Archive
Taxes: Afghan Government Has Levied Nearly a Billion Dollars in Business Taxes on Contractors Supporting U.S. Government Efforts in Afghanistan
Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Since 2008, the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MOF) has levied over $921 million in business taxes, and associated penalties, on 43 contractors that support U.S. government efforts in Afghanistan. DOD, INL, and USAID have agreements with the Afghan government that provide exemption from certain Afghan taxes. SIGAR identified instances where contractors were taxed despite these agreements. For example, $93 million of the $921 million represented taxes levied on business receipts and annual corporate income—a tax category that both the U.S. and Afghan governments have agreed should be exempt for contractors operating under covered agreements. SIGAR also identified instances in which the MOF assessed tax liabilities on contractors even though the contractors held MOF-issued tax exemption certificates. For example, the MOF issued Business Receipts Tax and annual corporate income tax assessments on some DOD contractors, even though the contractors should have been exempt from both tax categories. Three DOD contractors in SIGAR’s sample that held MOF-issued tax exemption certificates were improperly assessed nearly $59 million in business receipts and annual corporate income taxes. U.S. and MOF officials disagree about the tax-exempt status of subcontractors. MOF officials assert that the DOD and State INL agreements provide tax-exempt status only to prime contractors, and not subcontractors, whereas U.S. government officials contend that the agreements provide tax exemption for all non-Afghan companies (both prime and subcontractors) supporting U.S. government efforts. Given these ongoing disputes and the ambiguous nature of the MOF-issued assessments, the 43 contractors in SIGAR’s sample have paid approximately $67 million of the $921 million in total tax assessments, and most still face unresolved assessments. As a result of the outstanding assessments, the MOF has restricted contractors’ freedom of movement and refused to renew business licenses, and the Afghan government has even arrested some contractor personnel. The combined effect is the potential interruption of support to U.S. military operations.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Security Force Assistance: More Detailed Planning and Improved Access to Information Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in Afghanistan. GAO-13-381, April 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-381
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654290.pdf
2. National Preparedness: Efforts to Address the Medical Needs of Children in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Incident. GAO-13-438, April 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-438
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654265.pd
Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan
Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan
Source: RAND Corporation
The Demands Placed Upon the Army by Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
- The Army has provided the bulk of U.S. troops to Iraq and Afghanistan: over 1.5 million troop-years as of December 2011, and 54 percent of all active component troop-year deployments within the area of operations.
- Since 2008, the cumulative amount of time that a soldier has spent deployed has increased (on average) by 28 percent. In contrast, the percentage "not yet deployed" and the Army’s unutilized capacity to deploy have both decreased.
- As of December 2011, roughly 73 percent of active component soldiers had deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, an increase of 6 percentage points since December 2008. Most of these soldiers were working on their second, third, or fourth year of cumulative deployed duty.
- Most of the remaining 27 percent are not yet deployed, since they are recent recruits, are forward-stationed in other overseas locations, or have contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and/or Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn without deploying.
- The Army retains very little unutilized capacity to deploy additional active component soldiers without increasing the burden on those who have already deployed.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
Afghanistan
Key Oversight Issues
GAO-13-218SP, Feb 11, 2013
Depot Maintenance
Additional Information Needed to Meet DOD’s Core Capability Reporting Requirements
GAO-13-194, Feb 11, 2013
National Defense
Standard Missile-3 Block IIB Analysis of Alternatives
GAO-13-382R, Feb 11, 2013
CRS — U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom (February 5, 2013)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military casualties in the active Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan), as well as operations that have ended: Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq). This report includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), amputations, evacuations, and the demographics of casualties. Some of these statistics are publicly available at the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) website, whereas others have been obtained through contact with experts at DOD.
This report will be updated as needed.
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (PDF)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
During the reporting period of April 1 to September 30, 2012, the Coalition and our Afghan partners blunted the insurgent summer offensive, continued to transition the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) into security lead, pushed violence out of most populated areas, and coalition member nations signed several international agreements to support the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan. In May, President Obama and President Karzai signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement, reflecting the two governments’ desire for an enduring partnership. At the May 2012 Chicago Summit, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations also pledged to support Afghanistan through 2017. This was followed in July by the Tokyo Conference, at which the international community declared its support for Afghanistan by linking specific reforms in governance and rule-of-law by the Afghan government with sustained financial assistance through 2015.
During the reporting period enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) were up one percent compared to the same period last year, due in large part to a shortened poppy harvest employing low-level insurgents far less than in past years. However, EIAs are down 3 percent from January to September 2012 compared to the same period in 2011, after dropping nine percent in 2011 compared to 2010. EIAs are now disproportionately occurring outside of populated areas, and the security of many of Afghanistan’s largest cities increased substantially during the reporting period.
Security progress and the development of the ANSF during the reporting period have enabled the security transition process to continue in accordance with the framework agreed to at the 2010 Lisbon Summit. As of the end of September 2012, roughly 76 percent of Afghans are living in areas where the ANSF has begun to assume the lead for security.
Despite these and other positive trends during the reporting period, the campaign continued to face challenges, including a rise in insider attacks. The rise in insider attacks has the potential to adversely affect the Coalition’s political landscape, but mitigation policies and a collective ISAF-ANSF approach are helping to reduce risks to coalition personnel, and to sustain confidence in the campaign. The cause of and eventual solution to this joint ISAF and ANSF problem will require continuous assessment; it remains clear that the insider threat is both an enemy tactic and has a cultural component. The many mitigation policies recently put in place will require additional time to assess their effects, although the number of insider attacks has dropped off sharply from the peak in August.
CRS — Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance (Updated)
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The capacity and transparency of Afghan governance are crucial to the success of a planned transition from U.S.-led NATO forces to Afghan leadership by the end of 2014. The capacity of the formal Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but nepotism is entrenched in Afghan culture and other forms of corruption are widespread. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anticorruption institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai backlash when they have targeted his allies or relatives. At a donors’ conference in Tokyo on July 8, 2012, donors pledged to aid Afghanistan’s economy through at least 2017, provided Afghanistan takes concrete, verifiable action to rein in corruption. On July 26, 2012, Karzai appeared to try to meet his pledges to the Tokyo conference by issuing a “decree on administrative reforms”—a document of sweeping policy directives intended to curb corruption.
Even though the government is weak, President Hamid Karzai has tried to concentrate authority in Kabul through his constitutional powers of appointment at all levels. Karzai has repeatedly and publicly denied assertions by opposing faction leaders that he wants to stay in office beyond the 2014 expiration of his second term, but there are concerns he plans to use state election machinery to support the election of a successor. International efforts to curb fraud in two successive elections (for president in 2009 and parliament in 2010) largely failed and Afghan efforts to improve election oversight for the 2014 election are behind schedule, although the issue is being closely watched by Afghan civil society groups. Organized opposition political parties are working together to ensure a fair election.
No matter how the 2014 election works out, there is concern among many observers that governance will founder as the United States and its partners wind down their involvement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic leaders—who have always been at least as significant a factor in governance as the formal power structure—is expected to assert itself after 2014 should governing institutions falter. However, the reassertion of informal leaders might produce even more corruption and arbitrary administration of justice than is the case now. Karzai has thus fare been unable to marginalize these ethnic faction leaders, in part because they have large constituencies, but he relies more closely on the loyalty of several close, ethnic Pashtun allies, particularly those from the Qandahar area. The non-Pashtun faction leaders generally oppose Karzai’s willingness to make concessions to insurgent leaders in search of a settlement. There are fears that a reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan politics will further set back progress in human rights and the rights of women and boost Pashtun power.
Broader issues of human rights often vary depending on the security environment in particular regions, although some trends prevail nationwide. Women, media professionals, and civil society groups have made substantial gains since the fall of the Taliban, but traditional attitudes contribute to the judicial and political system’s continued toleration of child marriages, imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence, judgments against converts from Islam to Christianity, and curbs on the sale of alcohol and Western-oriented programming in the Afghan media. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
PASSENGER RAIL SECURITY
Consistent Incident Reporting and Analysis Needed to Achieve Program Objectives
GAO-13-20, Dec 19, 2012
AFGHANISTAN DRAWDOWN PREPARATIONS
DOD Decision Makers Need Additional Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess Equipment
GAO-13-185R, Dec 19, 2012
CRS — Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
U.S. policy toward the Central Asian states has aimed at facilitating their cooperation with U.S. and NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and their efforts to combat terrorism; proliferation; and trafficking in arms, drugs, and persons. Other U.S. objectives have included promoting free markets, democratization, human rights, energy development, and the forging of East-West and Central Asia-South Asia trade links. Such policies aim to help the states become what various U.S. administrations have considered to be responsible members of the international community rather than to degenerate into xenophobic, extremist, and anti-Western regimes that contribute to wider regional conflict and instability.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian “front-line” states offered over-flight and other support for coalition anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq. About two dozen Kazakhstani troops served in Iraq until late 2008. Uzbekistan rescinded U.S. basing rights in 2005 after the United States criticized the reported killing of civilians in the town of Andijon. In early 2009, Kyrgyzstan ordered a U.S. base in that country to close, allegedly because of Russian inducements and U.S. reluctance to meet Kyrgyz requests for greatly increased lease payments. An agreement on continued U.S. use of the Manas Transit Center was reached in June 2009. In recent years, most of the regional states also participate in the Northern Distribution Network for the transport of U.S. and NATO supplies into and out of Afghanistan.
Policymakers have tailored U.S. policy in Central Asia to the varying characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and successive administrations have backed diverse export routes to the West for these resources. U.S. policy toward Kyrgyzstan has long included support for its civil society. In Tajikistan, the United States focuses on developmental assistance to bolster the fragile economy and address high poverty rates. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan—the most populous state in the heart of the region—were cool after 2005, but recently have improved.
Congress has been at the forefront in advocating increased U.S. ties with Central Asia, and in providing backing for the region for the transit of equipment and supplies for U.S.-led stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Congress has pursued these goals through hearings and legislation on humanitarian, economic, and democratization assistance; security issues; and human rights. During the 112th Congress, the Members may review assistance for bolstering regional border and customs controls and other safeguards to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), combating trafficking in persons and drugs, encouraging regional integration with South Asia and Europe, advancing energy security, and countering terrorism. Support for these goals also has been viewed as contributing to stabilization and reconstruction operations by the United States and NATO in Afghanistan. For several years, Congress has placed conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because of concerns about human rights abuses and lagging democratization (the Secretary of State may waive such conditions). Congress will continue to consider how to balance these varied U.S. interests in the region.
Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond
Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond (PDF)
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace
Despite interesting patterns from the past and at least superficially striking parallels with the present, policies on Afghanistan have not been adequately informed by an understanding of the country’s history. Nor has the extensive academic literature on Afghan history been translated into policy; on the contrary, much that has been attempted in Afghanistan since late 2001 has been remarkably ahistorical. This report identifies broad historical patterns and distills relevant lessons that may be applicable to policies during the 2011 to 2014 transition and beyond.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Airport Noise Grants: FAA Needs to Better Ensure Project Eligibility and Improve Strategic Goal and Performance Measures. GAO-12-890, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-890
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648149.pdf
2. Asset Forfeiture Programs: Justice and Treasury Should Determine Costs and Benefits of Potential Consolidation. GAO-12-972, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-972
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648097.pdf
3. Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk Management. GAO-12-898, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-898
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648111.pdf
4. Bureau of Prisons: Growing Inmate Crowding Negatively Affects Inmates, Staff, and Infrastructure. GAO-12-743, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-743
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648124.pdf
5. Critical Infrastructure: DHS Needs to Refocus Its Efforts to Lead the Government Facilities Sector. GAO-12-852, August 20.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-852
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593580.pdf
6. Department of Homeland Security: Oversight and Coordination of Research and Development Should Be Strengthened. GAO-12-837, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-837
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648153.pdf
7. Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to Assess a Jurisdiction’s Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own. GAO-12-838, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-838
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648163.pdf
8. Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting. GAO-12-977R, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-977R
9. Military Training: DOD Met Annual Reporting Requirements and Improved Its Sustainable Ranges Report. GAO-12-879R, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-879R
10. Millennium Challenge Corporation: Results of Transportation Infrastructure Projects in Seven Countries. GAO-12-631, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-631
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648093.pdf
11. Nonproliferation: Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports. GAO-12-536, July 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-536
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593132.pdf
+ Testimonies
1. Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Oversight of Safety, Security, and Project Management, by Mark Gaffigan, managing director, natural resources and environment, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. GAO-12-912T, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-912T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592773.pdf
2. Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Faces Implementation Challenges, by Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., director, physical infrastructure issues, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. GAO-12-1011T, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1011T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648121.pdf
3. Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies, by Timothy J. DiNapoli, acting director, acquisition and sourcing management, before the House Committee on Armed Services. GAO-12-1026T, September 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1026T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648106.pdf
Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning from America’s Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation
Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning from America’s Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation
Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, NATO’s irregular warfare and nation-building mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. Put directly, the Alliance and its partners have fallen short of achieving the results needed to create a stable, secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan nation, a particularly daunting proposition given Afghanistan’s history and culture, the region’s contemporary circumstances, and the fact that no such country has existed there before. Furthermore, given the central nature of U.S. contributions to this NATO mission, these shortfalls also serve as an indicator of a serious American problem as well. Specifically, inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in the U.S. Government’s strategic planning processes and products, as well as fundamental flaws in the U.S. Government’s structures and systems for coordinating and integrating the efforts of its various agencies, are largely responsible for this adverse and dangerous situation. This book explores these strategic and interagency shortfalls, while proposing potential reforms that would enable the United States to achieve the strategic coherence and genuine unity of effort that will be needed in an era of constrained resources and emerging new threats.
India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region
Source: RAND Corporation
India and Pakistan have very different visions for Afghanistan, and they seek to advance highly disparate interests through their respective engagements in the country. Pakistan views Afghanistan primarily as an environment in which to pursue its rivalry with India. India pursues domestic priorities (such as reining in anti-Indian terrorism, accessing Central Asian energy resources, and increasing trade) that require Afghanistan to experience stability and economic growth. Thus, whereas Pakistan seeks to fashion an Afghan state that would detract from regional security, India would enhance Afghanistan’s stability, security, economic growth, and regional integration. Afghanistan would welcome greater involvement from India, though it will need to accommodate the interests of multiple other external powers as well. India has a range of options for engaging Afghanistan, from continuing current activities to increasing economic and commercial ties, deploying forces to protect Indian facilities, continuing or expanding training for Afghan forces, or deploying combat troops for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. To avoid antagonizing Pakistan, India is likely to increase economic and commercial engagement while maintaining, or perhaps augmenting, military training, though it will continue to conduct such training inside India. Increased Indian engagement in Afghanistan, particularly enhanced Indian assistance to Afghan security forces, will advance long-term U.S. objectives in central and south Asia. As the United States prepares to withdraw its combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014, it should therefore encourage India to fill the potential vacuum by adopting an increasingly assertive political, economic, and security strategy that includes increased security assistance.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Federal Buildings Fund: Improved Transparency and Long-term Plan Needed to Clarify Capital Funding Priorities. GAO-12-646, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-646
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592378.pdf
2. Medicaid: Providers in Three States with Unpaid Federal Taxes Received Over $6 Billion in Medicaid Reimbursements. GAO-12-857, July 27.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-857
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593096.pdf
3. Ownership by Minority, Female, and Disadvantaged Firms in the Pipeline Industry. GAO-12-896R, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-896R
4. Federal Fleets: Overall Increase in Number of Vehicles Masks That Some Agencies Decreased Their Fleets. GAO-12-780, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-780
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593248.pdf
5. Cancellation of the Army’s Autonomous Navigation System. GAO-12-851R, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-851R
6. Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law. GAO-12-750, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-750
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593262.pdf
7. Secure Communities: Criminal Alien Removals Increased, but Technology Planning Improvements Needed. GAO-12-708, July 13.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-708
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592416.pdf
+ Testimony
1. Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse Remains, by Richard J. Hillman, managing director, forensic audits and investigative service, before the Subcommittees on Economic Opportunity and Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. GAO-12-967T, August 2.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-967T
New From the GAO
New GAO Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Federal Protective Service: Preliminary Results on Efforts to Assess Facility Risks and Oversee Contract Guards, by Mark L. Goldstein, director, physical infrastructure, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-943T, July 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-943T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592884.pdf
2. Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Take Actions to Strengthen Monitoring of Schools, by Rebecca Gambler, acting director, homeland security and justice, before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border Security, Senate Committee on the Judiciary. GAO-12-895T, July 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-895T
3. Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces, by Charles Michael Johnson Jr., director, international affairs and trade, and Sharon L. Pickup, director, defense capabilities and management, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee. GAO-12-951T, July 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-951T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592914.pdf
Evaluating Female Engagement Team Effectiveness in Afghanistan
Evaluating Female Engagement Team Effectiveness in Afghanistan (PDF)
One hallmark of the United States’ population-centric strategy in Afghanistan has been the development of specialized teams tasked with engaging local populations. One such team is the Female Engagement Team (FET), which the military first developed in 2009 to overcome cultural barriers to access Afghan females, a previously untouchable segment of the Afghan population. The job of the all-female teams is to engage local women, and at times men and children, in support of battle owners’ counterinsurgency objectives. The FET mission statement has undergone many modifications, but can currently be summarized as follows: influence the population through persistent and consistent interaction to create stability and security.For its relatively small size, the program has received an enormous amount of attention and praise. While the teams are frequently heralded as a success both in military circles and in the media, I contend that assertions that the FET program has been a success are problematic. The FET program has been promoted and defended as a critical element of population-centric counterinsurgency that separates the insurgency from the population on which it depends for support, but there has been no meaningful assessment from which one can make conclusions about the contribution of the teams as a COIN tool.Specifically, I argue that current assessment models for the FET program are insufficient in two respects. First, while the military has collected a significant amount of data on their independent variable—the activities FETs have done to engage the Afghan population—they have failed to gather in any systematic fashion data that connect the actions of the teams to the mechanisms of population-centric COIN through which they are believed to operate. In particular, the military has not convincingly shown that the outreach conducted by the teams influences women and their communities to stop enabling the insurgency and instead support coalition forces and the Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Second, the military has failed to establish a causal link between FETs and successful outcomes, most notably, a decrease in insurgency violence. In the absence of sound assessment on which to draw, proponents of the program have relied heavily upon untested assumptions, sometimes problematic, about the impact of FET engagements among the population, as well as the relevance of those engagements for meeting the goal of weakening the insurgency, to conclude that the program has been a success.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Bankruptcy: Agencies Continue Rulemakings for Clarifying Specific Provisions of Orderly Liquidation Authority. GAO-12-735, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-735
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592317.pdf
2. Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-800
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592372.pdf
3. Trade Adjustment Assistance: USDA Has Enhanced Technical Assistance for Farmers and Fishermen, but Steps Are Needed to Better Evaluate Program Effectiveness. GAO-12-731, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-731
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592321.pdf
4. Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund: Transparency of Balances and Controls over Equitable Sharing Should Be Improved. GAO-12-736, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-736
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592350.pdf
5. Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment. GAO-12-517, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-517
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592360.pdf
6. Human Capital: HHS and EPA Can Improve Practices Under Special Hiring Authorities. GAO-12-692, July 9.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-692
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592200.pdf
+ Testimony
1. Counterterrorism: U.S. Agencies Face Challenges Countering the Use of Improvised Explosive Devices in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Region, by Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-907T, July 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-907T
CRS — In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress
In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
On May 1, 2012, President Obama gave a speech from Bagram Air Field in which he laid out U.S. government approaches for “winding down” the war in Afghanistan. While a number of observers have challenged the logical plausibility of a unilateral decision to “wind down” a war, the Administration’s commitment to decreasing U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan is clear.
As of mid-2012, many observers point to a coalescing vision of the way forward—shared by the governments of the United States, Afghanistan, and other international partners—that includes bringing the current campaign to a close by the end of 2014, and pursuing a political settlement among the parties in conflict, while extending U.S. and other international commitments to Afghanistan beyond 2014. In evaluating this emerging vision, some observers emphasize that the overall level of ambition has been lowered, while others stress that the timeline for international engagement has been extended. For the U.S. government, the broad strategic issues at stake in the war in Afghanistan continue to include:
- What fundamental national security interests does the United States have in Afghanistan and the region?
- What minimum conditions—political, economic, security—would need to pertain in Afghanistan in order for those U.S. interests to be protected?
- How appropriate are current and projected future U.S. approaches, until and after 2014, for helping Afghans establish those conditions?
- When and to what extent are Afghans likely to be able to sustain those conditions with relatively limited support from the international community?
- Ultimately, how important is this overall effort—given its likely timeline, risks, and costs—compared to other U.S. government priorities?
At this apparent turning point in both strategic thinking and activity on the ground, this short report considers issues that may be of interest to Congress as it considers the strength and duration of further U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, to 2014 and beyond.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures for Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices. GAO-12-614, May 15.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-614
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590870.pdf
2. Veterans’ Pension Benefits: Improvements Needed to Ensure Only Qualified Veterans and Survivors Receive Benefits. GAO-12-540, May 15.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-540
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590848.pdf
3. Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions. GAO-12-711, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-711
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591399.pdf
+ Testimonies
1. Afghanistan: USAID Oversight of Assistance Funds and Programs, by John P. Hutton, director, acquisition and sourcing management, and Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, international affairs and trade, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. GAO-12-802T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-802T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591394.pdf
2. Commercial Space Launch Act: Preliminary Information on Issues to Consider for Reauthorization, by Alicia Puente Cackley, director, financial markets and community investment, before the Subcommittee on Space, and Aeronautics, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. GAO-12-767T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-767T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591392.pdf
3. Disaster Recovery: Selected Themes for Effective Long-Term Recovery, by Stanley J. Czerwinski, director, strategic issues, before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO-12-813T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-813T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591389.pdf
4. Veterans’ Pension Benefits: Improvements Needed to Ensure Only Qualified Veterans Receive Benefits, by Daniel Bertoni, director, eduction, workforce, and income security issues, before the Senate Special Committee on Aging. GAO-12-784T, June 6.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-784T
Improving Access to Mental Health Care and Psychosocial Support within a Fragile Context: A Case Study from Afghanistan
Summary Points+ After the fall of the Taliban, the rebuilding of the Afghan health care system, from scratch, provided opportunities to integrate mental health into basic health services through the use of funds that became available during this complex humanitarian emergency.+ Practice-oriented mental health trainings for general health workers and ongoing clinical supervision in the basic health care system led to substantially increased demand for and access to basic mental health care services.+ Treatment of mental disorders within the health care system needs to be accompanied by a community-based approach that focuses on psychosocial problems.+ Addressing service delivery needs in a fragile state has to be accompanied by capacity building and policy development in order to foster structural changes within the health care system.
