ukraine border at an altitude of 33,000 feet.

Initial reports from the crash scene indicated that the resulting debris field covered a large area. This is characteristic when an aircraft breaks up at high altitude (as opposed to diving into the ground or incidents on landing or takeoff, where the debris field is tightly confined around the point of impact). Inflight breakup can occur for a number of reasons, including metal fatigue (as in the case of two DeHavilland Comet jetliners in the 1950s); onboard explosions, whether caused by bombs or accidental combustion (such as TWA flight 800 in 1996); or external events like a missile attack (as was the case with Korean Air Lines 007 in 1983 and Iran Air 655 in 1988).

Because spontaneous inflight breakup of an airliner is a rare event, the crash’s proximity to an active conflict zone where military aircraft had recently been shot down led to speculation that MH17’s breakup may have been the result of a surface-to-air missile. This was reinforced when, almost immediately, pictures appeared in social media purporting to show Russian-built Buk anti-aircraft missile launchers near the crash site.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 919 other followers