Archive
CRS — Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Kuwait was pivotal to two decades of U.S. efforts to end a strategic threat posed by Iraq, because of its location, its role as the object of past Iraqi aggression, and its close cooperation with the United States. Kuwait is a key to the U.S. ability to act militarily, if necessary, in the northern Persian Gulf region now that all U.S. forces have left Iraq. Kuwait’s relations with the postSaddam government in Iraq have been hampered by long-standing territorial, economic, and political issues unresolved from the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but those issues have been narrowed significantly since 2011. Kuwait is increasingly suspicious of Iranian intentions in the Gulf, aligning Kuwait with U.S. efforts to contain Iranian power in the Gulf and prevent Iran from exerting undue influence in post-withdrawal Iraq. Still, Kuwait maintains relatively normal economic and political relations with Iran so as not to provoke Iran militarily or prompt it to try to empower pro-Iranian elements in Kuwait.
Although Kuwait’s foreign policy fluctuates little, its political system has been in turmoil since 2006, and has deteriorated significantly since late 2012. Previously, political disputes in Kuwait had consisted of opposition within the elected National Assembly to the political dominance of the Al Sabah family. These disputes aggravated—and been aggravated by—schisms within rival branches of the ruling Al Sabah. The disputes produced five dissolutions of the National Assembly and new elections since 2006, the latest of which occurred on October 8, 2012, requiring new elections that were held on December 1, 2012.
During 2011-2012, there were relatively small demonstrations in Kuwait by opposition groups over official corruption, security force brutality, citizenship eligibility, and other issues. However, protests expanded significantly in late 2012 to challenge Sabah regime efforts to shape the December 1, 2012 elections to its advantage. Most oppositionists boycotted the December 1 elections, lowering the turnout but producing an overwhelmingly pro-government Assembly. Since the election, the opposition has continued its battle to reduce Sabah power through public protests, but the demonstrations sometimes are suspended after compromises with the government.
Even though opposition to Sabah rule has grown, the opposition still largely confines its demands to limiting Sabah power rather than ending the family’s rule. And, Kuwait remains a relatively wealthy society where most citizens do not want to risk their economic well-being to try to bring about the downfall of Al Sabah rule through violence. To try to contain the unrest, the government has used financial largesse—budgets loaded with subsidies and salary increases—as well as some repressive measures, including beatings and imprisonments. But, the many years of political paralysis have led to some economic stagnation as well, because parliamentary approval for several major investment projects, such as development of major oil fields in northern Kuwait, has been held up due to the infighting. The lack of economic vibrancy led to strikes in several economic sectors in 2012.
On other regional issues, in part because of its leadership turmoil, Kuwait tends to defer to consensus positions within the Gulf Cooperation Council; this deference is evident in Kuwait’s stances on the Israel-Palestinian dispute as well as on the uprisings in Yemen and Syria. On the uprising in Bahrain, in March 2011, Kuwait joined a Gulf Cooperation Council intervention on the side of the government, but unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Kuwait sent naval and not ground forces.
Widespread Middle East Fears that Syrian Violence Will Spread
Widespread Middle East Fears that Syrian Violence Will Spread
Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project
As concern mounts about the Syrian government’s possible use of chemical weapons against its own people, publics in the Middle East – especially the Lebanese – are extremely worried about violence spreading to neighboring countries. Nonetheless, a new survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted before news emerged of alleged use of chemical agents by the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, found little regional support for Western or Arab countries sending arms and military supplies to anti-government groups in Syria. And there is even greater opposition among American and European publics to such indirect Syrian involvement by their governments. A more recent Pew Research nationwide U.S. poll finds that hard evidence that Damascus has engaged in chemical warfare would only lead to a modest increase in American public support for an allied military effort in Syria.
Meanwhile, Assad is very unpopular throughout the region, except among Shia Muslims in Lebanon. In turn, Lebanese Muslims are divided over aid to the rebels. Most Sunnis back such assistance, while Shia overwhelmingly oppose it.
These are the key findings from a new survey by the Pew Research Center of 11,771 people in 12 countries from March 3 to April 7, 2013. Surveyed countries include Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian territories and Tunisia in the Middle East; Germany, France and Britain in Europe; and the United States and Russia.
CRS — Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, at the outbreak of the uprisings that swept several Middle Eastern leaders from power, has not come close to changing Bahrain’s regime into a constitutional monarchy. However, the mostly Shiite opposition shows no signs of ending its campaign to achieve that goal or, at the very least greatly increased political influence and rights. The crisis has demonstrated that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by reform efforts instituted since 1999.
Even though demonstrations against the government continue, the two sides have engaged in dialogue as well. A “national dialogue” held in July 2011 reached consensus on a few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest. The government asserts it implemented most of the 26 BICI recommendations, but outside human rights groups assessed that overall implementation was modest and incomplete. In January 2013, the perception within the government and the opposition that the political system could split apart entirely caused both sides to restart that dialogue. The two sides remain far apart, but the new, ongoing dialogue could produce some additional modest reforms and potentially represent incremental progress toward a solution to the crisis.
The Obama Administration has not called for an end to the Al Khalifa regime, but it has criticized the regime’s human rights abuses, urged it to undertake further political reform, and advanced ideas to narrow government-opposition differences. The U.S. criticism has angered some Al Khalifa officials but it has also been insufficient for human rights activists who assert that the United States is downplaying regime abuses because of U.S. dependence on the security relationship with Bahrain. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests—particularly the containment of Iran—by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years. The United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the Administration announced a resumption of other arms sales to Bahrain that it can potentially use to protect itself and support any military effort against Iran. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve political crises in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies and therefore lacks the resources to significantly improve Shiite standards of living. In 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained Bahrain’s economy.
CRS — The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The UAE’s relatively open borders and economy have won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in the Middle East while producing financial excesses, social ills such as human trafficking, and opportunity for Iranian businesses based there to try to circumvent international sanctions. The social and economic freedoms have not translated into significant political change; the UAE government remains under the control of a small circle of leaders, although it allows informal and some formal citizen participation to supplement traditional methods of consensusbuilding. To date, these mechanisms, economic wealth, and reverence for established leaders have enabled the UAE to avoid wide-scale popular unrest. Since 2006, the government has increased formal popular participation in governance through a public selection process for half the membership of its consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC). But, particularly since the Arab uprisings of 2011-12, discontent has risen somewhat over the unchallenged power and privileges of the UAE ruling elite as well as the government strategy of spending large amounts of funds on elaborate projects that cater to expatriates and international tourists. The leadership has resisted any dramatic or rapid further opening of the political process, and it is becoming increasingly aggressive in preventing the rise of Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamist as well as secular opposition movements. The crackdown is drawing increased criticism from human rights groups.
On foreign policy issues, the UAE—along with fellow Gulf state Qatar—has become increasingly assertive in recent years—a product of the UAE’s ample financial resources and its drive to promote regional stability. The UAE has joined the United States and U.S. allies in backing and then implementing most international sanctions against Iran, causing friction with its powerful northern neighbor. It has ordered the most sophisticated missile defense system sold by the United States, making the UAE pivotal to U.S. efforts to assemble a regional missile defense network directed primarily to counter Iran’s expanding missile force. The UAE has deployed troops to Afghanistan since 2003 and pledges to keep some forces there after the existing international security mission there ends in 2014. Since 2011, it has sent police to help the beleaguered government of fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state Bahrain, supported operations against Muammar Qadhafi of Libya, joined the GCC diplomatic effort that brokered a political solution to the unrest in Yemen, and financially backed rebels in Syria. It gives large amounts of international aid, for example for relief efforts in Somalia.
For the Obama Administration and many in Congress, there were early concerns about the UAE oversight and management of a complex and technically advanced initiative such as a nuclear power program. This was underscored by dissatisfaction among some Members of Congress with a U.S.-UAE civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement was signed on May 21, 2009, submitted to Congress that day, and entered into force on December 17, 2009. Concerns about potential leakage of U.S. and other advanced technologies through the UAE to Iran, in particular, have been largely alleviated by the UAE’s development of strict controls, capable management, and cooperation with international oversight of its nuclear program.
CRS — Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Ten years after the March 19, 2003, U.S. military intervention to oust Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, accelerating violence and growing political schisms call into question whether the fragile stability left in place after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will collapse. Iraq’s stability is increasingly threatened by a revolt—with both peaceful and violent components—by Sunni Arab Muslims who resent Shiite political domination. Sunni Arabs, always fearful that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would seek unchallenged power, accuse him of attempting to marginalize them politically in part by arresting or attempting to remove key Sunni leaders. Sunni demonstrations have grown since late December 2012 and some have led to protester deaths. Iraq’s Kurds are increasingly aligned with the Sunnis, based on their own disputes with Maliki over territorial, political, and economic issues. The Shiite faction of Moqtada Al Sadr has been leaning to the Sunnis and Kurds, and could hold the key to Maliki’s political survival. Adding to the schisms is the physical incapacity of President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd who has served as a key mediator, who suffered a stroke in mid-December 2012 and remains outside Iraq. The rifts have impinged on provincial elections on April 20, 2013, and will likely affect national elections for a new parliament and government in 2014. Maliki is expected to seek to retain his post in that vote.
The violent component of Sunni unrest is spearheaded by the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). The group, apparently emboldened by the Sunni-led uprising in Syria, is conducting attacks against Shiite neighborhoods and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members with increasing frequency and lethality. The attacks are intended to reignite all-out sectarian conflict, and some fear that goal might be realized. Should the violence escalate further, there are concerns whether the ISF—which numbers nearly 700,000 members—can counter it now that U.S. troops are no longer in Iraq.
U.S. forces left in December 2011 in line with a November 2008 bilateral U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Iraq refused to extend the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, seeking to put behind it the period of U.S. political and military tutelage and arguing that the ISF could handle violence on its own. Since the U.S. pullout, many observers assert that U.S. influence over Iraq has ebbed significantly. Cornerstone programs of what were to be enduring, close security relations—U.S. training for Iraq’s security forces through an Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I) and a State Department police development program—have languished. The U.S. civilian presence in Iraq has declined from about 17,000 to about 10,500 as of March 2013, and might fall to 5,500 by the end of 2013. However, the Administration—with increasing Iraqi concurrence—has asserted that the escalating violence necessitates that Iraq rededicate itself to military cooperation with and assistance from the United States. In December 2012 signed a new defense cooperation agreement with the United States.
Although recognizing that Iraq wants to rebuild its relations in its immediate neighborhood, the United States is seeking to prevent Iraq from falling under the sway of Iran. The Maliki government has built close relations with the Islamic Republic. Apparently fearing that a change of regime in Syria will further embolden the Iraqi Sunni opposition, Maliki has joined Iran in supporting Bashar Al Assad’s regime. However, the legacy of Iran-Iraq hostilities, and Arab and Persian differences, limit Iranian influence among the Iraqi population. Another limitation on Iranian influence is Iraq’s effort to reestablish its historic role as a major player in the Arab world. Iraq took a large step toward returning to the Arab fold by hosting an Arab League summit on March 27-29, 2012.
Country Analysis Brief: Iraq
Country Analysis Brief: Iraq
Source: Energy Information Administration
Iraq was the world’s eighth largest producer of total petroleum liquids in 2012, and it has the world’s fifth largest proven petroleum reserves after Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Canada, and Iran. Just a fraction of Iraq’s known fields are in development, and Iraq may be one of the few places left where much of its known hydrocarbon resources has not been fully exploited. Iraq’s energy sector is heavily based on oil. Over 90 percent of its energy needs are met with petroleum (2010 estimate), with the rest supplied by natural gas and hydropower.
Iraq has begun to develop its oil and natural gas reserves after years of sanctions and wars, but it will need to develop its infrastructure in order to reach its production potential. According to estimates by Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister for Energy, capital expenditures of $30 billion per year in Iraqi energy infrastructure are required to meet Iraq’s production targets. Progress has been hampered by political disputes and the lack of a law to govern development of Iraq’s oil and gas. The proposed Hydrocarbon Law, which would govern contracting and regulation, has been under review in the Council of Ministers since October 26, 2008, but has not received final passage.
Country Analysis Brief: Iran
Country Analysis Brief: Iran
Source: Energy Information Administration
Iran, a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), ranks among the world’s top four holders of both proven oil and natural gas reserves. In 2012, Iran saw unprecedented drops in its oil exports as sanctions by the United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU) were tightened, targeting Iranian oil export revenues. Preliminary data show that Iran ranked fifth in terms of crude oil and condensate exports, which was in contrast to its third position only two years ago. Given the sanctions and resulting drop in production, export volumes likely will continue to be hampered.
Iran has the world’s second largest natural gas reserves, but the sector is underdeveloped and used mostly to meet domestic demand. In contrast to the decreasing oil production, natural gas development has been slowly expanding. Nonetheless, natural gas production has been lower than expected as a result of a lack of foreign investment and technology.
Syria at the Crossroads: United States Policy and Recommendations for the Way Forward
Syria at the Crossroads: United States Policy and Recommendations for the Way Forward (PDF)
Source: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (Rice University)
From press release (EurekAlert!):
As Syria’s raging civil war approaches the two-year mark, the United States should prepare a more focused strategy that strengthens the moderate political forces in Syria and engages Syria’s regional and international stakeholders, according to a new special report from Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The report also recommends that U.S. strategy should buttress Syria’s neighbors, address the deepening humanitarian crisis and plans for a post-Assad Syria.
The special report, "Syria at the Crossroads: United States Policy and Recommendations for the Way Forward," was co-authored by Edward Djerejian, founding director of the Baker Institute and a former U.S. ambassador to Syria and Israel, and Andrew Bowen, the Baker Institute’s scholar for the Middle East. It highlights the deepening challenges Syria faces and provides substantive policy recommendations for the U.S. government in securing a multi-ethnic, democratic Syria.
"Given the absence of a negotiated political settlement and the prolonged military stalemate on the ground, the U.S., engaging its partners in the international community, should act to preserve the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of the Syrian state and help the Syrian people transition to a broadly representative government and a country at peace with its neighbors," Djerejian said. "While a renewed U.S. and EU engagement with Russia is needed to help reach a political solution in Syria, immediate steps should be taken to support and to buttress both the moderate forces in Syria and Syria’s neighbors, who are vulnerable to the continued crisis."
The special report recommends that the U.S. should consider supplying military assistance to vetted leaders of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in an effort to support the moderate opposition, protect Syrian civilians and abate extremists. In addition, the U.S., in conjunction with NATO, should form a joint special operations command in Turkey to monitor the distribution of this assistance and provide logistical support, communications and training to vetted commanders. "What is needed is to combine military assistance with a coordinated strategy of capacity building within the opposition, which can then have measurable results and importantly, not lead the U.S. into any overextended commitment," Bowen said.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Concerns with Major Construction Projects at the Office of Environmental Management and NNSA
GAO-13-484T, Mar 20, 2013
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Causes and Consequences of Recent Failures of Community Banks
GAO-13-476T, Mar 20, 2013
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN
Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Emergency Food Aid and Assess Security Assistance
GAO-13-310, Mar 20, 2013
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
DHS Needs to Enhance Management of Major Investments
GAO-13-478T
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
Evaluations Needed to Determine Effectiveness of U.S. Aid to Lebanon’s Security Forces
GAO-13-289
VETERAN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESSES
Planning and Data System for VA’s Verification Program Need Improvement
GAO-13-425T
Adverse health consequences of the Iraq War
Adverse health consequences of the Iraq War
Source: The Lancet
The adverse health consequences of the Iraq War (2003—11) were profound. We conclude that at least 116 903 Iraqi non-combatants and more than 4800 coalition military personnel died over the 8-year course. Many Iraqi civilians were injured or became ill because of damage to the health-supporting infrastructure of the country, and about 5 million were displaced. More than 31 000 US military personnel were injured and a substantial percentage of those deployed suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, and other neuropsychological disorders and their concomitant psychosocial problems. Many family members of military personnel had psychological problems. Further review of the adverse health consequences of this war could help to minimise the adverse health consequences of, and help to prevent, future wars.
Free registration required to access full text.
Syria as an Arena of Strategic Competition
Syria as an Arena of Strategic Competition
Source: RAND Corporation
Less than two years since the beginning of the uprising in Syria, localized protests have morphed into full-blown civil conflict. Along with internal escalation, the conflict has drawn in external actors, including Syria’s neighbors and extra-regional powers. With the regional balance of power hinging on the conflict’s outcome, Middle Eastern and extra-regional states have taken sides — some in support of the Assad regime, others in support of the opposition. RAND convened a group of 26 experts who cover Syria and the various external players to participate in an analytic exercise on November 16, 2012, to generate a greater understanding of the parties and issues in play. The report begins by analyzing what is driving both regional (e.g., Iran and Saudi Arabia) and extra-regional (e.g., Russia) players to intervene in the Syrian conflict. It then proceeds to look at the internal actors (e.g., the Free Syrian Army and Alawite community) that may operate as conduits of external influence. The report concludes with an examination of the relationships between external and internal actors and possible effects of these groups’ actions.
CRS — Arab League Boycott of Israel
Arab League Boycott of Israel (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Office)
The Arab League, an umbrella organization comprising 22 Middle Eastern and African countries and entities, has maintained an official boycott of Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods since the founding of Israel in 1948. The boycott is administered by the Damascus-based Central Boycott Office, a specialized bureau of the Arab League.
The boycott has three tiers. The primary boycott prohibits citizens of an Arab League member from buying from, selling to, or entering into a business contract with either the Israeli government or an Israeli citizen. The secondary boycott extends the primary boycott to any entity world-wide that does business in Israel. A blacklist of global firms that engage in business with Israel is maintained by the Central Boycott Office, and disseminated to Arab League members. The tertiary boycott prohibits an Arab League member and its nationals from doing business with a company that deals with companies that have been blacklisted by the Arab League.
Since the boycott is sporadically applied and ambiguously enforced, its impact, measured by capital or revenue denied to Israel by companies adhering to the boycott, is difficult to measure. The effect of the primary boycott appears limited since intra-regional trade and investment are small. Enforcement of the secondary and tertiary boycotts has decreased over time, reducing their effect. Thus, it appears that since intra-regional trade is small, and that the secondary and tertiary boycotts are not aggressively enforced, the boycott may not currently have an extensive effect on the Israeli economy.
Despite the lack of economic impact on either Israeli or Arab economies, the boycott remains of strong symbolic importance to all parties. The U.S. government has often been at the forefront of international efforts to end the boycott and its enforcement. Despite U.S. efforts, however, many Arab League countries continue to support the boycott’s enforcement. U.S. legislative action related to the boycott dates from 1959 and includes multiple statutory provisions expressing U.S. opposition to the boycott, usually in foreign assistance legislation. In 1977, Congress passed laws making it illegal for U.S. companies to cooperate with the boycott and authorizing the imposition of civil and criminal penalties against U.S. violators. U.S. companies are required to report to the Department of Commerce any requests to comply with the Arab League Boycott.
The current list of countries that request U.S. companies to participate or agree to participate in boycotts prohibited under U.S. law includes Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
This report provides background information on the boycott and U.S. efforts to end its enforcement. More information on Israel is contained in CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
Learning From Iraq: A Final Report From the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Learning From Iraq: A Final Report From the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
A Final Report From the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction culminates SIGIR’s nine-year mission overseeing Iraq’s reconstruction. It serves as a follow-up to our previous comprehensive review of the rebuilding effort, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.
This study provides much more than a recapitulation of what the reconstruction program accomplished and what my office found in the interstices. While examining both of these issues and many more, Learning From Iraq importantly captures the effects of the rebuilding program as derived from 44 interviews with the recipients (the Iraqi leadership), the executors (U.S. senior leaders), and the providers (congressional members). These interviews piece together an instructive picture of what was the largest stabilization and reconstruction operation ever undertaken by the United States (until recently overtaken by Afghanistan).
The body of this report reveals countless details about the use of more than $60 billion in taxpayer dollars to support programs and projects in Iraq. It articulates numerous lessons derived from SIGIR’s 220 audits and 170 inspections, and it lists the varying consequences meted out from the 82 convictions achieved through our investigations. It urges and substantiates necessary reforms that could improve stabilization and reconstruction operations, and it highlights the financial benefits accomplished by SIGIR’s work: more than $1.61 billion from audits and over $191 million from investigations.
The Media Economics and Cultural Politics Of Al Jazeera English in the United States
The Media Economics and Cultural Politics Of Al Jazeera English in the United States (PDF)
Source: University of Michigan (Youmans)
Before scholarship can consider the greater implications of AJE’s brand of reporting on world affairs, it is necessary to begin with a mapping of the actuality of AJE’s circulation – the focus of this thesis. This immediately generates a problem. The United States is the key market implied in these theoretical approaches given its centricity in international communication. Yet, AJE is not reachable by the vast majority of Americans’ remote controls. This necessarily dampens analysis of wider effects on power and inter-cultural conflict. Before considering impact, we must take an inventory of where and how AJE travels in the country – and why. There are distributional exceptions to its absence, including large centers, such as Washington, DC and parts of New York City, as well as limited cities such as Burlington, VT and Toledo, OH. While it is fully available online, an increasingly key avenue for American news viewership, Internet news consumption is still secondary to TV – one motivation for AJE’s active pursuit of cable deals in the largest majority English-speaking news market. For AJE, distribution in the United States has been a primary goal and source of frustration, despite its easy availability via the Internet. AJE sees cable in particular as the best way to reach, and therefore influence, a wide American audience – which is one of the most vital news markets in the world, given the country’s disproportionate role in world affairs. The primary question of interest is why has it failed to gain wide TV availability and therefore a large audience? A second question is, what does AJE’s absence mean for international communication, US-Arab relations and the channel itself? This study seeks to identify and examine the factors and constraints that keep AJE largely off of American televisions and relate these to the larger theoretical questions posited in AJE and global communication scholarship. Also, there are key junctures, such as the Arab Spring, which rejuvenated the network’s reputation in key quarters of American society. These moments illuminate further how the factors work in explaining AJE’s lack of distribution.
Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan
Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan
Source: RAND Corporation
The Demands Placed Upon the Army by Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
- The Army has provided the bulk of U.S. troops to Iraq and Afghanistan: over 1.5 million troop-years as of December 2011, and 54 percent of all active component troop-year deployments within the area of operations.
- Since 2008, the cumulative amount of time that a soldier has spent deployed has increased (on average) by 28 percent. In contrast, the percentage "not yet deployed" and the Army’s unutilized capacity to deploy have both decreased.
- As of December 2011, roughly 73 percent of active component soldiers had deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, an increase of 6 percentage points since December 2008. Most of these soldiers were working on their second, third, or fourth year of cumulative deployed duty.
- Most of the remaining 27 percent are not yet deployed, since they are recent recruits, are forward-stationed in other overseas locations, or have contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and/or Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn without deploying.
- The Army retains very little unutilized capacity to deploy additional active component soldiers without increasing the burden on those who have already deployed.
Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First
Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First
Source: International Journal of Press/Politics
The goal of this article is to place the role that social media plays in collective action within a more general theoretical structure, using the events of the Arab Spring as a case study. The article presents two broad theoretical principles. The first is that one cannot understand the role of social media in collective action without first taking into account the political environment in which they operate. The second principle states that a significant increase in the use of the new media is much more likely to follow a significant amount of protest activity than to precede it. The study examines these two principles using political, media, and protest data from twenty Arab countries and the Palestinian Authority. The findings provide strong support for the validity of the claims.
Hat tip: Journalist’s Resource
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
DEFENSE CONTRACTING
Actions Needed to Explore Additional Opportunities to Gain Efficiencies in Acquiring Foreign Language Support
GAO-13-251R, Feb 25, 2013
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
Firms Reported to Have Engaged in Activities Related to Iran’s Energy and Communications Sectors While Having Had U.S. Government Contracts
GAO-13-344R, Feb 25, 2013
IRAN
U.S. and International Sanctions Have Adversely Affected the Iranian Economy
GAO-13-326, Feb 25, 2013
WATER QUALITY
EPA Faces Challenges in Addressing Damage Caused by Airborne Pollutants
GAO-13-39, Jan 24, 2013
WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH
Further Steps by OSHA Would Enhance Monitoring of Enforcement and Effectiveness
GAO-13-61, Jan 24, 2013
CRS — U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom (February 5, 2013)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military casualties in the active Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan), as well as operations that have ended: Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq). This report includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), amputations, evacuations, and the demographics of casualties. Some of these statistics are publicly available at the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) website, whereas others have been obtained through contact with experts at DOD.
This report will be updated as needed.
RAND Review: Vol. 36, No. 3, Winter 2012-2013
RAND Review: Vol. 36, No. 3, Winter 2012-2013
Source: RAND Corporation
Feature stories discuss the promotion of tolerance and critical thinking in the Arab world through children’s media, the challenges faced by the United States in an era of fiscal austerity, and promising models for measuring teacher performance. Two other stories highlight the National Science Foundation’s role in promoting research in the United States and how RAND is helping several countries to foster technological innovation.
