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Archive for the ‘Pakistan’ Category

Select Diaspora Populations in the United States

July 24, 2014 Comments off

Select Diaspora Populations in the United States
Source: Migration Policy Institute

Diaspora populations often perform essential functions in the economic and human capital development of their countries of origin, and can continue playing a strong role in shaping these countries long after they or their forebears departed.The Rockefeller Foundation and the Aspen Institute have launched the Rockefeller-Aspen Diaspora Program (RAD), a joint venture to better understand diaspora members’ financial and human capital investments and to design an approach to foster further growth in these areas. The Migration Policy Institute has partnered with RAD to produce profiles of 15 diaspora communities in the United States, which is home to nearly 60 million first- or second-generation immigrants.

These profiles address 15 different diaspora populations in the United States, gathering in one place key data and analysis on diasporas from Bangladesh, Colombia, El Salvador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, India, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Each profile explores the demographic characteristics of first- and second-generation immigrants in a particular diaspora, their educational attainment, household income, employment patterns, geographic distribution, and remittance volume.

Five longer profiles, focusing on Colombia, Egypt, India, Kenya, and the Philippines, also detail historical immigration pathways and contemporary entry trends, poverty status, active diaspora organizations, and country-of-origin policies and institutions related to interaction with emigrants and their descendants abroad.

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Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context

June 12, 2014 Comments off

Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context
Source: RAND Corporation

This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. “small-footprint” partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report’s findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small-footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as “success stories” all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Such a verdict is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; rather, it is meant to highlight that similar U.S. policies with less promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. The majority of insurgencies have taken place in worst-case conditions, and in these environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to end rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships.

CRS — Major U.S. Arms Sales and Grants to Pakistan Since 2001

March 31, 2014 Comments off

Major U.S. Arms Sales and Grants to Pakistan Since 2001 (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

Major U.S. arms sales and grants to Pakistan since 2001 have included items useful for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, along with a number of “big ticket” platforms more suited to conventional warfare. In dollar value terms, the bulk of purchases have been made with Pakistani national funds, although U.S. grants have eclipsed these in recent years. The Pentagon reports total Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan worth about $5.2 billion for FY2002-FY2012 (sales of F-16 combat aircraft and related equipment account for about half of this). Congress has appropriated more than $3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Pakistan since 2001, more than $2 billion of which has been disbursed. These funds are used to purchase U.S. military equipment for longer-term modernization efforts. Pakistan has also been granted U.S. defense supplies as Excess Defense Articles (EDA).

CRS — Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2015

March 19, 2014 Comments off

Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2015 (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. State Department Foreign Press Center)
Chart

CRS — Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2015

March 10, 2014 Comments off

Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2015 (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Chart

Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context

February 28, 2014 Comments off

Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context
Source: RAND Corporation

This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. “small-footprint” partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report’s findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small-footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as “success stories” all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Such a verdict is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; rather, it is meant to highlight that similar U.S. policies with less promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. The majority of insurgencies have taken place in worst-case conditions, and in these environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to end rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships.

Reorienting U.S. Pakistan Strategy

January 22, 2014 Comments off

Reorienting U.S. Pakistan Strategy
Source: Council on Foreign Relations

As U.S. and coalition forces prepare to draw down troops in Afghanistan, this new report urges Washington to view Pakistan not solely or even principally in the context of U.S.-Afghanistan policy, but rather to reorient the relationship toward Asia. “A U.S. strategy for Asia that does not contemplate Pakistan’s role is incomplete, and a U.S. strategy for Pakistan that primarily considers its role in the context of Afghanistan is shortsighted,” writes the report’s author, Daniel S. Markey, CFR senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia.

“Will I Be Next?” U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan

October 23, 2013 Comments off

“Will I Be Next?” U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan (PDF)
Source: Amnesty International

This report is not a comprehensive survey of US drone strikes in Pakistan; it is a qualitative assessment based on detailed field research into nine of the 45 reported strikes that occurred in Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal agency between January 2012 and August 2013 (see Appendix) and a survey of publicly available information on all reported drone strikes in Pakistan over the same period.

An area bordering Afghanistan, North Waziristan is one of the seven tribal agencies that make up the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Tribal Areas), a loosely-governed territory in northwest Pakistan that has been the focus of all US drone strikes in the country. Research was also carried out on the general impact of the US drone program on life in North Waziristan, as well as attacks by Pakistani forces and armed groups. The report highlights incidents in which men, women and children appear to have been unlawfully killed or injured. By examining these attacks in detail, Amnesty International seeks to shed light on a secretive program of surveillance and killings occurring in one of the most dangerous, neglected and inaccessible regions of the world.

Rethinking Pakistan’s Development Choices: Contributions to the Emerging Agenda

August 23, 2013 Comments off

Rethinking Pakistan’s Development Choices: Contributions to the Emerging Agenda
Source: World Bank

In recent years, the World Bank has had the honor and privilege of welcoming incoming administrations with a series of diagnostics studies and policy choices. Continuing this practice, the World Bank has put together a Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) and a series of 16 sector-specific Policy Notes for the incoming governments. Whereas the CEM focuses on conditions for growth acceleration and jobs creation, the Policy Notes are wide-ranging, and look at issues from improving inclusion and human development, enhancing economic growth and providing jobs, and improving governance and accountability.

This effort is meant to facilitate a broad understanding of key topics and support a creative dialogue around menus of policy options, while being informative in the spirit of knowledge-exchange. Ultimately, both publications aim to help the incoming governments achieve their ambitious economic and social goals along with the Bank’s mission of fighting poverty and achieving shared prosperity.

Accelerated economic growth in Pakistan has been possible in the past, and it can be again. Pakistan’s economy has shown it can be very resilient in preserving growth and poverty reduction despite civil conflicts, natural disasters, and complex political transitions.

To achieve rapid growth, Pakistan has many “positives”. These positives include the legitimacy of its institutions, capacity to implement national projects, growth in remittances, natural resource base, potential in food production and mining, its strategic location, and the rapid growth of women in the labor force. These positives can help reinvigorate the economy.

In such regard, the CEM and Policy Notes have three main messages:

  1. Pakistan must aim to achieve higher growth linked to more and better jobs – especially among women and youth.
  2. Pakistan must strive for inclusion and improving human capital as a cornerstone of rebuilding productivity.
  3. Pakistan can sustain its growth, jobs, and inclusion agenda only by enhancing governance and accountability.

CRS — Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (7/1/13)

July 15, 2013 Comments off

Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. State Department Foreign Press Center)

In the post-2001 era, the United States has viewed Pakistan as a key ally, especially in the context of counterterrorism and Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance both historically and in recent years, although assistance levels have has fluctuated considerably over the decades of Pakistani independence. In the wake of 9/11, however, aid to Pakistan increased steadily. Since 1948, the United States has pledged more than $30 billion in direct aid, about half for military assistance, and more than two-thirds appropriated in the post-2001 period. Many observers question the gains accrued to date, variously identifying poor planning, lack of both transparency and capacity, corruption, and slow reform by the Pakistani government as major obstacles. Moreover, any goodwill generated by U.S. aid is offset by widespread and intense anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people.

Developments in 2011 put immense strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future direction of the U.S. aid program. Relations have remained tense since that time, although civilian aid has continued to flow and substantive defense transfers are set to resume later in 2013. Disruptions in 2011 included the killing of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani city and a NATO military raid into Pakistani territory near Afghanistan that inadvertently left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead. The latter development led Islamabad to bar U.S. and NATO access to vital ground lines of communication (GLOCs) linking Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea for a period of more than seven months. More recently, the 113 th Congress is focusing on measures to reduce the federal budget deficit. This backdrop appears to be further influencing debate over assistance levels to a top- ranking recipient that many say lacks accountability and even credibility as a U.S. ally. For many lawmakers, the core issue remains balancing Pakistan’s strategic importance to the United States—not least its role in Afghan reconciliation efforts—with the pervasive and mutual distrust bedeviling the bilateral relationship. The 111 th Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73) authorizing the President to provide $1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary aid to Pakistan for five years (FY2010-FY2014) and requiring annual certification for release of security-related aid. Such conditionality is a contentious issue. Congress also established two new funds in 2009, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF, within Defense Department appropriations) and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF, within State-Foreign Operations Appropriations). The 112 th Congress enacted further conditions and limitations on assistance.

Among these were certification requirements for nearly all FY2012 assistance (in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012—P.L. 112-74) and for FY2013 Coalition Support Funds (CSF, military reimbursements funded out of the Pentagon) and PCF (in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013—P.L. 112-239). Similar provisions appear in pending FY2014 legislation. In September 2012, the Administration waived FY2012 certification requirements under included national security provisions and, in February 2013, it issued a waiver to allow for the transfer of major defense equipment in FY2013.

The Administration has requested nearly $1.2 billion economic and security aid to Pakistan for FY2014. This represents a steep decline from total FY2012 assistance of about $1.9 billion (excluding CSF). Estimated FY2013 allocations are not yet available. This report will be updated as warranted by events. For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations , by K. Alan Kronstadt. See also CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements , by Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt.

A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India

June 27, 2013 Comments off

A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India
Source: Brookings Institution

With the U.S. and its allies planning to scale down their military efforts significantly in Afghanistan in 2014, a dangerous neighborhood—filled with nuclear weapons, disputed borders, as well as ethnic and tribal divisions—has the potential to become even more threatening. In the first Brookings Essay, historian William Dalrymple examines one ominous scenario, which could be disastrous for both the region and the world: the contest between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan becoming even more deadly.

New From the GAO

May 7, 2013 Comments off

New GAO Reports

Source: Government Accountability Office

CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM

Status of the Program and Financial Health of Remaining Participants
GAO-13-458, May 7, 2013

PAKISTAN

Reporting on Visa Delays That Disrupt U.S. Assistance Could Be Improved

GAO-13-427, May 7, 2013

VA CONSTRUCTION

Additional Actions Needed to Decrease Delays and Lower Costs of Major Medical-Facility Projects
GAO-13-556T, May 7, 2013

CRS — Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations

April 23, 2013 Comments off

Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations (PDF)

Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)

Seven nations—China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—possess nuclear weapons. North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006, and announced that it had conducted a test in 2009 and another in 2013. Israel is widely thought to have nuclear weapons. As an aid to Congress in understanding nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and arms control matters, this report describes which agency is responsible for research and development (R&D) of nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices, as distinct from the bombers and missiles that deliver them) in these nations and whether these agencies are civilian or military. It also traces the history of such agencies in the United States from 1942 to the present. This report will be updated annually, or more often as developments warrant.

In the United States, the Army managed the nuclear weapons program during World War II. Since 1946, weapons R&D has been managed by civilian agencies, at present by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy. Concerns about “the immediate and long-term issues associated with the NNSA,” however, led Congress to establish the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-239. China’s nuclear weapons R&D is apparently under the direction of the military, collectively called the People’s Liberation Army.

France’s nuclear weapons R&D is supervised by the Ministry of Defense, which delegates the direction of these programs to the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission (CEA). However, as with NNSA in the United States, CEA is not a part of the Ministry of Defense. CEA also conducts nuclear programs in science and industry under the supervision of other ministries.

India’s nuclear weapons R&D appears to be controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy, which is under the direct control of the Prime Minister.

Israel’s nuclear program is under civilian control, but since Israel neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons, it classifies information on such weapons, including organizations responsible for R&D. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission reportedly has overall responsibility for Israel’s nuclear weapons program, and the Director General of that commission reports directly to the Prime Minister.

North Korea’s Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry is in charge of the day-to-day operation of the nuclear weapons program. Under it are nuclear-related organizations. Policy is decided by leader Kim Jong-un and other Communist Party and military leaders who advise him.

Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan’s organizations involved in nuclear weapons R&D and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces. The Prime Minister is the chair of the NCA, and membership includes senior civilian and military leaders.

Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is responsible for nuclear weapons R&D and production. It is a civilian agency, though it has many links to the military.

In the United Kingdom, a private company, AWE Management Limited, manages and operates the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), a government-owned, contractor-operated entity. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), which is headed by a civilian, controls the operations, policy, and direction of AWE and can veto actions of the company. The MoD provides most of the funding for AWE.

CRS — Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2014

April 23, 2013 Comments off

Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2014 (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)

Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service for distribution to multiple congressional offices, April 11, 2013.

When Armies Divide: The Security of Nuclear Arsenals During Revolts, Coups, and Civil Wars

April 17, 2013 Comments off

When Armies Divide: The Security of Nuclear Arsenals During Revolts, Coups, and Civil Wars

Source: RAND Corporation

This work examines what happened in April of 1961, when the French government was about to conduct the fourth of a series of nuclear tests in the Sahara. Four French Army generals, unhappy that de Gaulle was willing to support Algerian independence, staged a coup to keep Algeria as a French colony. The nuclear test was conducted a few days ahead of schedule — it was not successful — and speculation ever since has been that the test was moved up to keep the weapon out of the rebel generals’ hands.

While there is evidence that one of the generals contacted the officer who was in charge of the tests to try to delay them, Jenkins concludes that the generals really never had a plan in place to seize the weapon and that the French government didn’t want to delay the test. At the time it happened, the world viewed it as an internal, French problem.

The second, shorter part of the book compares the 1961 events to what might happen today if the military in Pakistan or North Korea splintered, and a rebel group got their hands on those countries’ nuclear materials. Jenkins contends that such a scenario today would clearly be an international incident, that neither Pakistan nor North Korea would want any foreign intervention, and that the United States "might not be the only first responder."

Two additional short essays by Dr. Stephen J. Lukasik and Constantin Melnik, a security assistant to the French prime minister in 1961, also review what happened in 1961.

CRS — Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

February 18, 2013 Comments off

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan.

Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear- related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s security situation in recent years.

However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.

The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013

February 15, 2013 Comments off

The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013
Source: New America Foundation

The purpose of this database is to provide as much information as possible about the covert U.S. drone program in Pakistan in the absence of any such transparency on the part of the American government. This data was collected from credible news reports and is presented here with the relevant sources. You can read more about our methodology here.

This database was originally published in February 2010 by Katherine Tiedemann, then a Policy Analyst at the New America Foundation, and was later added to by Andrew Lebovich, then a Program Associate at the New America Foundation, both working with Peter Bergen, director of New America’s National Security Studies Program.

That database underwent a comprehensive review in the summer of 2012. As part of this process we established an updated methodology for counting strikes and deaths, incorporated additional news reports about the drone strikes, and presented the data in a revised format for greater clarity.

This review was undertaken by Meg Braun, a Rhodes Scholar working towards her MPhil in International Relations at St. John’s College at Oxford University, Fatima Mustafa, a Pakistani PhD candidate in Political Science at Boston University, Farhad Peikar, an Afghan journalist and masters student at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Public Policy, and Jennifer Rowland, a Program Associate with the New America Foundation working together with Peter Bergen. We are also grateful to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism for their work on this topic.

CRS — Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (Updated)

October 15, 2012 Comments off

Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (PDF)

Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

The 112th Congress has focused on measures to reduce the federal budget deficit. This backdrop may continue to influence congressional debate over a top-ranking U.S. aid recipient, Pakistan—a country vital to U.S. national security interests but that some say lacks accountability and even credibility as a U.S. ally.

Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance both historically and in recent years. The country arguably is as important to forwarding U.S. security interests as any in the world. Developments in 2011 put immense strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future direction of U.S. aid to Pakistan. Disruptions included the May killing of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani city and a November NATO military raid into Pakistani territory near Afghanistan that inadvertently left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead. For many lawmakers, the core issue remains balancing Pakistan’s strategic importance to the United States with the pervasive and mounting distrust in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, as well as with budget deficit-reduction pressures.

U.S. assistance to Pakistan has fluctuated considerably over the past 60 years. In the wake of 9/11, however, aid to Pakistan increased steadily as the Bush and Obama Administrations both characterized Pakistan as a crucial U.S. partner in efforts to combat terrorism and to promote stability in both Afghanistan and South Asia. Since 1948, the United States has pledged more than $30 billion in direct aid, about half for military assistance. Two-thirds of this total was appropriated in the post-9/11 era from FY2002 to FY2011. Many observers question the gains accrued to date, viewing a lack of accountability and reform by the Pakistani government as major obstacles. Moreover, any goodwill generated by U.S. aid is offset by widespread and intense anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people.

In 2009, Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73). The law authorizes the President to provide $1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary aid to Pakistan for FY2010 through FY2014 and requires annual certification for release of security-related aid; such conditionality is a contentious issue. Congress also established two new funds in 2009—the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) within the Defense Department appropriations and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund within the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations—to help build Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities. When $1.5 billion in “coalition support fund” military reimbursements are added to economic and security aid totals, the United States provided a total of $4.3 billion for Pakistan for FY2010 alone, making it the second-highest recipient after Afghanistan. In addition to these ongoing programs, the United States pledged about $700 million in a response to extensive mid-2010 flooding in Pakistan.

In its Second Session, the 112th Congress considered and, in some cases, enacted further conditions and limitations on assistance to Pakistan. Among these was a new certification requirement in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74). Moreover, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81) would withhold 60% of any FY2012 appropriations for PCF unless the Secretary of Defense reports to Congress a strategy for the use of such funds and the metrics for determining their effectiveness, among other provisions.

This report will be updated as warranted by events. For broader discussion of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. See also CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements, by Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt.

India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region

August 10, 2012 Comments off

India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
Source: RAND Corporation

India and Pakistan have very different visions for Afghanistan, and they seek to advance highly disparate interests through their respective engagements in the country. Pakistan views Afghanistan primarily as an environment in which to pursue its rivalry with India. India pursues domestic priorities (such as reining in anti-Indian terrorism, accessing Central Asian energy resources, and increasing trade) that require Afghanistan to experience stability and economic growth. Thus, whereas Pakistan seeks to fashion an Afghan state that would detract from regional security, India would enhance Afghanistan’s stability, security, economic growth, and regional integration. Afghanistan would welcome greater involvement from India, though it will need to accommodate the interests of multiple other external powers as well. India has a range of options for engaging Afghanistan, from continuing current activities to increasing economic and commercial ties, deploying forces to protect Indian facilities, continuing or expanding training for Afghan forces, or deploying combat troops for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. To avoid antagonizing Pakistan, India is likely to increase economic and commercial engagement while maintaining, or perhaps augmenting, military training, though it will continue to conduct such training inside India. Increased Indian engagement in Afghanistan, particularly enhanced Indian assistance to Afghan security forces, will advance long-term U.S. objectives in central and south Asia. As the United States prepares to withdraw its combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014, it should therefore encourage India to fill the potential vacuum by adopting an increasingly assertive political, economic, and security strategy that includes increased security assistance.

New From the GAO

July 12, 2012 Comments off

New GAO Reports and Testimony

Source: Government Accountability Office

+ Reports

1. Bankruptcy: Agencies Continue Rulemakings for Clarifying Specific Provisions of Orderly Liquidation Authority. GAO-12-735, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-735
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592317.pdf

2. Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-800
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592372.pdf

3. Trade Adjustment Assistance: USDA Has Enhanced Technical Assistance for Farmers and Fishermen, but Steps Are Needed to Better Evaluate Program Effectiveness. GAO-12-731, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-731
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592321.pdf

4. Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund: Transparency of Balances and Controls over Equitable Sharing Should Be Improved. GAO-12-736, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-736
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592350.pdf

5. Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment. GAO-12-517, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-517
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592360.pdf

6. Human Capital: HHS and EPA Can Improve Practices Under Special Hiring Authorities. GAO-12-692, July 9.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-692
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592200.pdf

+ Testimony

1. Counterterrorism: U.S. Agencies Face Challenges Countering the Use of Improvised Explosive Devices in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Region, by Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-907T, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-907T

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