Archive

Archive for the ‘Afghanistan’ Category

CRS — Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs (January 20, 2015)

February 13, 2015 Comments off

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

Congress has enacted a series of legislative provisions since 2006 to enable certain Iraqi and Afghan nationals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs). These provisions make certain Iraqis and Afghans who have worked as translators or interpreters, or who were employed by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government in Iraq or Afghanistan, eligible for special immigrant visas (SIVs). Special immigrants comprise a category of permanent employment-based admissions under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). While the special immigrant category is unique, it does bear some similarities to other admission categories that are authorized by other sections of the INA, including refugees and Amerasian children.

CBO — Updated Death and Injury Rates of U.S. Military Personnel During the Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan: Working Paper 2014-08

December 18, 2014 Comments off

Updated Death and Injury Rates of U.S. Military Personnel During the Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan: Working Paper 2014-08
Source: Congressional Budget Office

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, which ended on August 31, 2010, some 3,482 hostile deaths occurred among U.S. military personnel and 31,947 people were wounded in action (WIA). More than 1,800 hostile deaths occurred during Operation Enduring Freedom (in Afghanistan and surrounding countries) through November 2014; about 20,000 more people were wounded in action.

In the Iraq conflict, a larger proportion of wounded personnel survived their wounds than was the case during the Vietnam War, but the increased survival rates are not as high as some studies have asserted. Prior to the surge in troop levels that began in early 2007, the survival rate was 90.4 percent in Iraq—compared with 86.5 percent in Vietnam.

Amputation rates are difficult to measure consistently, but I estimate that 2.6 percent of all WIA and 9.0 percent of medically-evacuated WIA from the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters combined resulted in the major loss of a limb.

CRS — A Guide to U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom (November 20, 2014)

December 9, 2014 Comments off

A Guide to U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)

This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military casualties in the active missions Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR, Iraq and Syria) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan), as well as operations that have ended, Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq). This report includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), amputations, evacuations, and the demographics of casualties. Some of these statistics are publicly available at the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) website and others have been obtained through contact with experts at DOD.

This report will be updated as needed.

What Lessons Did We Learn (or Re-Learn) About Military Advising After 9/11?

December 1, 2014 Comments off

What Lessons Did We Learn (or Re-Learn) About Military Advising After 9/11? (PDF)
Source: Military Review

As military operations in Afghanistan continue to wind down in 2014, the U.S. military and international partner armed forces need to codify lessons learned on military advising from 9/11 to the present, with special emphasis on capturing insights from the two major counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. A compendium of lessons should include answers to certain essential questions. What major advising lessons did the U.S. military learn since 9/11? What current advising lessons parallel previously gleaned insights from historic advising missions? How should armed forces treat the advising mission after the troops withdraw from Afghanistan?

The main purpose of this article is to provide a set of the most important military advising lessons learned from past and present. These lessons have been distilled from comparing historical and contemporary advisory experiences extracted from dozens of sources including military journal articles, doctrine, book chapters, and monographs.

DOD Releases Report on Progress in Afghanistan

November 4, 2014 Comments off

DOD Releases Report on Progress in Afghanistan
Source: U.S. Department of Defense

The Department of Defense provided to Congress today the October 2014 “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” in accordance with Section 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended; to include section 1221 of the NDAA for FY 2012 (Public Law 112-81); sections 1212, 1223, and 1531(d) of the NDAA for FY 2013 (Public Law 112-239); and Senate Report 113-211, to accompany H.R. 4870, the Department of Defense (DoD) Appropriations Bill, 2015. This report covers April 1 to September 30,

During the reporting period, several significant milestones set the stage for the post-2014 transition and an enduring U.S. – Afghanistan partnership. On May 27, 2014, President Barack Obama announced his decision on the post-2014 U.S. military mission in Afghanistan, contingent on a signed U.S.-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement (BSA) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Afghan status of forces agreement (SOFA). On September 29, 2014, Dr. Ashraf Ghani was inaugurated as President and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah was sworn in as Chief Executive Officer, a new position established in the national unity government. The day following President Ghani’s inauguration, representatives of the U.S. and Afghanistan signed the BSA and representatives of NATO and Afghanistan signed the SOFA.

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have increasingly demonstrated their ability to plan and conduct independent and combined operations that employ multiple capabilities, to disrupt the insurgency, and to protect the populace. They successfully secured the April national elections and June presidential runoff with minimal support from the International Security Assistance Force.

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency Over Direct Contributions

October 1, 2014 Comments off

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency Over Direct Contributions
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General

Objective

Our objective was to determine whether the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI) have controls in place to ensure a transparent and accountable fiscal process for the direct funding provided for the sustainment of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF).

Findings

GIRoA lacked the basic controls to provide reasonable assurance that it appropriately spent $3.3 billion of ASFF direct contributions. These controls are key aspects of a transparent and accountable fiscal process. Specifically,

  • Ministry of Finance (MoF) could not provide a current cash balance for direct contributions or account for currency gains of at least $110.4 million made on Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) direct contributions.
  • MoF could not provide support for $17.4 million and MoI could not support $9.9 million withheld from ANSF salaries.
  • MoD and MoI controls over the payroll process were not adequate.
  • MoI processed $40 million in payroll payments that appeared improper.
  • MoD and MoI incorrectly charged $82.7 million of ASFF direct contribution funds.
  • This occurred because GIRoA did not develop the ministerial capability and capacity tomanage and oversee ASFF direct contributions and Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) had not held GIRoA accountable for not implementing controls and improper handling of ASFF direct contribution funds.

As a result, CSTC-A could not verify that GIRoA used ASFF direct contributions properly or for their intended purposes. In addition, the $13 billion in additional direct contributions DoD plans to provide to the ANSF between FY 2015 and FY 2019 may be subject to wasteful spending and abuse.

New From the GAO

September 30, 2014 Comments off

New From the GAO
Source: Government Accountability Office
Reports

1. Afghanistan Equipment Drawdown: Progress Made, but Improved Controls in Decision Making Could Reduce Risk of Unnecessary Expenditures. GAO-14-768, September 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-768
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666236.pdf

2. Bureau of Prisons: Information on Efforts and Potential Options to Save Costs. GAO-14-821, September 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-821
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666255.pdf

3. Unmanned Aerial Systems: Department of Homeland Security’s Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Use and Compliance with Privacy and Civil Liberty Laws and Standards. GAO-14-849R, September 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-849R

4. Elections: Observations on Wait Times for Voters on Election Day 2012. GAO-14-850, September 30.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-850
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666251.pdf

Press Release

1. GAO Makes Appointment to PCORI Governing Board. September 30.
http://www.gao.gov/press/pcori_governing_board_2014sep30.htm

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 1,023 other followers