Archive
Alleged Improprieties Regarding the Canine Program at the Department Of Energy’s Y-12 Site
Alleged Improprieties Regarding the Canine Program at the Department Of Energy’s Y-12 Site
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General
The Department of Energy’s (Department) Canine Program is an essential component of its efforts to identify and deter potential threats to infrastructure and personnel. At the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and other nuclear material hosting sites in the Department, canines are used to detect explosives, narcotics, concealed humans and also track human presence at facilities that store, handle and maintain special nuclear material. As outlined in Department directives and adopted as best practices by law enforcement and security professionals, the performance of canine teams depends on continual reinforcement of skills through realistic performance testing, proficiency training and annual certifications. As required by their contract with the Department, canine services contractors are required to develop and implement a canine training and certification program that embodies these principles. Canine services at Y-12 were obtained through a 5-year contract that is valued at almost $15 million. Subsequently, in 2012, we received allegations that the Department’s Y-12 site: (1) possibly "rigged" testing for canine teams, and (2) worked canines beyond their physical capability to perform effectively. Because of conflicting testimony and a lack of supporting documentation, we could not conclusively determine whether there were instances of "rigged" testing. However, our inspection identified a number of issues that led us to question the efficacy of the processes used to test, train and certify canines at Y-12. For instance, performance testing, training and annual certifications of canine teams were not properly conducted and/or documented. We did substantiate the allegation that handlers had worked canines beyond their physical capability to perform assigned duties. Deficiencies associated with the management of a multi-layered contract structure for furnishing canine services at the Y-12 site contributed to the problems we observed. Finally, Federal officials and various contractor officials acknowledged that they had not reviewed the training and certification records for the canine teams because the Canine Program was not identified as a high-risk security area based on the Department’s graded approach for risk determination. Management concurred with the recommendations in the report and agreed to develop and implement standardized policies and guidelines for all National Nuclear Security Administration sites utilizing canine detection services.
CRS — North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons production capabilities, warhead sophistication, the scope and success of its uranium enrichment program, or extent of its proliferation activities. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. North Korea’s plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon has been shuttered since its cooling tower was destroyed under international agreement in June 2008. However, on April 1, 2013, North Korea said it would resume operation of its plutonium production reactor. Experts estimate it will take approximately six months to restart. This would provide North Korea with approximately one bomb’s worth of plutonium per year.
While North Korea’s weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the past decade, intelligence emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment program in 2009, but has said its purpose is the production of fuel for nuclear power. In November 2010, North Korea showed visiting American experts early construction of a 100 MWT light-water reactor and a newly built gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, both at the Yongbyon site. The North Koreans claimed the enrichment plant was operational, but this has not been independently confirmed. U.S. officials have said that it is likely other, clandestine enrichment facilities exist. Enrichment (as well as reprocessing) technology can be used to produce material for nuclear weapons or fuel for power reactors. An enrichment capability could potentially provide North Korea with a faster way of making nuclear material for weapons and therefore is of great concern to policymakers.
North Korea has made multiple policy statements in the past year asserting its nuclear weapons status: in May 2012, North Korea changed its constitution to say that it was a “nuclear-armed state.” In January 2013, North Korea said that no dialogue on denuclearization “would be possible” and it would only disarm when all the other nuclear weapon states also disarm. In March 2013, North Korea stated its goal of expanding its nuclear weapons program.
Many experts believe that the prime objective of North Korea’s nuclear program is to develop a nuclear warhead that could be mounted on North Korea’s intermediate-range and long-range missiles. This was confirmed by North Korean official statements in late March 2013.
Miniaturization of a nuclear warhead would likely require additional nuclear and missile tests. In January 2013, a North Korean statement said that it would respond with a nuclear test “of higher level.” On February 12, 2013, the North Korean official news agency announced a “successful” underground nuclear detonation, and seismic monitoring systems measured a resulting earthquake that was 5.1 in magnitude. This is magnitude is slightly higher than past tests, but yield estimates are still uncertain. The South Korean Ministry of Defense estimated that the test yield was between 6 and 7 kilotons, while the U.S. Director of National Intelligence so far has said “approximately several kilotons.” North Korea claimed that the February 12, 2013, nuclear test was to develop a “smaller and light” warhead. At a minimum, the test would likely contribute to North Korea’s ability to develop a warhead that could be mounted on a long-range missile. To date, no open source date on test emissions is available that might show whether the North Koreans tested a uranium or plutonium device. This information could help determine the type and sophistication of the North Korean nuclear warhead design, about which little is known.
CRS — Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress
Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated that the United States would “engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals.” These reductions could include limits on strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. Yet, arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia have stalled, leading many observers to suggest that the United States reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally, or in parallel with Russia, without negotiating a new treaty. Many in Congress have expressed concerns about this possibility, both because they question the need to reduce nuclear forces below New START levels and because they do not want the President to agree to further reductions without seeking the approval of Congress.
Over the years, the United States reduced its nuclear weapons with formal, bilateral treaties, reciprocal, but informal, understandings, and unilateral adjustments to its force posture. The role of Congress in the arms control process also depends on the mechanism used to reduce forces. If the United States and Russia sign a formal treaty, then the Senate must signal its advice and consent with a vote of two-thirds of its Members. The House and Senate would each need to pass legislation approving an Executive Agreement. But the President can reduce U.S. nuclear weapons in parallel with Russia, without seeking congressional approval, if the reductions are taken unilaterally, or as the result of a nonbinding political agreement.
Each of the mechanisms for reducing nuclear forces can possess different characteristics for the arms control process. These include balance and equality, predictability, flexibility, transparency and confidence in compliance, and timeliness. Provisions in formal treaties can mandate balance and equality between the two sides’ forces. They can also provide both sides with the ability to predict the size and structure of the other’s current and future forces. Unilateral measures allow each side to maintain flexibility in deciding the size and structure of its nuclear forces. In addition, the monitoring and verification provisions included in bilateral treaties can provide each side with detailed information about the numbers and capabilities of the other’s nuclear forces, while also helping each side confirm that the other has complied with the limits and restrictions in the treaty. With unilateral reductions, the two sides could still agree to share information, or they could withhold information so that they would not have to share sensitive data about their forces.
It usually takes far longer to reduce nuclear forces through a bilateral arms control treaty than it takes to adopt unilateral adjustments to nuclear forces. The need to find balanced and equitable trades, limits acceptable to both sides, detailed definitions of systems limited by the treaty, and agreed procedures for monitoring and verification can slow the process of negotiations. In addition, it can take months or years for a treaty to enter into force, both because the legislatures must review and vote on the treaty and because other domestic or international events intervene. In contrast, the nations may be able to adopt and implement unilateral adjustments more quickly.
If the Obama Administration reduces U.S. nuclear forces in parallel with Russia, but without a formal treaty, the two nations could avoid months or years in negotiations. Because New START would remain in force, predictability and transparency would remain important. Balance and equality would, however, receive a lower priority, while flexibility and timeliness would grow more important. Congress may question whether such an agreement is subject to congressional review. It may also seek to limit funding for further reductions through the annual authorization and appropriations process if it does not support the Administration’s approach to further reductions. This report will be updated as needed.
CRS — Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations
Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Seven nations—China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—possess nuclear weapons. North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006, and announced that it had conducted a test in 2009 and another in 2013. Israel is widely thought to have nuclear weapons. As an aid to Congress in understanding nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and arms control matters, this report describes which agency is responsible for research and development (R&D) of nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices, as distinct from the bombers and missiles that deliver them) in these nations and whether these agencies are civilian or military. It also traces the history of such agencies in the United States from 1942 to the present. This report will be updated annually, or more often as developments warrant.
In the United States, the Army managed the nuclear weapons program during World War II. Since 1946, weapons R&D has been managed by civilian agencies, at present by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy. Concerns about “the immediate and long-term issues associated with the NNSA,” however, led Congress to establish the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-239. China’s nuclear weapons R&D is apparently under the direction of the military, collectively called the People’s Liberation Army.
France’s nuclear weapons R&D is supervised by the Ministry of Defense, which delegates the direction of these programs to the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission (CEA). However, as with NNSA in the United States, CEA is not a part of the Ministry of Defense. CEA also conducts nuclear programs in science and industry under the supervision of other ministries.
India’s nuclear weapons R&D appears to be controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy, which is under the direct control of the Prime Minister.
Israel’s nuclear program is under civilian control, but since Israel neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons, it classifies information on such weapons, including organizations responsible for R&D. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission reportedly has overall responsibility for Israel’s nuclear weapons program, and the Director General of that commission reports directly to the Prime Minister.
North Korea’s Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry is in charge of the day-to-day operation of the nuclear weapons program. Under it are nuclear-related organizations. Policy is decided by leader Kim Jong-un and other Communist Party and military leaders who advise him.
Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan’s organizations involved in nuclear weapons R&D and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces. The Prime Minister is the chair of the NCA, and membership includes senior civilian and military leaders.
Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is responsible for nuclear weapons R&D and production. It is a civilian agency, though it has many links to the military.
In the United Kingdom, a private company, AWE Management Limited, manages and operates the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), a government-owned, contractor-operated entity. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), which is headed by a civilian, controls the operations, policy, and direction of AWE and can veto actions of the company. The MoD provides most of the funding for AWE.
When Armies Divide: The Security of Nuclear Arsenals During Revolts, Coups, and Civil Wars
When Armies Divide: The Security of Nuclear Arsenals During Revolts, Coups, and Civil Wars
Source: RAND Corporation
This work examines what happened in April of 1961, when the French government was about to conduct the fourth of a series of nuclear tests in the Sahara. Four French Army generals, unhappy that de Gaulle was willing to support Algerian independence, staged a coup to keep Algeria as a French colony. The nuclear test was conducted a few days ahead of schedule — it was not successful — and speculation ever since has been that the test was moved up to keep the weapon out of the rebel generals’ hands.
While there is evidence that one of the generals contacted the officer who was in charge of the tests to try to delay them, Jenkins concludes that the generals really never had a plan in place to seize the weapon and that the French government didn’t want to delay the test. At the time it happened, the world viewed it as an internal, French problem.
The second, shorter part of the book compares the 1961 events to what might happen today if the military in Pakistan or North Korea splintered, and a rebel group got their hands on those countries’ nuclear materials. Jenkins contends that such a scenario today would clearly be an international incident, that neither Pakistan nor North Korea would want any foreign intervention, and that the United States "might not be the only first responder."
Two additional short essays by Dr. Stephen J. Lukasik and Constantin Melnik, a security assistant to the French prime minister in 1961, also review what happened in 1961.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINES
Some Consumer Fees Have Increased
GAO-13-266, Apr 11, 2013
COMMERCIAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
Observations on the Key Attributes and Challenges of Storage and Disposal Options
GAO-13-532T, Apr 11, 2013
INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE
GAO-13-272, Apr 11, 2013
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK
Spring 2013 Update
GAO-13-481SP, Apr 11, 2013
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
Outcome-Based Measures Would Assist DHS in Assessing Effectiveness of Cybersecurity Efforts
GAO-13-275, Apr 3, 2013
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Additional Actions Needed to Enhance Program Efficiency and Resource Management
GAO-13-505T, Apr 10, 2013
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
GAO-13-243, Mar 11, 2013
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS EDUCATION
Governmentwide Strategy Needed to Better Manage Overlapping Programs
GAO-13-529T, Apr 10, 2013
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
MODERNIZING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE
Observations on DOE’s and NNSA’s Efforts to Enhance Oversight of Security, Safety, and Project and Contract Management
GAO-13-482T, Mar 13, 2013
VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS
Challenges to Timely Processing Persist
GAO-13-453T, Mar 13, 2013
WATER INFRASTRUCTURE
Approaches and Issues for Financing Drinking Water and Wastewater Infrastructure
GAO-13-451T, Mar 13, 2013
Global report on Fukushima nuclear accident details health risks
Global report on Fukushima nuclear accident details health risks
Source: World Health Organization
A comprehensive assessment by international experts on the health risks associated with the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) disaster in Japan has concluded that, for the general population inside and outside of Japan, the predicted risks are low and no observable increases in cancer rates above baseline rates are anticipated.
The WHO report ‘Health Risk Assessment from the nuclear accident after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami based on preliminary dose estimation’ noted, however, that the estimated risk for specific cancers in certain subsets of the population in Fukushima Prefecture has increased and, as such, it calls for long term continued monitoring and health screening for those people.
Experts estimated risks in the general population in Fukushima Prefecture, the rest of Japan and the rest of the world, plus the power plant and emergency workers that may have been exposed during the emergency phase response.
…
In terms of specific cancers, for people in the most contaminated location, the estimated increased risks over what would normally be expected are:
- all solid cancers – around 4% in females exposed as infants;
- breast cancer – around 6% in females exposed as infants;
- leukaemia – around 7% in males exposed as infants;
- thyroid cancer – up to 70% in females exposed as infants (the normally expected risk of thyroid cancer in females over lifetime is 0.75% and the additional lifetime risk assessed for females exposed as infants in the most affected location is 0.50%).
For people in the second most contaminated location of Fukushima Prefecture, the estimated risks are approximately one-half of those in the location with the highest doses.
Choosing a New Organization for Management and Disposition of Commercial and Defense High-Level Radioactive Materials
Source: RAND Corporation
Finding ways to safely store and ultimately dispose of nuclear waste has been on the national policy agenda for decades and remains a matter of considerable debate. This volume considers the creation of a new, single-purpose organization to manage and dispose of commercial and defense high-level radioactive materials. The authors first examine three organizational models — federal government corporation, federally chartered private corporation, and independent government agency — and evaluate how well they could perform the goals and responsibilities needed in a new management and disposition organization (MDO). The authors find that a federally chartered private corporation, with its commitment to stockholders and making a profit, would be weak in public accountability and political credibility. For the other two models (a federal government corporation and independent government agency), they describe the critical steps to designing an MDO, focusing on the critical relationship of the organization to the President and Congress, its source of funding, and other organizational attributes, such as how it will engage stakeholders and be treated by federal and state regulatory agencies. The authors emphasize that the key challenge in designing a new MDO is the need to strike a balance between political accountability and flexibility.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS
Timely Processing Remains a Daunting Challenge
GAO-13-89, Dec 21, 2012
VA HEALTH CARE
Reliability of Reported Outpatient Medical Appointment Wait Times and Scheduling Oversight Need Improvement
GAO-13-130, Dec 21, 2012
FEDERAL REAL PROPERTY
Improved Cost Reporting Would Help Decision Makers Weigh the Benefits of Enhanced Use Leasing
GAO-13-14, Dec 19, 2012
HANFORD WASTE TREATMENT PLANT
DOE Needs to Take Action to Resolve Technical and Management Challenges
GAO-13-38, Dec 19, 2012
CRS — Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues (updated)
Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The policy debate over the role of nuclear power in the nation’s energy mix is rooted in the technology’s fundamental characteristics. Nuclear reactors can produce potentially vast amounts of energy with relatively low consumption of natural resources and emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants. However, facilities that produce nuclear fuel for civilian power reactors can also produce materials for nuclear weapons. The process of nuclear fission (splitting of atomic nuclei) to generate power also results in the production of radioactive material that must be contained in the reactor and can remain hazardous for thousands of years. How to manage the weapons proliferation and safety risks of nuclear power, or whether nuclear power is worth those risks, are issues that have long been debated in Congress.
The 104 licensed nuclear power reactors at 65 sites in the United States generate about 20% of the nation’s electricity. Five new reactors are currently licensed for construction. About a dozen more are planned, but whether they move forward will depend largely on their economic competitiveness with natural gas and coal plants. Throughout the world, 436 reactors are currently in service, and 62 more are under construction.
The March 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan increased attention to nuclear safety throughout the world. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which issues and enforces nuclear safety requirements, established a task force to identify lessons from Fukushima applicable to U.S. reactors. The task force’s report led to NRC’s first Fukushima-related regulatory requirements on March 12, 2012. Several other countries, such as Germany and Japan, eliminated or reduced their planned future reliance on nuclear power after the accident.
Highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel that is regularly removed from nuclear power plants is currently stored at plant sites in the United States. Plans for a permanent underground repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, were abandoned by the Obama Administration, although that decision is being challenged in court. The Obama Administration appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to recommend an alternative nuclear waste policy. The Commission recommended in January 2012 that new candidate sites for nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities be selected through a “consent based” process.
The level of security that must be provided at nuclear power plants has been a high-profile issue since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. Since those attacks, NRC issued a series of orders and regulations that substantially increased nuclear plant security requirements, although industry critics contend that those measures are still insufficient.
Encouraging exports of U.S. civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while making sure they are not used for foreign nuclear weapons programs has long been a fundamental goal of U.S. nuclear energy policy. Recent proposals to build nuclear power plants in several countries in the less developed world, including the Middle East, have prompted concerns that international controls may prove inadequate.
Radiation and the Risk of Chronic Lymphocytic and Other Leukemias among Chornobyl Cleanup Workers
Radiation and the Risk of Chronic Lymphocytic and Other Leukemias among Chornobyl Cleanup Workers
Source: Environmental Health Perspectives
Background: Risks of most types of leukemia from exposure to acute high doses of ionizing radiation are well known, but risks associated with protracted exposures, and associations between radiation and chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL) are not clear.
Objectives: To estimate relative risks of CLL and non-CLL from protracted exposures to low-dose ionizing radiation.
Methods: A nested case-control study was conducted in a cohort of 110,645 Ukrainian cleanup workers of the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear power plant accident. Cases of incident leukemia diagnosed in 1986-2006 were confirmed by a panel of expert hematologists/hematopathologists. Controls were matched to cases on place of residence and year of birth. Individual bone marrow radiation doses were estimated by the Realistic Analytical Dose Reconstruction with Uncertainty Estimation (RADRUE) method. A conditional logistic regression model was used to estimate excess relative risk of leukemia per gray (ERR/Gy) of radiation dose.
Results:A significant linear dose-response was found for all leukemia (137 cases, ERR/Gy=1.26 (95% confidence interval 0.03, 3.58)). There were non-significant positive dose-responses for both CLL and non-CLL (ERR/Gy=0.76 and 1.87, respectively). In our primary analysis excluding 20 cases with direct in-person interviews
Conclusions: Exposure to low doses and low dose-rates of radiation from post-Chornobyl cleanup work was associated with a significant increase in risk of leukemia, which was statistically consistent with estimates for the Japanese atomic bomb survivors. Based on the primary analysis, we conclude that CLL and non-CLL are both radiosensitive.
See: Chernobyl Cleanup Workers Had Significantly Increased Risk of Leukemiahttp://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/11/121108073635.htm (Science Daily)
CRS — Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power
Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
After several decades of widespread stagnation, nuclear power has attracted renewed interest in recent years. New license applications for 30 reactors have been announced in the United States, and another 548 are under construction, planned, or proposed around the world. In the United States, interest appears driven, in part, by tax credits, loan guarantees, and other incentives in the 2005 Energy Policy Act, as well as by concerns about carbon emissions from competing fossil fuel technologies.
A major concern about the global expansion of nuclear power is the potential spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology—particularly uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing—that could be used for nuclear weapons. Despite 30 years of effort to limit access to uranium enrichment, several undeterred states pursued clandestine nuclear programs, the A.Q. Khan black market network’s sales to Iran and North Korea representing the most egregious examples. However, concern over the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies may be offset by support for nuclear power as a cleaner and more secure alternative to fossil fuels. The Obama Administration has expressed optimism that advanced nuclear technologies being developed by the Department of Energy may offer proliferation resistance. The Administration has also pursued international incentives and agreements intended to minimize the spread of fuel cycle facilities.
Proposals offering countries access to nuclear power and thus the fuel cycle have ranged from requesting formal commitments by these countries to forswear sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology, to a de facto approach in which states would not operate fuel cycle facilities but make no explicit commitments, to no restrictions at all. Countries joining the U.S.- led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), now the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), signed a statement of principles that represented a shift in U.S. policy by not requiring participants to forgo domestic fuel cycle programs. Whether developing states will find existing proposals attractive enough to forgo what they see as their “inalienable” right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes remains to be seen.
GNEP was transformed into IFNEC under the Obama Administration and has continued as an international fuel cycle forum, but the Bush Administration’s plans for constructing nuclear fuel reprocessing and recycling facilities in the United States have been halted. Instead, the Obama Administration is supporting fundamental research on a variety of potential waste management technologies. Other ideas addressing the potential global expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities include placing all enrichment and reprocessing facilities under multinational control, developing new nuclear technologies that would not produce weapons-usable fissile material, and developing a multinational waste management system. Various systems of international fuel supply guarantees, multilateral uranium enrichment centers, and nuclear fuel reserves have also been proposed.
Congress will have a considerable role in at least four areas of oversight related to fuel cycle proposals. The first is providing funding and oversight of U.S. domestic programs related to expanding nuclear energy in the United States. The second area is policy direction and/or funding for international measures to assure supply. A third set of policy issues may arise in the context of U.S. participation in IFNEC or related initiatives. A fourth area in which Congress plays a key role is in the approval of nuclear cooperation agreements. Significant interest in these issues is expected to continue in the 112 th Congress.
CRS — Iran Sanctions (Updated)
Iran Sanctions (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The principal objective of international sanctions—to compel Iran to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses—has not been achieved to date. However, a broad international coalition has imposed progressively strict economic sanctions on Iran’s oil export lifeline, producing increasingly severe effects on Iran’s economy. Many judge that Iran might soon decide it needs a nuclear compromise to produce an easing of sanctions because:
- Oil exports provide about 70% of Iran’s government revenues and Iran’s oil exports have declined sharply as a result of the sanctions. A European Union embargo on purchases of Iranian crude oil that took full effect on July 1, 2012. Previously, EU countries were buying about 20% of Iran’s oil exports. This embargo is coupled with decisions by several other Iranian oil customers to substantially reduce purchases of Iranian oil in order to comply with a provision of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81).
- Together, these sanctions have reduced Iranian oil exports to about 1 million barrels per day as of October 2012, a dramatic decline from the 2.5 million barrels per day Iran exported during 2011. This loss of sales has caused Iran to reduce oil production, to the point where it is producing less oil than is Iraq.
- The loss of hard currency revenues from oil—coupled with the cut off of Iran from the international banking system and the reported depletion of Iran’s foreign exchange reserves—caused a collapse in the value of Iran’s currency, the rial, in early October. That collapse prompted street demonstrations and a halt to commerce by merchants who are uncertain how to price their goods. In response, Iran has tried to impose currency controls and arrested some illegal currency traders, although these steps are unlikely to restore public confidence in the regime’s economic management. Other oil producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, are selling additional oil to countries cutting Iranian oil buys, thus far preventing the lost Iranian sales from raising world oil prices.
Department of Defense and other assessments indicate that sanctions have not stopped Iran from building up its conventional military and missile capabilities, in large part with indigenous skills. However, sanctions may be slowing Iran’s nuclear program somewhat by preventing Iran from obtaining some needed technology from foreign sources. Iran is also judged not complying with U.N. requirements that it halt any weapons shipments outside its borders, particularly with regard to purported Iranian weapons shipments to help the embattled Asad government in Syria.
Despite the imposition of what many now consider to be “crippling” sanctions, some in Congress believe that economic pressure on Iran needs to increase further and faster. In the 112 th Congress, a House-Senate compromise version of an extensive Iran sanctions bill, H.R. 1905 (“Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012”), was passed by both chambers on August 1, 2012, and signed on August 10 (P.L. 112-158). The bill makes sanctionable numerous additional forms of foreign energy dealings with Iran, including shipments of crude oil, and enhances human rights-related provisions of previous Iran sanctions laws. Some press reports indicate that the 112 th Congress might try to increase sanctions further in late 2012, possibly as an amendment to a FY2013 national defense authorization act. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
Nuclear Physics: Exploring the Heart of Matter
Nuclear Physics: Exploring the Heart of Matter
Source: National Research Council (Board on Physics and Astronomy)
Nuclear physics today is a diverse field, encompassing research that spans dimensions from a tiny fraction of neutrons and protons in the atomic nucleus to the enormous scales of astrophysical objects in the cosmos.
Its research objectives include the desire not only to better understand the nature of matter interacting at the nuclear level but to describe the liquid state of the Universe that existed at the big bang—a phenomenon that can now be replicated in the most advanced colliding-beam accelerators. Its discoveries impact other fields such as astrophysics, particle physics, and cosmology, while the tools developed by nuclear physicists not only are employed by other basic sciences but have found wide-spread applications in a range of technologies that benefit society.
The Committee on Assessment of and Outlook for Nuclear Physics (NP 2010) has prepared a report assessing the outlook for nuclear physics research in the United States. Building on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Science Advisory Committee’s "2007 Long-range Plan Report," this report, Exploring the Heart of Matter, develops a clear and compelling articulation of the scientific rationale and objectives for nuclear physics, placing near-term goals in a broader international context. This report also puts the long-term priorities for the field (in terms of major facilities, research infrastructure, and scientific manpower) into a global context and recommends a strategy that can serve as a framework for progress in U.S. nuclear physics through 2020 and beyond.
See: National Research Council presents long-term priorities for US nuclear physics program (EurekAlert!)
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Prescription Drug Data: HHS Has Issued Health Privacy and Security Regulations but Needs to Improve Guidance and Oversight. GAO-12-605, June 22.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-605
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591808.pdf
2. Managing Critical Isotopes: DOE’s Isotope Program Needs Better Planning for Setting Prices and Managing Production Risks. GAO-12-591, May 23.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-591
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591064.pdf
Nuclear Notes (Vol. 2, Issue 1)
Nuclear Notes (Vol. 2, Issue 1)
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Nuclear Notesis a biannual publication of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) featuring innovative thinking by rising experts. Its goal is to advance the public debate about nuclear weapons strategy and policy. PONI welcomes submissions of 1,500–2,000 words on contemporary topics pertaining to nuclear weapons strategy or policy. See the Nuclear Notes page for more information on the publication and submitting an article for future editions.
In this issue, Jonah Friedman reviews Russia’s military modernization. Eli Jacobs considers the paradox of de-escalation. Henry Philippens analyzes the future prospects of de-alerting. Yogesh Joshi and Alankrita Sinha investigate India and ballistic missile interception. Stephanie Spies makes the case for (rhetorically) taking the military option off the table with Iran. And Heather Williams looks at the crises of arms control.
New From the GAO
New GAO ReportsSource: Government Accountability Office
1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Natural Hazard Assessments Could Be More Risk-Informed.
GAO-12-465, April 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-465
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590430.pdf
2. Highway Infrastructure: Federal-State Partnership Produces Benefits and Poses Oversight Risks.
GAO-12-474, April 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-474
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590500.pdf
New From the GAO
New GAO ReportSource: Government Accountability Office
Nuclear Safety: DOE Needs to Determine the Costs and Benefits of Its Safety Reform Effort. GAO-12-347, April 20.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-347
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590257.pdf
CRS — U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage
U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Regardless of the outcome of the ongoing debate about the proposed Yucca Mountain geologic waste repository in Nevada, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF)—also referred to as “highlevel nuclear waste”—will continue to be needed and the issue will continue to be debated. The need for SNF storage, even after the first repository is opened, will continue for a few reasons. First, the Obama Administration terminated work on the only planned permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, which was intended to provide a destination for most of the stored SNF. Also, the Yucca Mountain project was not funded by Congress in FY2011 and FY2012, and not included in the Administration’s budget request for FY2013. Second, even if the planned repository had been completed, the quantity of SNF and other high-level waste in storage awaiting final disposal now exceeds the legal limit for the first repository under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). Third, the expected rate of shipment of SNF to the repository would require decades to remove existing SNF from interim storage. Accordingly, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and reactor operators are considering extended SNF storage lasting for more than 100 years.
The debate about SNF typically involves where and how it is stored, as well as what strategies and institutions should govern SNF storage. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and resulting damage to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, caused some in Congress and NRC to consider the adequacy of protective measures at U.S. reactors. The NRC Near-Term Task Force on the disaster concluded it has “not identified any issues that undermine our confidence in the continued safety and emergency planning of U.S. plants.” Nonetheless, NRC has accepted a number of staff recommendations on near-term safety enhancement, including requirements affecting spent fuel storage and prevention and coping with station blackout. NRC is not requiring accelerated transfer of SNF from wet pools to dry casks, but the SNF storage data from the last several years indicate that accelerated transfer has already been occurring.
As of December 2011, more than 67,000 metric tons of SNF, in more than 174,000 assemblies, is stored at 77 sites (including 4 Department of Energy (DOE) facilities) in the United States located in 35 states (see Ta ble 1 and Figure 5), and increases at a rate of roughly 2,000 metric tons per year. Approximately 80% of commercial SNF is stored east of the Mississippi River. At 9 commercial SNF storage sites there are no operating nuclear reactors (so-called “stranded” SNF), and at the 4 DOE sites reactor operations largely ceased in the 1980s, but DOE-owned and some commercial SNF continues to be stored at DOE facilities. In the United States, SNF is stored largely at nuclear reactor sites where it was generated. Of the 104 operating nuclear reactors in the United States, all necessarily have wet storage pools for storing SNF (wet pools are required to allow for a safe “cooling off” period of 1 to 5 years after discharge of SNF from a reactor). Wet storage pools are used for storage of approximately 73% (49,338 out of 67,450 metric tons of uranium, or MTU) of the current commercial SNF inventory, whereas the remaining 27% (18,112 MTU) of commercial SNF is stored in dry casks on concrete pads or in vaults. As wet storage pools become filled to capacity using “dense packing” storage methods, dry storage is increasingly being used, although there are 27 sites with 36 wet storage pools with no dry cask storage capabilities.
This report focuses on the current situation with spent nuclear fuel storage in the United States. It does not address all of the issues associated with permanent disposal of SNF, but rather focuses on the SNF storage situation, primarily at current and former reactor facilities for the potentially foreseeable future.
