Archive
CRS — Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2013
Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2013
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
This report shows in tabular form how much the Administration requested and how much Congress appropriated for U.S. payments to the multilateral development banks (MDBs) since 2000. It also provides a brief description of the MDBs and the ways they fund their operations. It will be updated periodically as annual appropriation figures are known. The title of this report will also change annually, as new yearly appropriation figures are added.
For FY2013, the Administration has requested funds for several of the non-concessional lending facilities at the MDBs. Several of the MDBs are in the process of increasing the size of their nonconcessional lending facilities, a process frequently called a “general capital increase” (GCI). GCIs are relatively unusual, particularly for so many institutions at the same time. Contributions to the GCIs are expected to be spread out over a five- to eight-year period, depending on the institution. For most of the institutions, the funds appropriated in FY2012 were the first annual payment. In addition to funds for the GCIs, the Administration has requested for FY2013 funds for several MDB concessional lending facilities and more targeted MDB funds, such as those dedicated to environmental issues. The total Administration’s request for the MDBs is smaller than its requests in FY2011 and FY2012.
For further information about the MDBs, the GCIs, and relevant U.S. policy process, see:
• CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson;
• CRS Report R41672, Multilateral Development Banks: General Capital Increases, by Martin A. Weiss; and
• CRS Report R41537, Multilateral Development Banks: How the United States Makes and Implements Policy, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss.
CRS — U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 113th Congress
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 113th Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
U.S. policy towards Burma has undergone a discernible shift in its approach since a quasi-civilian government was established in March 2011. While the overall objectives of U.S. policy towards the country remain in place—the establishment of civilian democratic government based on the rule of law and the protection of basic human rights—the Obama Administration has moved from a more reactive, “action-for-action” strategy and a skeptical and cautious attitude towards the newly created Union Government and Union Parliament to a more proactive mode. The new approach is designed to foster further reforms based on some form of partnership with the Union Government, headed by President Thein Sein.
During the last two years, the Obama Administration has conducted much of its policy towards Burma using existing constitutional and legal authority, while regularly consulting with Congress about the actions taken. The 112th Congress passed five laws containing provisions related to U.S. policy in Burma. Three laws—P.L. 112-33, P.L. 112-36, and P.L. 112-163—extended the general import ban contained in Section 3 of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (2003 BFDA, P.L. 108-61) which is subject to annual renewal. P.L. 112-74 placed restrictions on the use in Burma of appropriated funds for certain Defense and State Department programs. P.L. 112-192 granted the Secretary of the Treasury the option of instructing the U.S. Executive Director at any international financial institution to “vote in favor of the provision of assistance for Burma by the institution, notwithstanding any other provision of law” if the President has determined that to do so is in the national interest of the United States. The 113th Congress will have the opportunity to decide what role it will play in the future course of U.S. policy in Burma.
The Administration’s Burma policy in 2011 and 2012 may be characterized as the combination of increasing engagement with Burma’s Union Government, Union Parliament, and selected opposition groups, and the waiving or easing of many of the existing economic sanctions imposed on Burma by various laws, including the 2003 BFDA and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-286). However, the Administration may decide that it is approaching the limit of actions it can take with regard to easing of sanctions without Congress passing new legislation.
Some critics of the Obama Administration say that it has moved too fast and too far in easing the existing sanctions, given the continued reports of serious human rights violations and significant restrictions on civil liberties. Other critics think the Administration has moved too slowly and cautiously in waiving sanctions, hindering the reform process in Burma and blocking greater U.S. participation in Burma’s economic development.
Certain key issues with regard to Burma’s political situation may be important to the future course of U.S. policy in Burma. First, President Thein Sein’s vision for Burma’s “disciplined democracy” has not been clearly elaborated, and his commitment to further reforms remains untested. Second, the view of Burma’s military leadership on political reforms is uncertain. Third, the path for possible reconciliation between the country’s Burman majority and various ethnic minorities is unclear.
CRS — Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Kuwait was pivotal to two decades of U.S. efforts to end a strategic threat posed by Iraq, because of its location, its role as the object of past Iraqi aggression, and its close cooperation with the United States. Kuwait is a key to the U.S. ability to act militarily, if necessary, in the northern Persian Gulf region now that all U.S. forces have left Iraq. Kuwait’s relations with the postSaddam government in Iraq have been hampered by long-standing territorial, economic, and political issues unresolved from the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but those issues have been narrowed significantly since 2011. Kuwait is increasingly suspicious of Iranian intentions in the Gulf, aligning Kuwait with U.S. efforts to contain Iranian power in the Gulf and prevent Iran from exerting undue influence in post-withdrawal Iraq. Still, Kuwait maintains relatively normal economic and political relations with Iran so as not to provoke Iran militarily or prompt it to try to empower pro-Iranian elements in Kuwait.
Although Kuwait’s foreign policy fluctuates little, its political system has been in turmoil since 2006, and has deteriorated significantly since late 2012. Previously, political disputes in Kuwait had consisted of opposition within the elected National Assembly to the political dominance of the Al Sabah family. These disputes aggravated—and been aggravated by—schisms within rival branches of the ruling Al Sabah. The disputes produced five dissolutions of the National Assembly and new elections since 2006, the latest of which occurred on October 8, 2012, requiring new elections that were held on December 1, 2012.
During 2011-2012, there were relatively small demonstrations in Kuwait by opposition groups over official corruption, security force brutality, citizenship eligibility, and other issues. However, protests expanded significantly in late 2012 to challenge Sabah regime efforts to shape the December 1, 2012 elections to its advantage. Most oppositionists boycotted the December 1 elections, lowering the turnout but producing an overwhelmingly pro-government Assembly. Since the election, the opposition has continued its battle to reduce Sabah power through public protests, but the demonstrations sometimes are suspended after compromises with the government.
Even though opposition to Sabah rule has grown, the opposition still largely confines its demands to limiting Sabah power rather than ending the family’s rule. And, Kuwait remains a relatively wealthy society where most citizens do not want to risk their economic well-being to try to bring about the downfall of Al Sabah rule through violence. To try to contain the unrest, the government has used financial largesse—budgets loaded with subsidies and salary increases—as well as some repressive measures, including beatings and imprisonments. But, the many years of political paralysis have led to some economic stagnation as well, because parliamentary approval for several major investment projects, such as development of major oil fields in northern Kuwait, has been held up due to the infighting. The lack of economic vibrancy led to strikes in several economic sectors in 2012.
On other regional issues, in part because of its leadership turmoil, Kuwait tends to defer to consensus positions within the Gulf Cooperation Council; this deference is evident in Kuwait’s stances on the Israel-Palestinian dispute as well as on the uprisings in Yemen and Syria. On the uprising in Bahrain, in March 2011, Kuwait joined a Gulf Cooperation Council intervention on the side of the government, but unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Kuwait sent naval and not ground forces.
CRS — Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress
Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In February 2013, Castro was reappointed to a second five-year term as president (until 2018, when he would be 86 years old), and selected a 52-year old former Education Minister Miguel Díaz-Canel as his First Vice President, making him the official successor in the event that Castro cannot serve out his term. Raúl Castro has implemented a number of gradual economic policy changes over the past several years, including an expansion of self-employment. A party congress held in April 2011 laid out numerous economic goals that, if implemented, could significantly alter Cuba’s state-dominated economic model. Few observers, however, expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system. While the government reduced the number of political prisoners in 2010-2011, the number increased in 2012; moreover, short-term detentions and harassment have increased significantly.
CRS — Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, at the outbreak of the uprisings that swept several Middle Eastern leaders from power, has not come close to changing Bahrain’s regime into a constitutional monarchy. However, the mostly Shiite opposition shows no signs of ending its campaign to achieve that goal or, at the very least greatly increased political influence and rights. The crisis has demonstrated that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by reform efforts instituted since 1999.
Even though demonstrations against the government continue, the two sides have engaged in dialogue as well. A “national dialogue” held in July 2011 reached consensus on a few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest. The government asserts it implemented most of the 26 BICI recommendations, but outside human rights groups assessed that overall implementation was modest and incomplete. In January 2013, the perception within the government and the opposition that the political system could split apart entirely caused both sides to restart that dialogue. The two sides remain far apart, but the new, ongoing dialogue could produce some additional modest reforms and potentially represent incremental progress toward a solution to the crisis.
The Obama Administration has not called for an end to the Al Khalifa regime, but it has criticized the regime’s human rights abuses, urged it to undertake further political reform, and advanced ideas to narrow government-opposition differences. The U.S. criticism has angered some Al Khalifa officials but it has also been insufficient for human rights activists who assert that the United States is downplaying regime abuses because of U.S. dependence on the security relationship with Bahrain. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests—particularly the containment of Iran—by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years. The United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the Administration announced a resumption of other arms sales to Bahrain that it can potentially use to protect itself and support any military effort against Iran. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve political crises in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies and therefore lacks the resources to significantly improve Shiite standards of living. In 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained Bahrain’s economy.
CRS — North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons production capabilities, warhead sophistication, the scope and success of its uranium enrichment program, or extent of its proliferation activities. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. North Korea’s plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon has been shuttered since its cooling tower was destroyed under international agreement in June 2008. However, on April 1, 2013, North Korea said it would resume operation of its plutonium production reactor. Experts estimate it will take approximately six months to restart. This would provide North Korea with approximately one bomb’s worth of plutonium per year.
While North Korea’s weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the past decade, intelligence emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment program in 2009, but has said its purpose is the production of fuel for nuclear power. In November 2010, North Korea showed visiting American experts early construction of a 100 MWT light-water reactor and a newly built gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, both at the Yongbyon site. The North Koreans claimed the enrichment plant was operational, but this has not been independently confirmed. U.S. officials have said that it is likely other, clandestine enrichment facilities exist. Enrichment (as well as reprocessing) technology can be used to produce material for nuclear weapons or fuel for power reactors. An enrichment capability could potentially provide North Korea with a faster way of making nuclear material for weapons and therefore is of great concern to policymakers.
North Korea has made multiple policy statements in the past year asserting its nuclear weapons status: in May 2012, North Korea changed its constitution to say that it was a “nuclear-armed state.” In January 2013, North Korea said that no dialogue on denuclearization “would be possible” and it would only disarm when all the other nuclear weapon states also disarm. In March 2013, North Korea stated its goal of expanding its nuclear weapons program.
Many experts believe that the prime objective of North Korea’s nuclear program is to develop a nuclear warhead that could be mounted on North Korea’s intermediate-range and long-range missiles. This was confirmed by North Korean official statements in late March 2013.
Miniaturization of a nuclear warhead would likely require additional nuclear and missile tests. In January 2013, a North Korean statement said that it would respond with a nuclear test “of higher level.” On February 12, 2013, the North Korean official news agency announced a “successful” underground nuclear detonation, and seismic monitoring systems measured a resulting earthquake that was 5.1 in magnitude. This is magnitude is slightly higher than past tests, but yield estimates are still uncertain. The South Korean Ministry of Defense estimated that the test yield was between 6 and 7 kilotons, while the U.S. Director of National Intelligence so far has said “approximately several kilotons.” North Korea claimed that the February 12, 2013, nuclear test was to develop a “smaller and light” warhead. At a minimum, the test would likely contribute to North Korea’s ability to develop a warhead that could be mounted on a long-range missile. To date, no open source date on test emissions is available that might show whether the North Koreans tested a uranium or plutonium device. This information could help determine the type and sophistication of the North Korean nuclear warhead design, about which little is known.
CRS — Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress
Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated that the United States would “engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals.” These reductions could include limits on strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. Yet, arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia have stalled, leading many observers to suggest that the United States reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally, or in parallel with Russia, without negotiating a new treaty. Many in Congress have expressed concerns about this possibility, both because they question the need to reduce nuclear forces below New START levels and because they do not want the President to agree to further reductions without seeking the approval of Congress.
Over the years, the United States reduced its nuclear weapons with formal, bilateral treaties, reciprocal, but informal, understandings, and unilateral adjustments to its force posture. The role of Congress in the arms control process also depends on the mechanism used to reduce forces. If the United States and Russia sign a formal treaty, then the Senate must signal its advice and consent with a vote of two-thirds of its Members. The House and Senate would each need to pass legislation approving an Executive Agreement. But the President can reduce U.S. nuclear weapons in parallel with Russia, without seeking congressional approval, if the reductions are taken unilaterally, or as the result of a nonbinding political agreement.
Each of the mechanisms for reducing nuclear forces can possess different characteristics for the arms control process. These include balance and equality, predictability, flexibility, transparency and confidence in compliance, and timeliness. Provisions in formal treaties can mandate balance and equality between the two sides’ forces. They can also provide both sides with the ability to predict the size and structure of the other’s current and future forces. Unilateral measures allow each side to maintain flexibility in deciding the size and structure of its nuclear forces. In addition, the monitoring and verification provisions included in bilateral treaties can provide each side with detailed information about the numbers and capabilities of the other’s nuclear forces, while also helping each side confirm that the other has complied with the limits and restrictions in the treaty. With unilateral reductions, the two sides could still agree to share information, or they could withhold information so that they would not have to share sensitive data about their forces.
It usually takes far longer to reduce nuclear forces through a bilateral arms control treaty than it takes to adopt unilateral adjustments to nuclear forces. The need to find balanced and equitable trades, limits acceptable to both sides, detailed definitions of systems limited by the treaty, and agreed procedures for monitoring and verification can slow the process of negotiations. In addition, it can take months or years for a treaty to enter into force, both because the legislatures must review and vote on the treaty and because other domestic or international events intervene. In contrast, the nations may be able to adopt and implement unilateral adjustments more quickly.
If the Obama Administration reduces U.S. nuclear forces in parallel with Russia, but without a formal treaty, the two nations could avoid months or years in negotiations. Because New START would remain in force, predictability and transparency would remain important. Balance and equality would, however, receive a lower priority, while flexibility and timeliness would grow more important. Congress may question whether such an agreement is subject to congressional review. It may also seek to limit funding for further reductions through the annual authorization and appropriations process if it does not support the Administration’s approach to further reductions. This report will be updated as needed.
CRS — The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions
The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Service)
The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament—the Duma and Federation Council— approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification.
New START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments.
Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber.
New START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty’s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.
The monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side’s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.
New START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.
The Obama Administration and outside analysts argue that New START will strengthen strategic stability and enhance U.S. national security. They contend that New START will contribute to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals by convincing other nations that the United States is serious about its obligations under the NPT. This might convince more nations to cooperate with the United States in pressuring nations who are seeking their own nuclear weapons.
Critics, however, question whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Some also consider the U.S.-Russian arms control process to be a distraction from the more important issues on the nonproliferation agenda.
CRS — Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counterterrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration termed the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may have been conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as “covert actions,” and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees.
Defense officials have asserted that none of DOD’s current counterterrorism intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only “clandestine activities.” Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret but which constitute “passive” intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is “active,” in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target.
Some of DOD’s activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counterterrorism missions; to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local militaries conduct counterterrorism missions of their own.
Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each. They also have acknowledged that the U.S. intelligence community confronts a major challenge in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various intelligence agencies with regard to clandestine activities. Some Pentagon officials have appeared to indicate that DOD’s activities should be limited to clandestine or passive activities, pointing out that if such operations are discovered or are inadvertently revealed, the U.S. government would be able to preserve the option of acknowledging such activity, thus assuring the military personnel who are involved some safeguards that are afforded under the Geneva Conventions. Covert actions, by contrast, constitute activities in which the role of the U.S. government is not intended to be apparent or to be acknowledged publicly. Those who participate in such activities could jeopardize any rights they may have under the Geneva Conventions, according to these officials.
In committee report language accompanying P.L. 111-259, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) expressed its concern that the distinction between the CIA’s intelligence-gathering activities and DOD’s clandestine operations is becoming blurred and called on the Defense Department to meet its obligations to inform the committee of such activities. Perhaps in an effort to bring more clarity to the covert action issue, Department of Defense officials early in the 112th Congress stated that current statute could be updated to reflect U.S. Special Operations Command’s list of core tasks and the missions assigned to it in the Unified Command Plan. But in doing so, they also noted that Section 167 includes “such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense,” which, they argued, provides the President and the Secretary flexibility to meet changing circumstances.
CRS — Congressional Redistricting and the Voting Rights Act: A Legal Overview
Congressional Redistricting and the Voting Rights Act: A Legal Overview (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Office)
The Constitution requires a count of the U.S. population every 10 years. Based on the census, the number of seats in the House of Representatives is reapportioned among the states. Thus, at least every 10 years, in response to changes in the number of Representatives apportioned to it or to shifts in its population, each state is required to draw new boundaries for its congressional districts. Although each state has its own process for redistricting, congressional districts must conform to a number of constitutional and federal statutory standards, including the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965.
The VRA was enacted under Congress’s authority to enforce the 15th Amendment, which provides that the right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous servitude. Section 2 of the VRA prohibits the use of any voting qualification or practice—including the drawing of congressional redistricting plans—that results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority. The statute further provides that a violation is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that political processes are not equally open to members of a racial or language minority group in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate and to elect representatives of choice. In decisions including Thornburg v. Gingles and Bartlett v. Strickland, the Supreme Court further interpreted the requirements of Section 2.
Section 5 of the VRA requires certain covered jurisdictions—based on a formula set forth in Section 4(b)—to “preclear” their congressional redistricting plans with either the Department of Justice or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia before implementation. In order to be granted preclearance, the covered jurisdiction has the burden of proving that the proposed voting change neither has the purpose, nor will it have the effect, of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or membership in a language minority group. On February 27, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in a case challenging the constitutionality of the VRA’s preclearance requirement. In Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, the Court is considering whether Congress’s decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the VRA under the preexisting coverage formula contained in Section 4(b) exceeded its authority under the 14th and 15th Amendments, thereby violating the 10th Amendment and Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. A decision is expected by the end of June.
In the 113th Congress, legislation has been introduced that would establish certain standards and requirements for congressional redistricting, including identical bills H.R. 223 and H.R. 278, the “John Tanner Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act,” and H.R. 337, the “Redistricting Transparency Act of 2013.”
CRS — Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations
Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Seven nations—China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—possess nuclear weapons. North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006, and announced that it had conducted a test in 2009 and another in 2013. Israel is widely thought to have nuclear weapons. As an aid to Congress in understanding nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and arms control matters, this report describes which agency is responsible for research and development (R&D) of nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices, as distinct from the bombers and missiles that deliver them) in these nations and whether these agencies are civilian or military. It also traces the history of such agencies in the United States from 1942 to the present. This report will be updated annually, or more often as developments warrant.
In the United States, the Army managed the nuclear weapons program during World War II. Since 1946, weapons R&D has been managed by civilian agencies, at present by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy. Concerns about “the immediate and long-term issues associated with the NNSA,” however, led Congress to establish the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-239. China’s nuclear weapons R&D is apparently under the direction of the military, collectively called the People’s Liberation Army.
France’s nuclear weapons R&D is supervised by the Ministry of Defense, which delegates the direction of these programs to the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission (CEA). However, as with NNSA in the United States, CEA is not a part of the Ministry of Defense. CEA also conducts nuclear programs in science and industry under the supervision of other ministries.
India’s nuclear weapons R&D appears to be controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy, which is under the direct control of the Prime Minister.
Israel’s nuclear program is under civilian control, but since Israel neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons, it classifies information on such weapons, including organizations responsible for R&D. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission reportedly has overall responsibility for Israel’s nuclear weapons program, and the Director General of that commission reports directly to the Prime Minister.
North Korea’s Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry is in charge of the day-to-day operation of the nuclear weapons program. Under it are nuclear-related organizations. Policy is decided by leader Kim Jong-un and other Communist Party and military leaders who advise him.
Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan’s organizations involved in nuclear weapons R&D and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces. The Prime Minister is the chair of the NCA, and membership includes senior civilian and military leaders.
Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is responsible for nuclear weapons R&D and production. It is a civilian agency, though it has many links to the military.
In the United Kingdom, a private company, AWE Management Limited, manages and operates the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), a government-owned, contractor-operated entity. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), which is headed by a civilian, controls the operations, policy, and direction of AWE and can veto actions of the company. The MoD provides most of the funding for AWE.
CRS — The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy
The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The UAE’s relatively open borders and economy have won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in the Middle East while producing financial excesses, social ills such as human trafficking, and opportunity for Iranian businesses based there to try to circumvent international sanctions. The social and economic freedoms have not translated into significant political change; the UAE government remains under the control of a small circle of leaders, although it allows informal and some formal citizen participation to supplement traditional methods of consensusbuilding. To date, these mechanisms, economic wealth, and reverence for established leaders have enabled the UAE to avoid wide-scale popular unrest. Since 2006, the government has increased formal popular participation in governance through a public selection process for half the membership of its consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC). But, particularly since the Arab uprisings of 2011-12, discontent has risen somewhat over the unchallenged power and privileges of the UAE ruling elite as well as the government strategy of spending large amounts of funds on elaborate projects that cater to expatriates and international tourists. The leadership has resisted any dramatic or rapid further opening of the political process, and it is becoming increasingly aggressive in preventing the rise of Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamist as well as secular opposition movements. The crackdown is drawing increased criticism from human rights groups.
On foreign policy issues, the UAE—along with fellow Gulf state Qatar—has become increasingly assertive in recent years—a product of the UAE’s ample financial resources and its drive to promote regional stability. The UAE has joined the United States and U.S. allies in backing and then implementing most international sanctions against Iran, causing friction with its powerful northern neighbor. It has ordered the most sophisticated missile defense system sold by the United States, making the UAE pivotal to U.S. efforts to assemble a regional missile defense network directed primarily to counter Iran’s expanding missile force. The UAE has deployed troops to Afghanistan since 2003 and pledges to keep some forces there after the existing international security mission there ends in 2014. Since 2011, it has sent police to help the beleaguered government of fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state Bahrain, supported operations against Muammar Qadhafi of Libya, joined the GCC diplomatic effort that brokered a political solution to the unrest in Yemen, and financially backed rebels in Syria. It gives large amounts of international aid, for example for relief efforts in Somalia.
For the Obama Administration and many in Congress, there were early concerns about the UAE oversight and management of a complex and technically advanced initiative such as a nuclear power program. This was underscored by dissatisfaction among some Members of Congress with a U.S.-UAE civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement was signed on May 21, 2009, submitted to Congress that day, and entered into force on December 17, 2009. Concerns about potential leakage of U.S. and other advanced technologies through the UAE to Iran, in particular, have been largely alleviated by the UAE’s development of strict controls, capable management, and cooperation with international oversight of its nuclear program.
CRS — Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights
Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Ten years after the March 19, 2003, U.S. military intervention to oust Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, accelerating violence and growing political schisms call into question whether the fragile stability left in place after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will collapse. Iraq’s stability is increasingly threatened by a revolt—with both peaceful and violent components—by Sunni Arab Muslims who resent Shiite political domination. Sunni Arabs, always fearful that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would seek unchallenged power, accuse him of attempting to marginalize them politically in part by arresting or attempting to remove key Sunni leaders. Sunni demonstrations have grown since late December 2012 and some have led to protester deaths. Iraq’s Kurds are increasingly aligned with the Sunnis, based on their own disputes with Maliki over territorial, political, and economic issues. The Shiite faction of Moqtada Al Sadr has been leaning to the Sunnis and Kurds, and could hold the key to Maliki’s political survival. Adding to the schisms is the physical incapacity of President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd who has served as a key mediator, who suffered a stroke in mid-December 2012 and remains outside Iraq. The rifts have impinged on provincial elections on April 20, 2013, and will likely affect national elections for a new parliament and government in 2014. Maliki is expected to seek to retain his post in that vote.
The violent component of Sunni unrest is spearheaded by the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). The group, apparently emboldened by the Sunni-led uprising in Syria, is conducting attacks against Shiite neighborhoods and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members with increasing frequency and lethality. The attacks are intended to reignite all-out sectarian conflict, and some fear that goal might be realized. Should the violence escalate further, there are concerns whether the ISF—which numbers nearly 700,000 members—can counter it now that U.S. troops are no longer in Iraq.
U.S. forces left in December 2011 in line with a November 2008 bilateral U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Iraq refused to extend the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, seeking to put behind it the period of U.S. political and military tutelage and arguing that the ISF could handle violence on its own. Since the U.S. pullout, many observers assert that U.S. influence over Iraq has ebbed significantly. Cornerstone programs of what were to be enduring, close security relations—U.S. training for Iraq’s security forces through an Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I) and a State Department police development program—have languished. The U.S. civilian presence in Iraq has declined from about 17,000 to about 10,500 as of March 2013, and might fall to 5,500 by the end of 2013. However, the Administration—with increasing Iraqi concurrence—has asserted that the escalating violence necessitates that Iraq rededicate itself to military cooperation with and assistance from the United States. In December 2012 signed a new defense cooperation agreement with the United States.
Although recognizing that Iraq wants to rebuild its relations in its immediate neighborhood, the United States is seeking to prevent Iraq from falling under the sway of Iran. The Maliki government has built close relations with the Islamic Republic. Apparently fearing that a change of regime in Syria will further embolden the Iraqi Sunni opposition, Maliki has joined Iran in supporting Bashar Al Assad’s regime. However, the legacy of Iran-Iraq hostilities, and Arab and Persian differences, limit Iranian influence among the Iraqi population. Another limitation on Iranian influence is Iraq’s effort to reestablish its historic role as a major player in the Arab world. Iraq took a large step toward returning to the Arab fold by hosting an Arab League summit on March 27-29, 2012.
CRS — Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2014
Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2014 (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service for distribution to multiple congressional offices, April 11, 2013.
CRS — Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather Than Treaties
Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather Than Treaties (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
U.S. trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), World Trade Organization agreements, and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have been approved by majority vote of each house rather than by two-thirds vote of the Senate—that is, they have been treated as congressional-executive agreements rather than as treaties. The congressional-executive agreement has been the vehicle for implementing Congress’s long-standing policy of seeking trade benefits for the United States through reciprocal trade negotiations. In a succession of statutes, Congress has authorized the President to negotiate and enter into tariff and nontariff barrier (NTB) agreements for limited periods, while permitting NTB and free trade agreements negotiated under this authority to enter into force for the United States only if they are approved by both houses in a bill enacted into public law and other statutory conditions are met; implementing bills are also accorded expedited consideration under the scheme. This negotiating authority and expedited procedures are commonly known as Trade Promotion Authority (TPA).
Congress most recently granted the President tempor ary trade negotiating authority utilizing this approach in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Au thority Act of 2002 (BTPAA), contained in Title XXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210. Although the authority expired during the 110th Congress, agreements entered into before July 1, 2007, remained eligible for congressional consideration under the expedited procedure. The President had entered into free trade agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama before this date, each of which awaited congressional approval at the time. In Oct ober 2011, Congress approved the three pending agreements, making a total of 11 free trade agreements approved under the BTPAA process.
In addition, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), on behalf of the President, notified the House and Senate in December 2009 by letter that the President intended to enter into negotiations aimed at a regional, Asia-Pacific trade agreement, called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Notwithstanding the expiration of BTPAA authorities, the USTR stated that the Obama Administration would be observing the relevant procedures of the act with respect to notifying and consulting with Congress regarding these negotiations. Notably, discussions to reinstate TPA through legislation have recently gained attention. In March 2013, the Acting U.S. Trade Representative, Demetrios Marantis, stated that the Obama Administration will work with Congress to enact new TPA legislation.
CRS — International Trade and Finance: Key Policy Issues for the 113th Congress
International Trade and Finance: Key Policy Issues for the 113th Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The U.S. Constitution grants authority over the regulation of foreign commerce to Congress, which it exercises in a variety of ways. These include the oversight of trade policy generally, and more particularly, the consideration of legislation to approve trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy issues cover such areas as: U.S. trade negotiations; tariffs; nontariff barriers; worker dislocation from trade liberalization, trade remedy laws; import and export policies; international investment, economic sanctions; and the trade policy functions of the federal government. Congress also has an important role in international finance. It has the authority over U.S. financial commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and finance-related agencies of the U.S. Government.
The 112 th Congress approved U.S. bilateral free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, extended the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs through December 31, 2013, and reauthorized the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) through July 31, 2013. In addition, Congress authorized permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status for Russia and Moldova, reauthorized the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and approved full U.S. participation in general capital increases for the World Bank and four regional development banks.
The 113th Congress may revisit many of these issues and address new ones. Among the more potentially prominent issues are:
1. Negotiations for comprehensive reciprocal trade agreements with major trading partners, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 countries from the Western Hemisphere and Asia, and new negotiations with the European Union for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement;
2. Possible renewal of Trade Promotion Author ity (TPA), allowing the President to enter into reciprocal trade agreements, and providing trade negotiating objectives and expedited legislative procedures to consider trade agreement implementing bills; and the possible related issue of TAA program reauthorization;
3. U.S.-China trade relations including investment, intellectual property rights protection, currency reform, and market access liberalization;
4. International finance issues including implications of the ongoing Eurozone debt crisis for the U.S. economy, oversight of international financial institutions, and negotiations to conclude new bilateral investment treaties (BITs);
5. Oversight of the stalemated World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round negotiations and separate new trade negotiations (e.g. services) that some members of the WTO have undertaken;
6. Review of the President’s export control reform initiative and possible renewal of the Export Control Act (EAA), and review of trade sanctions;
7. Oversight of the President’s request for new authority to reorganize and consolidate the business- and trade-related functions of six federal entities; the Export-Import Bank, and the Administration’s National Export Initiative;
8. Reauthorization of U.S. Customs and Bord er Protection (CBP) and expiring trade preference programs (e.g., the GSP and the Andean Trade Preference Act).
A list of CRS reports covering these issues is provided at the end of the report.
CRS — “Hollowing Out” in U.S. Manufacturing: Analysis and Issues for Congress
“Hollowing Out” in U.S. Manufacturing: Analysis and Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The health of the U.S. manufacturing sector has been a long-standing concern of Congress. Although Congress has established a wide variety of tax preferences, direct subsidies, import restraints, and other federal programs with the goal of retaining or recapturing manufacturing jobs, only a small proportion of U.S. workers is now employed in factories. Meanwhile, U.S. factories have stepped up production of goods that require high technological sophistication but relatively little direct labor. Labor productivity in manufacturing, as measured by government data, has grown rapidly, suggesting that the manuf acturing sector as a whole remains healthy.
Recent data, however, challenge the belief that the manufacturing sector, taken as a whole, will continue to flourish. Unlike previous expansions, the two most recent cyclical upturns in the U.S. economy have generated few jobs in manufacturing. Moreover, statistics suggest that domestic value represents a diminishing share of the valu e of U.S. factory output. One interpretation of these data is that manufacturing is “hollowing out” as companies undertake a larger proportion of their high-value work abroad. These developments raise the question of whether the United States will continue to generate highly skilled, high-wage jobs related to advanced manufacturing.
The evidence concerning “hollowing out” is ambiguous, as conceptual issues and statistical deficiencies make it difficult to determine whether the recent decline in manufacturing value added, relative to shipments, is a short-term phenomenon or a long-term trend.
Despite improvements in recent years, U.S. statistical agencies still tend to treat manufacturing and services as unrelated economic activities, and it is not clear that existing data series on domestic economic activity, trade, and freight transportation adequately capture changes in the nature of manufacturing, the sources of employment, and the creation of value.
Nonetheless, evidence suggests strongly that physical production activities account for a diminishing share of the final value of manufactured products, with service-related inputs such as research, product development, and marketing becoming more important. Further, the production of many goods is dispersed across multiple locations along global supply chains, making it difficult to determine where value is added. Such shifts pose a challenge to efforts to capture economic value by promoting goods production in the United States. In the context of national security, the fact that U.S. manufacturers of vital products are critically dependent upon inputs from abroad is frequently a subject of concern. International comparisons indicate that the United States is in no way unique in its dependence on foreign inputs to manufacturing. Although the output of U.S. factorie s contains a large proportion of foreign value added, many other countries appear to be even more dependent upon foreign value added than is the United States, at least with respect to goods traded in international markets.
CRS — International Climate Change Financing: The Green Climate Fund (GCF)
International Climate Change Financing: The Green Climate Fund (GCF) (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. State Department Foreign Press Center)
Over the past several decades, the United States has delivered financial and technical assistance for climate change activities in the developing world through a variety of bilateral and multilateral programs. The United States and other industrialized countries committed to such assistance through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, Treaty Number: 102-38, 1992), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), and the UNFCCC Cancun Agreements (2010), wherein the higher-income c ountries pledged jointly up to $30 billion of “fast start” climate financing for lower-income countries for the period 2010-2012, and a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion annually by 2020. The Cancun Agreements also proposed that the pledged funds are to be new, additional to previous flows, adequate, predictable, and sustained, and are to come from a wide variety of sources, bo th public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.
One potential mechanism for mobilizing a share of the proposed international climate financing is the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund (GCF), proposed in the Cancun Agreements and accepted by Parties during the December 2011 conference in Durban, South Africa. The fund aims to assist developing countries in their efforts to combat climate change through the provision of grants and other concessional financing for mitigation and adaptation projects, programs, policies, and activities. The GCF is to be capitalized by contributions from donor countries and other sources, including both innovative mechanisms and the private sector. Currently, the GCF complements many of the existing multilateral climate change funds (e.g., the Global Environment Facility, the Climate Investment Funds, and the Adaptation Fund); however, as the official financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, some Parties believe that it may eventually replace or subsume the other funds. While many Parties expect capitalization and operation of the GCF to begin shortly after the November 2013 conference in Warsaw, Poland, many issues remain to be clarified, and some involve long-standing and contentious debate . They include what role the CGF would play in providing sustained finance at scale, how it would fit into the existing development assistance and climate financing architecture, how it would be capitalized, and how it would allocate and deliver assistance efficiently and effectively to developing countries.
The U.S. Congress—through its role in authorizations, appropriations, and oversight—would have significant input on U.S. participation in the GCF. Congress regularly determines and gives guidance to the allocation of foreign aid between bilateral and multilateral assistance as well as among the variety of multilateral mechanisms. In the past, Congress has raised concerns regarding the cost, purpose, direction, efficiency, and effectiveness of the UNFCCC and existing international institutions of climate financing. Potential authorizations and appropriations for the GCF would rest with several committees, including the U.S. House of Representatives Committees on Foreign Affairs (various subcommittees); Financial Services (Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade); and Appropriations (Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs); and the U.S. Senate Committees on Foreign Relations (Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection); and Appropriations (Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs). As of April 2013, the U.S. Administration—through its State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 150 account—has made no specific budget request for appropriated funds to be contributed to the GCF.
CRS — The United Kingsom and U.S.-UK Relations
The United Kingsom and U.S.-UK Relations (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom (UK) as the United States’ closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a combination of factors, including a sense of shared history, values, and culture, as well as extensive and long-established cooperation on a wide range of foreign policy and security issues. In the minds of many Americans, the UK’s strong role in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past decade reinforced an impression of closeness and solidarity.
The 2010 UK election resulted in the country’s first coalition government since the Second World War. The Conservative Party won the most votes in the election, and Conservative leader David Cameron became prime minister. To command a parliamentary majority, however, the Conservatives were compelled to partner with the Liberal Democrats, who came in third place, and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg became deputy prime minister. The Labour Party, now led by Ed Miliband, moved into opposition after leading the UK government since 1997.
Economic and fiscal issues have been the central domestic challenge facing the coalition thus far.
Seeking to reduce the country’s budget deficit and national debt, the coalition adopted a five-year austerity program early in its tenure. With a double-dip recession in 2012 and low growth forecasts, the government has been maintaining its austerity strategy under considerable pressure and criticism. Austerity has also heightened social tensions and contributed to rising political friction between the coalition partners. Although the coalition arrangement went smoothly during its first year, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats have subsequently disagreed about a series of domestic issues, including a number of proposed changes to the country’s political system.
Europe has been another source of tension. The UK has long been one of the most skeptical and ambivalent members of the 27-country European Union (EU). While the Conservative Party remains a stronghold of “euro-skeptics,” the Liberal Democrats are the UK’s most pro-EU political party. The Eurozone crisis has deepened British antipathy toward the EU, fueling calls to reclaim national sovereignty over issues where decision-making has been pooled and integrated in Brussels. Some analysts believe that a British departure from the EU is a growing possibility; Prime Minister Cameron intends to renegotiate some of the terms of membership and put the UK’s relationship with the EU to a national referendum in 2017. Adding another note of uncertainty to the British political landscape, Scotland plans to hold a referendum in September 2014 on whether to separate from the UK and become an independent country.
In recent years, some observers have suggested that the U.S.-UK relationship is losing relevance due to changing U.S. foreign policy priorities and shifting global dynamics. An imbalance of power in favor of the United States has occasionally led some British observers to call for a reassessment of their country’s approach to the relationship. Despite such anxieties, most analysts believe that the two countries will remain close allies that choose to cooperate on many important global issues such as counterterrorism, the NATO mission in Afghanistan, efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear activities, and global economic challenges.
Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in the UK and its relations with the United States are of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress. This report provides an overview and assessment of some of the main dimensions of these topics. For a broader analysis of transatlantic relations, see CRS Report RS22163, The United States and Europe: Current Issues , by Derek E. Mix.
CRS — Reauthorizing the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000
Reauthorizing the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via National Agricultural Law Center)
Many counties are compensated for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. Counties with national forest lands and with certain Bureau of Land Management lands have historically received a percentage of agency revenues, primarily from timber sales. However, timber sales have declined substantially—by more than 90% in some areas. Thus, Congress enacted the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRS; P.L. 106-393) as a temporary, optional program of payments based on historic, rather than current, revenues.
Authorization for SRS payments originally expired at the end of FY2006, but through several reauthorizations the program was extended through FY2012. Congressional debates over reauthorization considered the basis and level of compensation (historical, tax equivalency, etc.); the source of funds (receipts, a new tax or revenue source, etc.); the authorized and required uses of the payments; interaction with other compensation programs (notably Payments in Lieu of Taxes); and the duration of any changes (temporary or permanent). In addition, legislation with mandatory spending, such as SRS reauthorization, raises policy questions about increasing the deficit; current budget rules to restrain deficit spending typically impose a procedural barrier to such legislation, generally requiring offsets by additional receipts or reductions in other mandatory spending.
In 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (P.L. 110-343) enacted a four-year extension to SRS authorization through FY2011, with declining payments, a modified formula, and transition payments for certain areas. In 2012, Congress enacted a one-year extension through FY2012, and amended the program by slowing the decline in payment levels and tightening requirements that counties select a payment option promptly (P.L. 112-141).
With the expiration of SRS at the end of FY2012, county compensation is again the subject of congressional debates. County payments are set to return to a revenue-based system for FY2013, and are likely to be significantly lower than the previous years’ payments. Congress may consider extending SRS, with or without modifications, implementing other legislative proposals to address the county payments, or taking no action (thus continuing the revenue-based system that took effect upon the program’s expiration). To date, no legislative action has occurred in the 113th Congress. Discussion in the 113th Congress may focus on many of the same issues that were debated in 2006-2008 and again in 2012.
