Archive
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM
Status of the Program and Financial Health of Remaining Participants
GAO-13-458, May 7, 2013
PAKISTAN
Reporting on Visa Delays That Disrupt U.S. Assistance Could Be Improved
GAO-13-427, May 7, 2013
VA CONSTRUCTION
Additional Actions Needed to Decrease Delays and Lower Costs of Major Medical-Facility Projects
GAO-13-556T, May 7, 2013
CRS — Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations
Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Seven nations—China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—possess nuclear weapons. North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006, and announced that it had conducted a test in 2009 and another in 2013. Israel is widely thought to have nuclear weapons. As an aid to Congress in understanding nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and arms control matters, this report describes which agency is responsible for research and development (R&D) of nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices, as distinct from the bombers and missiles that deliver them) in these nations and whether these agencies are civilian or military. It also traces the history of such agencies in the United States from 1942 to the present. This report will be updated annually, or more often as developments warrant.
In the United States, the Army managed the nuclear weapons program during World War II. Since 1946, weapons R&D has been managed by civilian agencies, at present by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy. Concerns about “the immediate and long-term issues associated with the NNSA,” however, led Congress to establish the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-239. China’s nuclear weapons R&D is apparently under the direction of the military, collectively called the People’s Liberation Army.
France’s nuclear weapons R&D is supervised by the Ministry of Defense, which delegates the direction of these programs to the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission (CEA). However, as with NNSA in the United States, CEA is not a part of the Ministry of Defense. CEA also conducts nuclear programs in science and industry under the supervision of other ministries.
India’s nuclear weapons R&D appears to be controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy, which is under the direct control of the Prime Minister.
Israel’s nuclear program is under civilian control, but since Israel neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons, it classifies information on such weapons, including organizations responsible for R&D. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission reportedly has overall responsibility for Israel’s nuclear weapons program, and the Director General of that commission reports directly to the Prime Minister.
North Korea’s Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry is in charge of the day-to-day operation of the nuclear weapons program. Under it are nuclear-related organizations. Policy is decided by leader Kim Jong-un and other Communist Party and military leaders who advise him.
Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan’s organizations involved in nuclear weapons R&D and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces. The Prime Minister is the chair of the NCA, and membership includes senior civilian and military leaders.
Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is responsible for nuclear weapons R&D and production. It is a civilian agency, though it has many links to the military.
In the United Kingdom, a private company, AWE Management Limited, manages and operates the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), a government-owned, contractor-operated entity. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), which is headed by a civilian, controls the operations, policy, and direction of AWE and can veto actions of the company. The MoD provides most of the funding for AWE.
CRS — Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2014
Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2014 (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service for distribution to multiple congressional offices, April 11, 2013.
When Armies Divide: The Security of Nuclear Arsenals During Revolts, Coups, and Civil Wars
When Armies Divide: The Security of Nuclear Arsenals During Revolts, Coups, and Civil Wars
Source: RAND Corporation
This work examines what happened in April of 1961, when the French government was about to conduct the fourth of a series of nuclear tests in the Sahara. Four French Army generals, unhappy that de Gaulle was willing to support Algerian independence, staged a coup to keep Algeria as a French colony. The nuclear test was conducted a few days ahead of schedule — it was not successful — and speculation ever since has been that the test was moved up to keep the weapon out of the rebel generals’ hands.
While there is evidence that one of the generals contacted the officer who was in charge of the tests to try to delay them, Jenkins concludes that the generals really never had a plan in place to seize the weapon and that the French government didn’t want to delay the test. At the time it happened, the world viewed it as an internal, French problem.
The second, shorter part of the book compares the 1961 events to what might happen today if the military in Pakistan or North Korea splintered, and a rebel group got their hands on those countries’ nuclear materials. Jenkins contends that such a scenario today would clearly be an international incident, that neither Pakistan nor North Korea would want any foreign intervention, and that the United States "might not be the only first responder."
Two additional short essays by Dr. Stephen J. Lukasik and Constantin Melnik, a security assistant to the French prime minister in 1961, also review what happened in 1961.
CRS — Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan.
Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear- related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s security situation in recent years.
However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.
The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013
The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013
Source: New America Foundation
The purpose of this database is to provide as much information as possible about the covert U.S. drone program in Pakistan in the absence of any such transparency on the part of the American government. This data was collected from credible news reports and is presented here with the relevant sources. You can read more about our methodology here.
This database was originally published in February 2010 by Katherine Tiedemann, then a Policy Analyst at the New America Foundation, and was later added to by Andrew Lebovich, then a Program Associate at the New America Foundation, both working with Peter Bergen, director of New America’s National Security Studies Program.
That database underwent a comprehensive review in the summer of 2012. As part of this process we established an updated methodology for counting strikes and deaths, incorporated additional news reports about the drone strikes, and presented the data in a revised format for greater clarity.
This review was undertaken by Meg Braun, a Rhodes Scholar working towards her MPhil in International Relations at St. John’s College at Oxford University, Fatima Mustafa, a Pakistani PhD candidate in Political Science at Boston University, Farhad Peikar, an Afghan journalist and masters student at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Public Policy, and Jennifer Rowland, a Program Associate with the New America Foundation working together with Peter Bergen. We are also grateful to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism for their work on this topic.
CRS — Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (Updated)
Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The 112th Congress has focused on measures to reduce the federal budget deficit. This backdrop may continue to influence congressional debate over a top-ranking U.S. aid recipient, Pakistan—a country vital to U.S. national security interests but that some say lacks accountability and even credibility as a U.S. ally.
Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance both historically and in recent years. The country arguably is as important to forwarding U.S. security interests as any in the world. Developments in 2011 put immense strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future direction of U.S. aid to Pakistan. Disruptions included the May killing of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani city and a November NATO military raid into Pakistani territory near Afghanistan that inadvertently left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead. For many lawmakers, the core issue remains balancing Pakistan’s strategic importance to the United States with the pervasive and mounting distrust in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, as well as with budget deficit-reduction pressures.
U.S. assistance to Pakistan has fluctuated considerably over the past 60 years. In the wake of 9/11, however, aid to Pakistan increased steadily as the Bush and Obama Administrations both characterized Pakistan as a crucial U.S. partner in efforts to combat terrorism and to promote stability in both Afghanistan and South Asia. Since 1948, the United States has pledged more than $30 billion in direct aid, about half for military assistance. Two-thirds of this total was appropriated in the post-9/11 era from FY2002 to FY2011. Many observers question the gains accrued to date, viewing a lack of accountability and reform by the Pakistani government as major obstacles. Moreover, any goodwill generated by U.S. aid is offset by widespread and intense anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people.
In 2009, Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73). The law authorizes the President to provide $1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary aid to Pakistan for FY2010 through FY2014 and requires annual certification for release of security-related aid; such conditionality is a contentious issue. Congress also established two new funds in 2009—the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) within the Defense Department appropriations and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund within the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations—to help build Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities. When $1.5 billion in “coalition support fund” military reimbursements are added to economic and security aid totals, the United States provided a total of $4.3 billion for Pakistan for FY2010 alone, making it the second-highest recipient after Afghanistan. In addition to these ongoing programs, the United States pledged about $700 million in a response to extensive mid-2010 flooding in Pakistan.
In its Second Session, the 112th Congress considered and, in some cases, enacted further conditions and limitations on assistance to Pakistan. Among these was a new certification requirement in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74). Moreover, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81) would withhold 60% of any FY2012 appropriations for PCF unless the Secretary of Defense reports to Congress a strategy for the use of such funds and the metrics for determining their effectiveness, among other provisions.
This report will be updated as warranted by events. For broader discussion of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. See also CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements, by Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt.
India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
Source: RAND Corporation
India and Pakistan have very different visions for Afghanistan, and they seek to advance highly disparate interests through their respective engagements in the country. Pakistan views Afghanistan primarily as an environment in which to pursue its rivalry with India. India pursues domestic priorities (such as reining in anti-Indian terrorism, accessing Central Asian energy resources, and increasing trade) that require Afghanistan to experience stability and economic growth. Thus, whereas Pakistan seeks to fashion an Afghan state that would detract from regional security, India would enhance Afghanistan’s stability, security, economic growth, and regional integration. Afghanistan would welcome greater involvement from India, though it will need to accommodate the interests of multiple other external powers as well. India has a range of options for engaging Afghanistan, from continuing current activities to increasing economic and commercial ties, deploying forces to protect Indian facilities, continuing or expanding training for Afghan forces, or deploying combat troops for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. To avoid antagonizing Pakistan, India is likely to increase economic and commercial engagement while maintaining, or perhaps augmenting, military training, though it will continue to conduct such training inside India. Increased Indian engagement in Afghanistan, particularly enhanced Indian assistance to Afghan security forces, will advance long-term U.S. objectives in central and south Asia. As the United States prepares to withdraw its combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014, it should therefore encourage India to fill the potential vacuum by adopting an increasingly assertive political, economic, and security strategy that includes increased security assistance.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Bankruptcy: Agencies Continue Rulemakings for Clarifying Specific Provisions of Orderly Liquidation Authority. GAO-12-735, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-735
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592317.pdf
2. Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-800
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592372.pdf
3. Trade Adjustment Assistance: USDA Has Enhanced Technical Assistance for Farmers and Fishermen, but Steps Are Needed to Better Evaluate Program Effectiveness. GAO-12-731, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-731
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592321.pdf
4. Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund: Transparency of Balances and Controls over Equitable Sharing Should Be Improved. GAO-12-736, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-736
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592350.pdf
5. Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment. GAO-12-517, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-517
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592360.pdf
6. Human Capital: HHS and EPA Can Improve Practices Under Special Hiring Authorities. GAO-12-692, July 9.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-692
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592200.pdf
+ Testimony
1. Counterterrorism: U.S. Agencies Face Challenges Countering the Use of Improvised Explosive Devices in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Region, by Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-907T, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-907T
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures for Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices. GAO-12-614, May 15.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-614
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590870.pdf
2. Veterans’ Pension Benefits: Improvements Needed to Ensure Only Qualified Veterans and Survivors Receive Benefits. GAO-12-540, May 15.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-540
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590848.pdf
3. Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions. GAO-12-711, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-711
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591399.pdf
+ Testimonies
1. Afghanistan: USAID Oversight of Assistance Funds and Programs, by John P. Hutton, director, acquisition and sourcing management, and Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. GAO-12-802T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-802T
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591394.pdf
2. Commercial Space Launch Act: Preliminary Information on Issues to Consider for Reauthorization, by Alicia Puente Cackley, director, financial markets and community investment, before the Subcommittee on Space, and Aeronautics, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. GAO-12-767T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-767T
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591392.pdf
3. Disaster Recovery: Selected Themes for Effective Long-Term Recovery, by Stanley J. Czerwinski, director, strategic issues, before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-813T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-813T
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591389.pdf
4. Veterans’ Pension Benefits: Improvements Needed to Ensure Only Qualified Veterans Receive Benefits, by Daniel Bertoni, director, eduction, workforce, and income security issues, before the Senate Special Committee on Aging. GAO-12-784T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-784T
How Deeply Held Are Anti-American Attitudes among Pakistani Youth? Evidence Using Experimental Variation in Information
This paper investigates how attitudes toward the United States are affected by the provision of information. We use an experimentally generated panel of attitudes, obtained by providing urban Pakistanis with fact-based statements describing the United States in either a positive or negative light. Anti-American sentiment is high and heterogenous in our sample at the baseline. We find that revised attitudes are, on average, significantly different from baseline attitudes, indicating that providing information had a meaningful effect on U.S. favorability. Observed revisions are a consequence of both the salience of already known information and information acquisition that leads to a convergence in attitudes across respondents with different priors. This analysis provides evidence that (i) public opinions are not purely a cultural phenomenon and are malleable, and (ii) the tendency of respondents to ignore information not aligned with their priors can be overcome. Our findings make the case for dissemination of accurate information about various aspects of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship in order to improve opinion toward the United States.
+ Full Paper (PDF)
CRS — Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan.
Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclearrelated technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s security situation in recent years.
However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.
This report updates a previous version published November 30, 2011.
CRS — Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2012
Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2012 (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Chart, with footnotes.
CRS — Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements
Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The 112th Congress continues to debate levels of U.S. assistance to Pakistan in light of signs that Pakistan may not be a fully willing and effective U.S. partner, and that official Pakistani elements continue to support Afghan insurgent forces. During a period of economic and budget crises in the United States, Obama Administration officials and some senior Members of Congress have voiced concerns about the efficacy of continuing the flow of billions of U.S. aid dollars into Pakistan, with some in Congress urging more stringent conditions on, or even curtailment of, such aid. At issue is whether Pakistan’s civilian government and security services are using the aid as intended domestically while actively supporting U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and combat regional insurgent and terrorist elements. Existing aid restrictions and the certification process required for greater accountability on the part of Pakistan are thus under scrutiny.
A number of current laws restrict or place conditions on certain aid to Pakistan, such as Economic Support Funds and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF). Others require the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of State to certify that Pakistan meets specific criteria to receive U.S. aid. Examples include that the implementing agency is qualified to manage the funds; that the Pakistani government has agreed to clear, achievable goals; that it is meeting human rights criteria; and that the country is making progress in achieving U.S. aid objectives, and is cooperating with the United States in combating terrorist networks and securing its nuclear weapons. In addition, reporting requirements include a quarterly report on the specific uses of PCF; an annual report on Pakistan’s cooperation regarding efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons- related supplier networks and combat terrorist groups (to allow security-related aid and arms transfers to Pakistan from 2011 to 2014); a report to explain certification of U.S. aid to Pakistan; and an annual report from the President confirming that providing aid to Pakistan is in the U.S. national interest and that Pakistan has made substantial efforts to adhere to international counternarcotics agreements. Waivers in current law exist: one allows aid restrictions to be waived for human health and welfare risks; three authorize waiving aid restrictions if the President determines that it is in U.S. national security interests to do so.
Legislation before the 112th Congress on U.S. aid to Pakistan goes beyond current law. The conference report for the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (H.R. 1540), issued on December 12, 2011, includes provisions to withhold 60% of any FY2012 appropriations for PCF unless the Secretary of Defense reports to Congress a strategy for the use of such funds and the metrics for determining their effectiveness, and a strategy to enhance Pakistani efforts to counter improvised explosive devices. Among other pending bills are those that would totally eliminate aid to Pakistan “under any provision of law,” and provide no waivers or certification requirements; one that would eliminate all aid unless new certification regarding the Pakistani government’s knowledge of Osama bin Laden is provided; one that would eliminate all aid except for aid that would ensure the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; and one that would prohibit all non-security aid. Increased reporting and certification requirements are included in many of the bills currently before Congress, as well.This report provides a comprehensive list of existing laws and pending legislation containing conditions, limitations, and reporting requirements for U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan. It will track the debate on this topic and resulting changes. For a broader discussion of U.S. aid to Pakistan, see CRS Report R41856, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance. For discussion of the current state of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary. Both are updated regularly.
CRS — Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary (10/20/11)
Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
This report summarizes important recent developments in Pakistan and in Pakistan-U.S. relations. Obama Administration engagement with Pakistan has been seriously disrupted by recent events. A brief analysis of the current state of Pakistan-U.S. relations illuminates the main areas of contention and uncertainty. Vital U.S. interests related to links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism, Islamist militancy in Pakistan and Islamabad’s policies toward the Afghan insurgency, Pakistan’s relations with historic rival India, nuclear weapons proliferation and security, and the troubled status of Pakistan’s domestic setting are reviewed. Ongoing human rights concerns and U.S. foreign assistance programs for Pakistan are briefly summarized, and the report closes with an analysis of current U.S.-Pakistan relations.
In the post-9/11 period, assisting in the creation of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy has been among the most important U.S. foreign policy efforts. Global and South Asian regional terrorism, and a nearly decade-long effort to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan are viewed as top-tier concerns. Pakistan’s apparently accelerated nuclear weapons program and the long-standing dispute with India over Kashmir continue to threaten regional stability. Pakistan is identified as a base for numerous U.S.- designated terrorist groups and, by some accounts, most of the world’s jihadist terrorist plots have some connection to Pakistan-based elements.
While Obama Administration officials and most senior congressional leaders have continued to recognize Pakistan as a crucial partner in U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, long-held doubts about Islamabad’s commitment to core U.S. interests have deepened considerably in 2011. Most independent analysts view the Pakistani military and intelligence services as too willing to distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to some as a means of forwarding Pakistani’s perceived security interests. Top U.S. officials have offered public expressions of acute concerns about Islamabad’s ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgent and anti-India militants operating from Pakistani territory. The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the now deeply troubled bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. aid both in FY2011 and in the post-9/11 period, having been appropriated about $22 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories rife among ordinary Pakistanis, persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers.
This report will be updated periodically. For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41307, Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
Letter from the President regarding a Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan
Letter from the President regarding a Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan
Source: White House
In response to section 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) (the “Act”), and in order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am providing the attached report related to Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the fourth report submitted under section 1117 of the Act and follows the April 2011 submission.
This report covers the period from January 1, 2011, through June 30, 2011. To the extent possible, the report also provides an assessment through August 31, 2011. Events continue to evolve since that time, for example in our relationship with Pakistan, but these developments fall outside the scope of this report. As I noted in my remarks on the way forward in Afghanistan on June 22, we have seen great progress in our fight against al-Qa’ida; we have reversed the Taliban’s momentum in Afghanistan; and we continue to see progress in training the Afghan National Security Forces. This will allow us in the coming year to fully recover the 33,000 U.S. troop surge I announced at West Point in December 2009. Beyond that change, we continue to implement the strategy and do not believe further modifications or adjustments to the metrics, resources, or authorities are required at this time. Huge challenges remain, and this is the beginning — but not the end — of our effort to wind down this war.
+ Full Report (via Council on Foreign Relations)
New Report Calls for ‘21st Century Agenda for Pakistan’
New Report Calls for ‘21st Century Agenda for Pakistan’
Source: New America Foundation
Today an expert study group co-sponsored by the New America Foundation and the National War College released their findings on U.S-Pakistan relations. The group, comprised of both American and Pakistani policy specialists, came together to devise practical ways to advance the U.S.-Pakistan relationship at a time when relations between the two countries are arguably at their most strained.
Peter Bergen, Michael J. Mazarr and additional members of the study group will discuss the findings at an 11 a.m briefing today at the New America Foundation.
The report states:
“In this post-Arab Spring, post-Osama bin Laden moment, military responses to radicalism have proven their limits, large-scale aid programs are becoming untenable, and the “leverage” of bilateral aid relationships has shown itself unable to produce sustainable changes in mindset. Pakistan, and its international partners including the United States, require a fresh approach that moves beyond security issues as the touchstone for policy, that lays out a vision for a more prosperous future, and that empowers civilian, democratic governments at all levels to become more effective.
“The strategic concept we propose to meet these goals is a collaborative agenda for Pakistan to take its place as a major power in a modernizing South Asia. This is a 21st century agenda for Pakistan, one based on progress, growth, trade, entrepreneurial energy, and popular involvement in democratic governance. It is a vision of an advancing, influential Pakistan standing at a vibrant crossroads of trade, diplomacy and geopolitics, at a time when the human capacities, natural resources, and mineral wealth of South Asia are destined to become increasingly important to global economic developments.”
CRS — Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (Updated)
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan.
Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs.
Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclearrelated technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s security situation in recent years.
However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.
This report updates a previous version published July 20, 2011.
The 2010 Pakistan Flood and Russian Heat Wave: Teleconnection of Hydrometeorologic Extremes
The 2010 Pakistan Flood and Russian Heat Wave: Teleconnection of Hydrometeorologic Extremes (PDF)
Source: Journal of Hydrometeorology
In this paper, we present preliminary results showing that the two record setting extreme events during 2010 summer, i.e., the Russian heat wave/wild fires and Pakistan flood were physically connected. We find that the Russian heat wave was associated with the development of an extraordinary strong and prolonged extratropical atmospheric blocking event, and excitation of a large-scale atmospheric Rossby wavetrain spanning western Russia, Kazakhstan, and northwestern China/Tibetan Plateau region. The southward penetration of upper level vorticity perturbations in the leading trough of the Rossby wave was instrumental in triggering anomalously heavy rain events over northern Pakistan and vicinity in mid-to-late July. Also shown are evidences that the Russian heat wave was amplified by a positive feedback through changes in surface energy fluxes between the atmospheric blocking pattern and an underlying extensive land region with below- normal soil moisture. The Pakistan heavy rain events were amplified and sustained by strong anomalous southeasterly flow along the Himalayas foothills and abundant moisture transport from the Bay of Bengal in connection with the northward propagation of the monsoonal intraseasonal oscillation.
CRS — Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (Updated 07/28/2011)
Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The 112th Congress is focused on cost-cutting measures to reduce the budget deficit. How it deals with the second-ranking U.S. aid recipient, Pakistan—which is important to U.S. national security interests but that some say lacks accountability—will be key.
Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance both historically and in FY2010, and most experts list the country among the most strategically important for U.S. policy makers. Recent major developments—including the killing of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in Pakistan—have put strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future direction of U.S. aid to Pakistan. For many lawmakers, the issue will be how to balance considerations about Pakistan’s strategic importance to the United States with the pervasive and mounting distrust in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and with budget deficit-reduction pressures.
U.S. assistance to Pakistan has fluctuated considerably over the past 60 years. In the wake of 9/11, however, aid to Pakistan has continually risen as the Bush and Obama Administrations have characterized Pakistan as a U.S. partner in the Afghanistan war, in the fight against terrorism, and in efforts to stabilize the region. Since 1948, the United States has pledged more than $30 billion in direct aid, about half for military assistance. Two-thirds of this total was appropriated in the post-9/11 era from FY2002 to FY2010. Some question the gains from the aid, saying there is a lack of accountability and reform by the Pakistani government, and any goodwill generated by it is offset by widespread anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people.
In September 2009, Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (EPPA, also known as the “Kerry-Lugar-Berman” or “KLB” bill for its main sponsors). This became P.L. 111-73 and authorizes the President to provide $1.5 billion in annual bilateral economic aid to Pakistan from FY2010 through FY2014. The law requires certification for release of security- related aid; such conditionality is an ongoing and contentious issue. Also in 2009, Congress established two new funds—the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) within the Defense Department appropriations and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) within the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations—to build Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities.
Within the FY2010 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 111-212), Congress provided $349 million in military and economic assistance to Pakistan, $5 million more than the Administration’s request. When “coalition support fund” military reimbursements are included, the U.S. provided a total of $4.5 billion for Pakistan for FY2010 alone, making it the second-highest recipient after Afghanistan. In addition to these ongoing programs, in mid-2010 the United States pledged an additional $592 million in emergency and recovery aid, plus more than $95 million of in-kind aid after extensive flooding resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis that affected an estimated 20 million Pakistanis. In October 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the Administration’s intention to increase U.S. Foreign Military Financing for Pakistan to $2 billion over a five year period, a $100 million annual increase from the current level. This would have to go through the congressional appropriation and authorization process.
This report will be updated as congressional actions on aid to Pakistan unfold in the 112th Congress. For broader discussion of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see CRS Report R41307, Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments, and CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary.
