Archive
CRS — The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed regional free trade agreement (FTA) being negotiated among the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. On March 15, 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that Japan would seek to participate in the TPP negotiations. On April 24, 2013, the Obama Administration gave Congress notice of its intent to negotiate with Japan in the TPP, and Japan is expected to participate in the next round of negotiations in late July 2013. U.S. negotiators and others describe and envision the TPP as a “comprehensive and high-standard” FTA that aims to liberalize trade in nearly all goods and services and include commitments beyond those currently established in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The broad outline of an agreement was announced on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial in November 2011, in Honolulu, HI. If concluded as envisioned, the TPP potentially could eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment among the parties and could serve as a template for a future trade pact among APEC members and potentially other countries. Congress has a direct interest in the negotiations, both through influencing U.S. negotiating positions with the executive branch, and by passing legislation to implement any resulting agreement.
The 17th round of negotiations concluded in Lima, Peru on May 24, 2013, and the 18th round is scheduled to be held in Malaysia July 15th-25th 2013. The current goal is to reach an agreement in time for the October 2013 APEC summit in Indonesia. For this deadline to be achieved, outstanding negotiating positions may need to be tabled soon in order for political decisions to be made. The negotiating dynamic itself is complex: decisions on key market access issues such as dairy, sugar, and textiles and apparel may be dependent on the outcome of controversial rules negotiations such as intellectual property rights or state-owned enterprises.
Twenty-nine chapters in the agreement are under discussion. The United States is negotiating market access for goods, services, and agriculture with countries with which it does not currently have FTAs: Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam. Negotiations are also being conducted on disciplines to intellectual property rights, trade in services, government procurement, investment, rules of origin, competition, labor, and environmental standards and other issues. In many cases, the rules being negotiated are intended to be more rigorous than comparable rules found in the WTO. Some topics, such as state-owned enterprises, regulatory coherence, and supply chain competitiveness, break new ground in FTA negotiations. As the countries that make up the TPP negotiating partners include advanced industrialized, middle income, and developing economies, the TPP, if implemented, may involve substantial restructuring of the economies of some participants.
The TPP serves several strategic goals in U.S. trade policy. First, it is the leading trade policy initiative of the Obama Administration, and is a manifestation of the Administration’s “pivot” to Asia. If concluded, it may serve to shape the economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region by harmonizing existing agreements with U.S. FTA partners, attracting new participants, and establishing regional rules on new policy issues facing the global economy—possibly providing impetus to future multilateral liberalization under the WTO.
As the negotiations proceed, a number of issues important to Congress are emerging. One is whether the United States can balance its vision of creating a “comprehensive and high standard” agreement with a large and expanding group of countries, while not insisting on terms that other countries will reject. Another issue is how Congress will consider the TPP, if concluded. The present negotiations are not being conducted under the auspices of formal trade promotion authority (TPA)—the latest TPA expired on July 1, 2007—although the Administration informally is following the procedures of the former TPA. If TPP implementing legislation is brought to Congress, TPA may need to be considered if the legislation is not to be subject to potentially debilitating amendments or rejection. Finally, Congress may seek to weigh in on the addition of new members to the negotiations, before or after the negotiations conclude.
CRS — Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress
Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. Congress may wish to assess the Administration’s plans to respond to possible scenarios involving the use, change of hands, or loss of control of Syrian chemical weapons.
Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical weapons, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad reportedly has stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles, and associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality. Little is known from open sources about the current size and condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, or are in the process of destroying them. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs.
While the United States and other governments have said they believe the Asad regime has kept its chemical weapons stocks secure, policymakers are concerned about what could happen to these weapons in the course of the civil war, such as diversion to terrorist groups or loss of control during a regime collapse.
Reports in early December 2012 quoted unnamed officials as saying intelligence showed possible preparations for use, but this was denied by the Syrian government. Since then, press reports have discussed several alleged incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria. A United Nations chemical weapons inspection team is negotiating with Syria on access to the sites to investigate. On June 13, 2013, the White House released a statement saying that following its investigation, “our intelligence community assesses that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year. Our intelligence community has high confidence in that assessment given multiple, independent streams of information.” The June 13 statement said that CW use had resulted in estimated 100-150 deaths in Syria.
President Obama and other world leaders have said that the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences, which could include the use of military force. There is also concern that Syria could transfer its chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Administration officials have stated that the United States has been working with regional allies to detect the movement of chemical weapons, prepare interdiction scenarios, and mitigate possible use against military or civilian populations. The June 13 White House statement said that in response to the Asad regime’s use of chemical weapons, the President has authorized the expansion of military assistance to the opposition forces in Syria.
During conflict, the intelligence community and Special Forces units would likely play a major role in locating and securing such weapons in a combat environment. The nature and recent course of the conflict in Syria suggests that rapid changes in control over critical military facilities may occur. U.S. government programs established to secure or remove chemical or other weapons of mass destruction through threat reduction or nonproliferation programs have focused on destruction or scientist redirection in an atmosphere of cooperation. At present, such programs are providing border security assistance to neighboring states. U.S. policymakers and Congress may wish to review and discuss authorities, funding, forces, and scenarios in advance.
For additional information on chemical weapons agents, see CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea. For a broader discussion of U.S. policy options, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.
CRS — Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response
Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion in Syria is in its third year, and seems poised to continue, with the government and a bewildering array of militias locked in a bloody struggle of attrition. The Obama Administration has signaled a pending expansion of U.S. civilian and military assistance to the opposition in the wake of the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion that President Bashar al Asad’s forces used chemical weapons in limited attacks in recent months. U.S. officials and many analysts have asserted that President Asad and his supporters will be forced from power, but few offer specific, credible timetables for a resolution to the crisis. Further escalation in fighting or swift regime change could jeopardize the security of chemical and conventional weapons stockpiles, threaten minority groups, or lead to wider regional conflict.
Opposition forces are formidable, but regime forces, backed by Hezbollah fighters and Iranian and Russian material support, have initiated successful tactical counteroffensives in recent weeks. The Syrian military continues to use air strikes, artillery, and pro-government militias in punishing attacks on areas where rebels operate. Some members of Syria’s Sunni Arab majority and of ethnic and sectarian minority groups view the conflict in communal, zero-sum terms. U.S. officials believe that fighting would likely continue even if Asad were toppled.
Amid extensive damage to major urban areas and reports attributing war crimes to government and opposition forces, the fighting has created a regional humanitarian emergency. Some estimates suggest more than 90,000 Syrians have been killed since unrest began in March 2011. As of June 14, more than 1,638,102 refugees had fled Syria amid United Nations projections the total may reach 3.5 million by years end. According to U.N. estimates, as many as 4.25 million Syrians may be internally displaced. U.N. agencies have launched their largest ever humanitarian assistance appeal– seeking $4.4 billion for the Syria crisis in 2013. The United States has provided more than $513 million in humanitarian assistance to date.
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August 2011, and have pressed the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Syrian government. The United States has recognized the National Coalition of Revolution and Opposition Forces (SC) as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and has provided nonlethal assistance to the Coalition and an affiliated Supreme Military Council (SMC). The Obama Administration believes that a negotiated political settlement is required and has prepared military plans to secure Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons, if necessary.
Some observers advocate for more robust civil and military aid to the SC and SMC as a means of forcing the Asad regime to the negotiating table. Opponents of this approach argue that making opposition groups more formidable could intensify the fighting and risks empowering extremists. Some armed opposition factions, including powerful Islamist coalitions, reject negotiation.
After two years of unrest and violence, the central question for policy makers remains how best to bring the conflict in Syria to a close before the crisis consigns the region to one of several destructive and destabilizing scenarios. The human toll of the fighting, and the resulting political, ethnic, and sectarian polarization, all but guarantee that political, security, humanitarian, and economic challenges will outlast Asad and keep Syria on the U.S. agenda for years to come.
CRS — The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is comprised of nine members, two ex officio members, and other members as appointed by the President representing major departments and agencies within the federal executive branch. While the group generally has operated in relative obscurity, the proposed acquisition of commercial operations at six U.S. ports by Dubai Ports World in 2006 placed the group’s operations under intense scrutiny by Members of Congress and the public. Prompted by this case, some Members of the 109th and 110th Congresses questioned the ability of Congress to exercise its oversight responsibilities given the general view that CFIUS’s operations lack transparency. Other Members revisited concerns about the linkage between national security and the role of foreign investment in the U.S. economy. Some Members of Congress and others argued that the nation’s security and economic concerns have changed since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and that these concerns were not being reflected sufficiently in the Committee’s deliberations. In addition, anecdotal evidence seemed to indicate that the CFIUS process was not market neutral. Instead, a CFIUS investigation of an investment transaction may have been perceived by some firms and by some in the financial markets as a negative factor that added to uncertainty and may have spurred firms to engage in behavior that may not have been optimal for the economy as a whole. In the 112th Congress, some Members expressed their concerns to the Obama Administration over the national security implications of a proposed acquisition of a U.S. technology company by the Chinese-owned Huawei Technologies.
In the first session of the 110th Congress, the House and Senate adopted S. 1610, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) of 2007. On July 11, 2007, the measure was sent to President Bush, who signed it on July 26, 2007. It is designated as P.L. 110-49. On January 23, 2008, President Bush issued Executive Order 13456 implementing the law. The Executive Order also established some caveats that may affect the way in which the law is implemented. These caveats stipulate that the President will provide information that is required under the law as long as it is “consistent” with the President’s authority “to (i) conduct the foreign affairs of the United States; (ii) withhold information the disclosure of which could impair the foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties; (iii) recommend for congressional consideration such measures as the President may judge necessary and expedient; and (iv) supervise the unitary executive branch.” Despite the relatively recent passage of the amendments, some Members of Congress and others have questioned the performance of CFIUS and the way the Committee reviews cases involving foreign governments, particularly with the emergence of direct investments through sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). The Obama Administration issued a statement on June 30, 2011, supporting an open investment policy, a commitment to treat all investors in a fair and equitable manner, and support for business investment from sources both home and abroad in the economy. On September 28, 2012, President Obama used the authority granted to him under FINSA to block a Chinese acquisition of a U.S. energy firm.
CRS — Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress
Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In February 2013, Castro was reappointed to a second five-year term as president (until 2018, when he would be 86 years old), and selected a 52-year old former Education Minister Miguel Díaz-Canel as his First Vice President, making him the official successor in the event that Castro cannot serve out his term. Raúl Castro has implemented a number of gradual economic policy changes over the past several years, including an expansion of self-employment. A party congress held in April 2011 laid out numerous economic goals that, if implemented, could significantly alter Cuba’s state-dominated economic model. Few observers, however, expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system. While the government reduced the number of political prisoners in 2010-2011, the number increased in 2012; moreover, short-term detentions and harassment have increased significantly.
U.S. Policy
Over the years, Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. While U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, a second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí) and support for human rights and democracy projects. The Obama Administration has continued this similar dual-track approach. While the Administration has lifted all restrictions on family travel and remittances, eased restrictions on other types of purposeful travel, and moved to reengage Cuba on several bilateral issues, it has also maintained most U.S. economic sanctions in place. On human rights, the Administration welcomed the release of many political prisoners in 2010 and 2011, but it has also criticized Cuba’s continued harsh repression of political dissidents through thousands of shortterm detentions and targeted violence. The Administration has continued to call for the release of U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross, detained in 2009 and sentenced to 15 years in prison in March 2011. Gross’s continued detention has been a major impediment toward improved relations.
Legislative Activity
Strong interest on Cuba is expected to continue in the 113th Congress with attention focused on economic and political developments, especially the human rights situation, and U.S. policy toward the island nation. The continued imprisonment of Alan Gross remains a key concern for many Members. Now that Congress has completed action on FY2013 appropriations, it will soon be considering the Administration’s FY2014 request for the State Department and Foreign Operations, which includes funding for Cuba democracy programs and Cuba broadcasting. For many years, U.S. sanctions, particularly restrictions on travel, remittances, and agricultural exports to Cuba, have been topics of congressional debate, and this could be possible again in the 113th Congress.
To date in the 113th Congress, eight initiatives on Cuba have been introduced. Several would lift or ease U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 214 and H.R. 872 (overall embargo); H.R. 871 (travel); and H.R. 873 (travel and agricultural exports). H.R. 215 would allow Cubans to play organized professional baseball in the United States. H.R. 1917, among its provisions, would lift the embargo and extend nondiscriminatory trade treatment to the products of Cuba after Cuba releases Alan Gross from prison. Identical initiatives, H.R. 778/S. 647 would modify a 1998 trademark sanction; in contrast, H.R. 214, H.R. 872, H.R. 873, and H.R. 1917 each have a provision that would repeal the trademark sanction. H.Res. 121 would honor the work of Cuban blogger Yoani Sánchez in challenging the oppression of the Castro regime. In addition, in March 2013, Congress completed action on full-year FY2013 appropriations with the approval of H.R. 933 (P.L. 113-6), which continues to provide funding for Cuba democracy and human rights projects and Cuba broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí).
This report will be updated periodically during the 113th Congress. For additional information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
CRS — Foreign Assistance to North Korea
Foreign Assistance to North Korea (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Between 1995 and 2008, the United States provided North Korea with over $1.3 billion in assistance: slightly more than 50% for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. Since early 2009, the United States has provided virtually no aid to North Korea, though episodically there have been discussions about resuming large-scale food aid. Additionally, the Obama Administration officials have said that they would be willing to consider other types of aid if North Korea takes steps indicating that it will dismantle its nuclear program. However, barring an unexpected breakthrough, there appears little likelihood the Obama Administration will provide large-scale assistance of any type to North Korea in the near future. In February 2013, North Korea announced it had conducted its third test of a nuclear device, a move that came weeks after its apparently successful launch of a long-range missile. Members of Congress have a number of tools they could use to influence the development and implementation of aid programs with North Korea.
Food Aid. North Korea has suffered from chronic, massive food shortages since the mid-1990s. Food aid—largely from China, South Korea, and the United States—has been essential in filling the gap. As of mid-2013, according to many observers, it appears that while North Korea’s continued food shortages are not severe enough to create a crisis situation, they are causing chronic malnutrition and stunting in vulnerable populations in certain regions. Many analysts think the Obama Administration will be reluctant to provide large-scale aid after the breakdown of a February 2012 deal, in which the United States announced it would provide North Korea with large-scale food aid in return for concessions by Pyongyang on its nuclear and missile programs. The deal unraveled in April 2012 after North Korea launched a long-range rocket in defiance of United Nations sanctions. Since then, the United States and North Korea have not reached any agreements, including on food aid. In June 2012, the Senate voted to prohibit food aid to North Korea.
Providing food to North Korea poses a number of dilemmas. Pyongyang has resisted reforms that would allow the equitable distribution of food and help pay for food imports. The North Korean government restricts the ability of donors to operate in the country. Additionally, multiple sources have asserted that some of the food assistance is routinely diverted for resale in private markets or other uses. However, it is likely that food aid has helped feed millions of North Koreans, at times possibly staving off a repeat of the famine conditions that existed in North Korea in the mid-late 1990s, when 5%-10% of the population died. South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s government has indicated that they would be willing to offer North Korea food aid as part of her plan to foster a “new era” in inter-Korean relations.
Energy Assistance. Between 1995 and 2009, the United States provided around $600 million in energy assistance to North Korea. The aid was given over two time periods—1995-2003 and 2007-2009—in exchange for North Korea freezing its plutonium-based nuclear facilities. In 2008 and 2009, North Korea also took steps to disable these facilities. However, no additional energy assistance has been provided since 2009, when Pyongyang withdrew from the Six-Party Talks— involving North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—over North Korea’s nuclear program. The move followed condemnation and sanctions by the U.N. Security Council for North Korea’s April 2009 launch of a suspected long-range missile and May 2009 test of a nuclear device.
In 2007 and 2008, the United States also provided technical assistance to help in North Korea’s nuclear disablement process. In 2008, Congress took steps to legally enable the President to give expanded assistance for this purpose. However, following North Korea’s actions in the spring of 2009, Congress rejected the Obama Administration’s requests for funds to supplement existing resources in the event of a breakthrough. Congress did approve monies for the State Department’s general emergency nonproliferation fund that the Administration could use in North Korea.
CRS — U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Merida Initiative and Beyond
U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Merida Initiative and Beyond (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Brazen violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security and governance in some parts of Mexico, a country with which the United States shares a nearly 2,000 mile border and $500 billion in annual trade. Although the violence in Mexico has generally declined since late 2011, analysts estimate that it may have claimed more than 60,000 lives between December 2006 and November 2012. The violence has increased U.S. concerns about stability in Mexico, a key political and economic ally, and about the possibility of violence spilling over into the United States.
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation increased significantly as a result of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime assistance package for Mexico and Central America first funded in FY2008. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on training and equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing the weak institutions and underlying societal problems that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico. The Mérida strategy now focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and resilient communities. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to intensify its anticrime efforts and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico.
Inaugurated on December 1, 2012, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has vowed to continue U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, albeit with a shift in focus toward reducing violent crime in Mexico. Peña Nieto has begun to adjust the process and priorities of U.S.-Mexican efforts, adjustments which President Obama has pledged to support. The Interior Ministry is now the primary entity through which Mérida training and equipment requests are coordinated and intelligence is channeled. The Mexican government is requesting increased assistance for judicial reform and prevention efforts, but limiting U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and intelligence operations. As the Peña Nieto government fleshes out its security strategy, Mérida programs are likely to be adjusted in order to support those efforts that align with U.S. priorities.
The 113th Congress is likely to continue funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative and related domestic initiatives, but may also consider supporting new programs. From FY2008 to FY2012, Congress appropriated $1.9 billion in Mérida assistance for Mexico, roughly $1.2 billion of which had been delivered as of April 2013. The Obama Administration asked for $234.0 million for Mérida programs in in its FY2013 budget request and $183 million in its FY2014 request.
Congress may wish to examine how well the Mexican government’s security strategy supports U.S. interests in Mexico. Congressional approval will be needed should the State Department seek to reprogram some of the funding already in the pipeline for Mérida, or shift new funding to better align with Mexico’s new priorities. Should disagreements occur between Mexican and U.S. priorities, Congress may weigh in on how those disagreements should be resolved. Congress may also debate how to measure the impact of Mérida Initiative programs, as well as the extent to which Mérida has evolved to respond to changing security conditions in Mexico. Another issue of congressional interest involves whether Mexico is meeting the human rights conditions placed on Mérida Initiative funding.
CRS — Israel: Background and U.S. Relations
Israel: Background and U.S. Relations (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Since Israel’s founding in 1948, successive U.S. Presidents and many Members of Congress have demonstrated a commitment to Israel’s security and to maintaining close U.S.-Israel defense, diplomatic, and economic cooperation. U.S. and Israeli leaders have developed close relations based on common perceptions of shared democratic values and religious affinities. U.S. policymakers often seek to determine how regional events and U.S. policy choices may affect Israel’s security, and Congress provides active oversight of executive branch dealings with Israel and the broader Middle East. Some Members of Congress and some analysts criticize what they perceive as U.S. support for Israel without sufficient scrutiny of its actions. Israel is a leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid and is a frequent purchaser of major U.S. weapons systems. The United States and Israel maintain close security cooperation—predicated on a U.S. commitment to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over other countries in its region. The two countries signed a free trade agreement in 1985, and the United States is Israel’s largest trading partner. For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
Israel has many regional security concerns. Israeli leaders calling for urgent international action against Iran’s nuclear program hint at the possibility of a unilateral military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In addition to concerns over Iran, Israel’s perceptions of security around its borders have changed since early 2011 as several surrounding Arab countries—including Egypt and Syria—have experienced political upheaval. Israel has shown particular concern about threats from Hezbollah and other non-state groups in ungoverned or minimally governed areas in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, as well as from Hamas and other Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip.
Israel’s political impasse with the Palestinians on core issues in their longstanding conflict shows little or no sign of abating. Since the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Israel has militarily occupied and administered the West Bank, with the Palestinian Authority exercising limited selfrule in some areas since 1995. Israeli settlement of that area, facilitated by successive Israeli governments, has resulted in a population of approximately 500,000 Israelis living in residential neighborhoods or settlements in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem). These settlements are of disputed legality under international law. Israel considers all of Jerusalem to be the “eternal, undivided capital of Israel,” but Palestinians claim a capital in East Jerusalem and some international actors’ advocate special political classification for the city or specific Muslim and Christian holy sites. Although Israel withdrew its permanent military presence and its settlers from the Gaza Strip in 2005, it still controls most access points and legal commerce to and from the territory.
Despite its unstable regional environment, Israel has developed a robust diversified economy and a vibrant democracy. Recent discoveries and exploitation of offshore natural gas raise the prospect of a more energy-independent future, while economic debates focus largely on cost-ofliving and income and labor distribution issues. Israel’s demographic profile has evolved in a way that appears to be affecting its political orientation. Along with secular and nationalist Jews from various ethnic backgrounds, Jewish ultra-Orthodox, Russian-speaking, and Arab citizens significantly influence societal debates. The government formed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in March 2013 features a set of coalition partners that is different from the previous government, largely due to electoral gains on socioeconomic issues by new national leaders and possible future prime ministerial candidates Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett.
CRS — The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North Africa
The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North Africa (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
U.S. and European Responses to Changes in the Middle East and North Africa
Over the last two years, many U.S. policymakers, Members of Congress, and their European counterparts have struggled with how best to respond to the wide range of challenges posed by the popular uprisings and political upheaval in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Almost immediately after the onset of the so-called “Arab Spring” in early 2011, U.S. and European leaders alike declared their intention to put greater emphasis than in the past on democratic reform and economic development in formulating their respective policies toward countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco. In Libya, the United States and many European allies participated in the NATO-led military intervention in support of rebel forces that ultimately toppled the Qadhafi regime. And as demonstrations in Syria escalated into a bloody civil war, the United States and the European Union (EU) have imposed sanctions, called for an end to the ruling Asad regime, and are considering greater material and financial support to the Syrian political and armed opposition.Possibilities for U.S.-European Cooperation and Potential Obstacles
In light of the immense changes and what many have long viewed as common U.S. and European interests in the Middle East and North Africa, numerous analysts have advocated for significant U.S.-European cooperation to promote a more peaceful and prosperous MENA region. Such collaboration, they argued, would help prevent a wasteful duplication of Western diplomatic and economic resources amid competing domestic political priorities and financial constraints on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite notable cultural, historical, and geopolitical differences, some commentators early on drew analogies with the way the United States and its West European allies worked together to support the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War, and hopes were high for a similar robust transatlantic effort in the MENA region.
As events in the MENA region have unfolded, U.S. and European policymakers have been in frequent contact with each other. Analysts suggest that U.S. and European policies have been closely aligned on most issues regarding the changes underway. There have been some U.S.- European efforts to promote a more coherent international response through institutions such as the G8, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund (especially with respect to reaching a financial assistance agreement for Egypt).
Nevertheless, many observers contend that so far, tangible joint or coordinated U.S.-European initiatives to encourage political transitions and economic opportunities in the MENA countries have been modest at best. Debate thus continues about the prospects for greater U.S.-European collaboration and the possible benefits of it for U.S. interests. Skeptics point out that both the United States and Europe are limited in what they can do to influence events in the region and they worry that the political and economic difficulties facing many MENA countries in transition, combined with deeply problematic issues involving Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Syria, could lead to a progressively worse regional situation in the years ahead. Others are also concerned that more intensive Western involvement could be counterproductive if viewed in the region as an attempt to protect U.S.-European interests, or if used by some MENA leaders to deflect blame for domestic and regional problems.
Issues for Congress
Many Members of Congress have closely followed events in the MENA region. Congress has been and will be considering the appropriation of U.S. aid to the MENA countries. As such, some Members may be interested in ways to coordinate U.S. and European foreign assistance, debt relief, and trade and investment policies in order to maximize their effectiveness as well as to conserve U.S. political capital and economic assets in the years ahead. Members may also be interested in European responses to the transitions in the MENA region, and the degree of U.S.- European cooperation, as a test of whether Europe can be an effective partner for the United States in protecting shared global interests and addressing common challenges.
At the same time, many Members of Congress are concerned about the eventual political orientation of emerging regimes in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, and about the implications of regional change for Israel’s security and U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Some Members may be apprehensive about working too closely with European governments or the EU if policy differences begin to emerge between the two sides, or if doing so might constrain future U.S. policy choices toward the MENA countries. Congress may also want to consider whether more robust U.S.-European cooperation in the MENA region could have implications for U.S. options in addressing challenges elsewhere in the greater Middle East (such as those related to Iran or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).
Atlanta Fed 2012 Annual Report Explores Intersections between Monetary Policy and the Economy
Atlanta Fed 2012 Annual Report Explores Intersections between Monetary Policy and the Economy
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
The Atlanta Fed’s 2012 annual report takes a retrospective look at the interaction between monetary policy and the economy last year. The online-only report, titled Turning Points: 7 Critical Conversations about the Economy in 2012, is fully interactive, packed with embedded videos, customizable charts and graphs, and a pop-up definitions of key information.
Through the lens of seven conversations, the main feature taps into a few of the most important ways in which monetary policy interacts with the economy. The conversation topics shown below are "a starting point from which readers can explore in greater depth key turning points that occurred in 2012 and the ways in which monetary policy worked to address the challenges that remain," said Atlanta Fed President Dennis Lockhart.
The seven critical conversations the Atlanta Fed identified are:
- Housing
- Labor markets
- Small business
- Inflation
- European sovereign debt
- Fiscal policy
- Monetary policy
International Migration Policies 2013
International Migration Policies 2013
Source: United Nations
International Migration Policies 2013 wall chart provides up-to-date and objective information on Government views and policies on immigration and emigration for all 193 Member States and three non-Member States of the United Nations. On immigration, it includes information on policies on major types of migration and migrant integration. On emigration, it includes information on policies to encourage the return of citizens and policies on diaspora matters. The wall chart also includes information on estimates of international migrant stock, female share of international migrants, net migration rate, and remittances. (12 MB)
Data Table (Excel)
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
Reports
1. Information Technology: Additional Executive Review Sessions Needed to Address Troubled Projects. GAO-13-524, June 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-524
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655215.pdf
2. Federal Judiciary: Efforts to Consolidate and Share Services between District and Bankruptcy Clerks’ Offices. GAO-13-531, June 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-531
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655213.pdf
Testimonies
1. Chemical Regulation: Observations on the Toxic Substances Control Act and EPA Implementation, by Alfredo Gomez, director, natural resources and environment, before the Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. GAO-13-696T, June 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-696T
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655203.pdf
2. Export-Import Bank: Recent Growth Underscores Need for Improved Risk Management and Reporting, by Mathew J. Scirè, director, financial markets and community investment, before the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade, House Committee on Financial Services. GAO-13-703T, June 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-703T
3. Financial Institutions: Causes and Consequences of Recent Community Bank Failures, by Lawrance L. Evans, Jr., director, financial markets and community investment, before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. GAO-13-704T, June 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-704T
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655194.pdf
4. Transportation Infrastructure: Limited Improvement in Bridge Conditions over the Past Decade, but Financial Challenges Remain, Phillip R. Herr, managing director, physical infrastructure, before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development, and Related Agencies, Senate Committee on Appropriations. GAO-13-713T, June 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-713T
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655199.pdf
SIPRI Yearbook 2013
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
From press release:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) today launches the findings of SIPRI Yearbook 2013, which assesses the current state of international security, armaments and disarmament. Key findings include: (a) Alone among the five legally recognized nuclear weapon states, China expanded its nuclear arsenal in 2012; (b) The number of personnel deployed with peace operations worldwide is falling rapidly, due to the withdrawal from Afghanistan; (c) Progress towards a global ban on cluster munitions stalled in 2012.
2013 summary (PDF)
Full product available via subscription.
A Study on the External Environment of Chinese Investments in the United States
A Study on the External Environment of Chinese Investments in the United States
Source: Brookings Institution
China’s outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) is entering a stage of rapid development. Outbound investment in 2010 was $68 billion, first among developing countries and fifth in the world. However investment has been concentrated in developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The share of investment in developed countries in Europe and North America has been relatively low. Up to the end of 2009, China’s accumulated FDI to developed countries totaled $18.17 billion, 7.4% of its total stock of outbound FDI. Of this, FDI stock in the United States was $3.34 billion, just 1.4% of China’s total outbound FDI stock. And, in great contrast to China and the United States’ status as one another’s second largest trading partners, China’s stock of FDI in the United States only represents 0.1% of the total stock of FDI to the United States. This is far below the share of FDI stock in the United States by Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Brazil and India, and is merely equal to the levels of New Zealand and Austria. According to calculations by the Asia Society, by 2020 China’s outbound FDI will surpass $1 trillion USD, of which a good share will flow to developed countries like the United States.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Press Release
Source: Government Accountability Office
Reports
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Enrollment and Spending in the Early Retiree Reinsurance and Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan Programs. GAO-13-391, April 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-391
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654261.pdf
2. Employing People With Blindness or Severe Disabilities: Enhanced Oversight of the AbilityOne Program Needed. GAO-13-457, May 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-457
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654947.pdf
3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Lobbying Policies and Monitoring for Program to Reduce Obesity and Tobacco Use. GAO-13-477R, April 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-477R
4. Tax Expenditures: IRS Data Available for Evaluations Are Limited. GAO-13-479, April 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-479
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654274.pdf
5. Health Insurance: Seven States’ Actions to Establish Exchanges under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. GAO-13-486, April 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-486
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654332.pdf
6. Export-Import Bank: Additional Analysis and Information Could Better Inform Congress on Exposure, Risk, and Resources. GAO-13-620, May 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-620
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654926.pdf
Press Release
1. GAO Makes MedPAC Appointments, May 30.
http://www.gao.gov/press/medpac_appointments30may2013.html
Not all paths lead to Rome: Analysing the network of sister cities
Not all paths lead to Rome: Analysing the network of sister cities (PDF)
Source: arXiv.org
This work analyses the practice of sister city pairing. We investigate structural properties of the resulting city and country networks and present rankings of the most central nodes in these networks. We identify different country clusters and find that the practice of sister city pairing is not influenced by geographical proximity but results in highly assortative networks.
See: Does Being ‘Sister Cities’ Really Mean Anything? (Atlantic Cities)
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Social Security Administration: Long-Term Strategy Needed to Address Key Management Challenges. GAO-13-459, May 29.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-459
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654866.pdf
Podcast –
http://www.gao.gov/multimedia/podcasts/654851
2. Human Capital: Additional Steps Needed to Help Determine the Right Size and Composition of DOD’s Total Workforce. GAO-13-470, May 29.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-470
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654881.pdf
3. UN Compensation: United Nations Should Clarify the Process and Assumptions Underlying Secretariat Professional Salaries. GAO-13-526, May 29.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-526
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654876.pdf
4. Worker Safety and Health at Department of Energy Sites. GAO-13-497R, May 29.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-497R
5. Export-Import Bank: Financing of Dual-Use Exports. GAO-13-628R, May 29.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-628R
CRS — The Peace Corps: Current Issues
The Peace Corps: Current Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Founded in 1961, the Peace Corps has sought to meet its legislative mandate of promoting world peace and friendship by sending American volunteers to serve at the grassroots level in villages and towns in all corners of the globe. As of end September 2012, about 8,073 volunteers were serving in 76 nations.
In 2013, the 113 th Congress will consider the President’s annual funding request for the Peace Corps, efforts to reauthorize the Peace Corps, and related issues. On April 10, 2013, the Administration issued its FY2014 budget request, proposing $378.8 million for the Peace Corps, 6% more than the agency’s currently estimated FY2013 post-sequester and across-the-board rescission level of $356.0 million.
The last Peace Corps funding authorization (P.L. 106-30), approved in 1999, covered the years FY2000 to FY2003. Authorization legislation offered in the 112 th Congress from both the House (H.R. 2583) and Senate (S. 1426) failed to receive floor action. On November 21, 2011, the Kate Puzey Peace Corps Volunteer Protection Act of 2011 was signed into law (P.L. 112-57). It put into place a number of safeguards to address and reduce the incidence of volunteer rape and sexual abuse.
A comprehensive assessment of Peace Corps operations was published in June 2010. It makes 64 recommendations supporting a six-point strategy that has been adopted by the agency for implementation over the next several years.
Current issues include the extent to which there is available funding for Peace Corps expansion, whether the Peace Corps has the institutional capacity to expand, and whether volunteers are able to function in a safe and secure environment. This report will be updated as events warrant.
CRS — Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns
Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. During that time, economic and social stability improved considerably, and many analysts believed Haiti was turning a corner toward sustainable development. Unfortunately, Haiti’s development was set back by a massive earthquake in January 2010 that devastated much of the capital of Port-au-Prince and other parts of the country. Poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide: Haiti remains the poorest country in the western hemisphere.
Haiti is the Obama Administration’s top foreign assistance priority for Latin American and Caribbean countries. Haiti’s developmental needs and priorities are many. The Haitian government and the international donor community are implementing a 10-year recovery plan focusing on territorial, economic, social, and institutional rebuilding. An outbreak of cholera that began in late 2010 has swept across most of the country and further complicated assistance efforts. While some progress has been made in developing democratic institutions, they remain weak. In May 2011, following yet another controversial election, President René Préval was succeeded by Michel Martelly, a popular musician without any previous political experience. President Martelly’s difficulty in forming a government and political gridlock, especially the lengthy and contentious delays in beginning a long overdue elections process, are hampering reconstruction efforts and frustrating international donors. Some steps toward elections have been made, including naming an electoral council and passing a political parties law.
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore order since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government in 2004. It currently has 9,464 troops. The mission has helped facilitate elections, conducted campaigns to combat gangs and drug trafficking with the Haitian National Police, and played a key role in emergency responses to natural disasters, especially after the earthquake. Nonetheless, popular protests have called for MINUSTAH’s withdrawal because of sexual abuse by some of its forces and scientific findings that its troops apparently introduced cholera to the country. In February 2013 the U.N. said it would not compensate cholera victims, citing diplomatic immunity.
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes, continue to improve security, and promote econom ic development. Other concerns include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; and alleviating poverty. The Obama Administration granted Temporary Protected Status to Haitians living in the United States at the time of the earthquake. Congressional concerns include the pace and effectiveness of reconstruction, respect for human rights, security issues, counternarcotics efforts and trade issues. Congress is also concerned that overdue Senate and local elections be scheduled quickly and be free, fair, and peaceful.
Current legislation related to Haiti includes P.L. 112-74, P.L. 111-171, P.L. 110-246 , P.L. 109- 432 , H.R. 651, H.R. 1525, H.R. 1749, H.Res. 31, H.Res. 61, and S.Res. 12.
CRS — U.S.-Chinese Motor Vehicle Trade: Overview and Issues
U.S.-Chinese Motor Vehicle Trade: Overview and Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The U.S. auto industry employs nearly 800,000 workers and is a major employer in certain parts of the country. International competition is fierce, with many automakers and thousands of parts makers vying for market share. Because of the industry’s importance to the U.S. economy, the rapid rise of China’s auto assembly and auto parts industries in recent years has raised concerns among some Members of Congress.
In 2009, China overtook the United States to become both the world’s largest producer of and market for motor vehicles. In 2012, assemblers in China sold 19 million vehicles, and forecasts project more than 30 million vehicles will be sold there in 2020. China’s increasing importance in this industry presents a unique set of opportunities and challenges for the United States. On the one hand, China is in some respects a relatively open market; it was the fourth-largest export market for U.S. autos and auto parts in 2012 at $7.3 billion ($5.7 billion for autos and $1.6 billion for auto parts), and has welcomed foreign direct investment by U.S.-based auto and auto parts manufacturers. Every year since 2010, General Mo tors has sold more cars in China (through exports and its joint ventures there) than in the United States.
On the other hand, China maintains a number of trade and investment barriers that affect trade flows in autos and auto parts. Foreign automakers can produce autos in China only through 50/50 joint ventures with Chinese partners. In addition, U.S. and other foreign auto firms have reportedly faced pressures relating to transfer of technology, export performance, and domestic content requirements. Although the United States imports few vehicles from China, China has become the fourth-largest source of U.S. auto parts imports, with shipments of $14.5 billion in 2012.
The Chinese government has made the development of its auto and auto parts industries, including “new energy vehicles,” a major economic priority, and has implemented a number of industrial policies to promote and protect Chinese auto firms with the long-term goal of making them globally competitive. As a result, auto and auto parts trade has become a source of conflict between the United States and China, most recently in 2012, when the Obama Administration asked the World Trade Organization (WTO) to consider whether alleged Chinese subsidies of auto and auto parts manufacturers violate international rules.
China’s demand for motor vehicles is likely to continue growing rapidly because its population of 1.3 billion is just beginning to have the financial resources to purchase automobiles. For the United States, this will mean many new opportunities and challenges. Unlike some other markets, such as Korea, China’s large internal demand may well shape the industry for many years, with exporting a secondary interest. China’s rising investments in U.S. parts makers such as Nexteer and B456 Systems may help develop a U.S. tec hnology lead in fuel-efficient, low-emission vehicles. But the prevalence of state and munici pal ownership of many Chinese auto and auto parts companies may also cause friction. Many in Congress have called on the Obama Administration to take a tougher stand against China’s industrial policies that may favor Chinese automakers over foreign automakers.
