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Country Analysis Brief: Iran
Country Analysis Brief: Iran
Source: Energy Information Administration
Iran, a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), ranks among the world’s top four holders of both proven oil and natural gas reserves. In 2012, Iran saw unprecedented drops in its oil exports as sanctions by the United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU) were tightened, targeting Iranian oil export revenues. Preliminary data show that Iran ranked fifth in terms of crude oil and condensate exports, which was in contrast to its third position only two years ago. Given the sanctions and resulting drop in production, export volumes likely will continue to be hampered.
Iran has the world’s second largest natural gas reserves, but the sector is underdeveloped and used mostly to meet domestic demand. In contrast to the decreasing oil production, natural gas development has been slowly expanding. Nonetheless, natural gas production has been lower than expected as a result of a lack of foreign investment and technology.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
DEFENSE CONTRACTING
Actions Needed to Explore Additional Opportunities to Gain Efficiencies in Acquiring Foreign Language Support
GAO-13-251R, Feb 25, 2013
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
Firms Reported to Have Engaged in Activities Related to Iran’s Energy and Communications Sectors While Having Had U.S. Government Contracts
GAO-13-344R, Feb 25, 2013
IRAN
U.S. and International Sanctions Have Adversely Affected the Iranian Economy
GAO-13-326, Feb 25, 2013
WATER QUALITY
EPA Faces Challenges in Addressing Damage Caused by Airborne Pollutants
GAO-13-39, Jan 24, 2013
WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH
Further Steps by OSHA Would Enhance Monitoring of Enforcement and Effectiveness
GAO-13-61, Jan 24, 2013
Number of jailed journalists sets global record
Number of jailed journalists sets global record
Source: Committee to Protect Journalists
Imprisonment of journalists worldwide reached a record high in 2012, driven in part by the widespread use of charges of terrorism and other anti-state offenses against critical reporters and editors, the Committee to Protect Journalists has found. In its annual census of imprisoned journalists, CPJ identified 232 individuals behind bars on December 1, an increase of 53 over its 2011 tally.
Large-scale imprisonments in Turkey, Iran, and China helped lift the global tally to its highest point since CPJ began conducting worldwide surveys in 1990, surpassing the previous record of 185 in 1996. The three nations, the world’s worst jailers of the press, each made extensive use of vague anti-state laws to silence dissenting political views, including those expressed by ethnic minorities. Worldwide, anti-state charges such as terrorism, treason, and subversion were the most common allegations brought against journalists in 2012. At least 132 journalists were being held around the world on such charges, CPJ’s census found.
Eritrea and Syria also ranked among the world’s worst, each jailing numerous journalists without charge or due process and holding them in secret prisons without access to lawyers or family members. Worldwide, 63 journalists are being held without any publicly disclosed charge.
Vietnam, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, and Saudi Arabia rounded out the 10 worst jailers. In two of those nations, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, the authorities used retaliatory charges such as hooliganism and drug possession to jail critical reporters and editors. In 19 cases worldwide, governments used a variety of charges unrelated to journalism to silence critical journalists. In the cases included in this census, CPJ determined that the charges were fabricated.
CRS — Iran Sanctions (Updated)
Iran Sanctions (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The principal objective of international sanctions—to compel Iran to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses—has not been achieved to date. However, a broad international coalition has imposed progressively strict economic sanctions on Iran’s oil export lifeline, producing increasingly severe effects on Iran’s economy. Many judge that Iran might soon decide it needs a nuclear compromise to produce an easing of sanctions because:
- Oil exports provide about 70% of Iran’s government revenues and Iran’s oil exports have declined sharply as a result of the sanctions. A European Union embargo on purchases of Iranian crude oil that took full effect on July 1, 2012. Previously, EU countries were buying about 20% of Iran’s oil exports. This embargo is coupled with decisions by several other Iranian oil customers to substantially reduce purchases of Iranian oil in order to comply with a provision of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81).
- Together, these sanctions have reduced Iranian oil exports to about 1 million barrels per day as of October 2012, a dramatic decline from the 2.5 million barrels per day Iran exported during 2011. This loss of sales has caused Iran to reduce oil production, to the point where it is producing less oil than is Iraq.
- The loss of hard currency revenues from oil—coupled with the cut off of Iran from the international banking system and the reported depletion of Iran’s foreign exchange reserves—caused a collapse in the value of Iran’s currency, the rial, in early October. That collapse prompted street demonstrations and a halt to commerce by merchants who are uncertain how to price their goods. In response, Iran has tried to impose currency controls and arrested some illegal currency traders, although these steps are unlikely to restore public confidence in the regime’s economic management. Other oil producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, are selling additional oil to countries cutting Iranian oil buys, thus far preventing the lost Iranian sales from raising world oil prices.
Department of Defense and other assessments indicate that sanctions have not stopped Iran from building up its conventional military and missile capabilities, in large part with indigenous skills. However, sanctions may be slowing Iran’s nuclear program somewhat by preventing Iran from obtaining some needed technology from foreign sources. Iran is also judged not complying with U.N. requirements that it halt any weapons shipments outside its borders, particularly with regard to purported Iranian weapons shipments to help the embattled Asad government in Syria.
Despite the imposition of what many now consider to be “crippling” sanctions, some in Congress believe that economic pressure on Iran needs to increase further and faster. In the 112 th Congress, a House-Senate compromise version of an extensive Iran sanctions bill, H.R. 1905 (“Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012”), was passed by both chambers on August 1, 2012, and signed on August 10 (P.L. 112-158). The bill makes sanctionable numerous additional forms of foreign energy dealings with Iran, including shipments of crude oil, and enhances human rights-related provisions of previous Iran sanctions laws. Some press reports indicate that the 112 th Congress might try to increase sanctions further in late 2012, possibly as an amendment to a FY2013 national defense authorization act. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
CRS — Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Iran’s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran’s construction of gas centrifuge-based uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.
Obtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of May 2012, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to five percent uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically produce enough HEU for several nuclear weapons. Iran has also produced LEU containing up to 20 percent uranium-235, but, as of May 2012, this amount was not sufficient to yield a sufficient amount of weapons-grade HEU for a weapon.
Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran’s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continues to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges.
Tehran has also continued work on a heavy-water reactor, which is a proliferation concern because its spent fuel will contain plutonium—the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel—a procedure called “reprocessing.” Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran’s nuclear facilities and has been able to verify that Tehran’s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. But the agency still has concerns about the program, particularly evidence that Iran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. The United States has assessed that Tehran has the technical capability eventually to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear.
Whether Iran has a nuclear weapons program is also unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran “halted its nuclear weapons program” in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is “keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons” and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is “inherently reversible.” U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. For example, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated in January 2012 that Iran “is keeping open the option to develop” nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated in January 2012 that Iran would probably need “about a year” to produce a nuclear weapon and “possibly another one to two years” to incorporate it into a delivery vehicle. However, Director Clapper indicated in February 2012 that it would likely take Iran longer than a year to produce a nuclear weapon after making a decision to do so. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.
CRS — Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decisionmakers are seriously considering whether to order a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel’s history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying what Israeli policymakers believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern state—destroying Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under construction in Syria in 2007. Today, Israeli officials generally view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an unacceptable threat to Israeli security—with some describing it as an existential threat. This report analyzes key factors that may influence Israeli political decisions relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views of and relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the Israeli public; U.S., regional, and international stances and responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates of the potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and responses Israeli leaders anticipate from Iran and Iranian-allied actors—including Hezbollah and Hamas—regionally and internationally.
For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. By all accounts, such an attack could have considerable regional and global security, political, and economic repercussions, not least for the United States, Israel, and their bilateral relationship. It is unclear what the ultimate effect of a strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Israeli government, President Barack Obama, and many Members of Congress have similar concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. They appear to have a range of views on how best to address those shared concerns. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy and research purposes, and U.S. intelligence assessments say that Iran has not made a decision to build nuclear weapons. However, Iran continues to enrich uranium in militarily hardened sites and questions remain about its nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions.
Short- and long-term questions for Members of Congress to consider regarding a possible Israeli decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities militarily might include, but are not limited to, the following: • How might an Israeli strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and other regional countries?
- Would an Israeli strike be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way?
- How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject?
- How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide oversight with respect to various political and military options?
This report has many aspects that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim to independently confirm any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to various Israeli, U.S., or other officials. This is an update of a report dated March 28, 2012. However, the only updated material is the initial section entitled “Developments from Late March to September 2012.”
The Rise of Diabetes Prevalence in the Arab Region
Introduction:Arab populations have many similarities and dissimilarities. They share culture, language and religion but they are also subject to economic, political and social differences. The purpose of this study is to understand the causes of the rising trend of diabetes prevalence in order to suggest efficient actions susceptible to reduce the burden of diabetes in the Arab world.Method:We use principal component analysis to illustrate similarities and differences between Arab countries according to four variables: 1) the prevalence of diabetes, 2) impaired glucose tolerance (IGT), 3) diabetes related deaths and 4) diabetes related expenditure per person. A linear regression is also used to study the correlation between human development index and diabetes prevalence.Results:Arab countries are mainly classified into three groups according to the diabetes comparative prevalence (high, medium and low) but other differences are seen in terms of diabetes-related mortality and diabetes related expenditure per person. We also investigate the correlation between the human development index (HDI) and diabetes comparative prevalence (R = 0.81).Conclusion:The alarming rising trend of diabetes prevalence in the Arab region constitutes a real challenge for heath decision makers. In order to alleviate the burden of diabetes, preventive strategies are needed, based essentially on sensitization for a more healthy diet with regular exercise but health authorities are also asked to provide populations with heath- care and early diagnosis to avoid the high burden caused by complications of diabetes.
CRS — Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The Obama Administration identifies Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests. This perception is generated by suspicions of Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program— heightened by a November 8, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report—as well as by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. Tensions have been particularly elevated since Iran’s late December 2011 threat to try to choke off much of the world’s oil supplies by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz—a reaction to the imposition of significant sanctions against Iran’s vital exports of oil.
The sense of imminent crisis with Iran—much of which has been brought on by Israeli threats to buck U.S. advice by acting militarily against Iran’s nuclear program—follows three years in which the Obama Administration has assembled a broad international coalition to pressure Iran through economic sanctions—while also offering sustained engagement with Iran.
None of the pressure has, to date, altered Iran’s pursuit of its nuclear program: Iran attended December 2010 and January 2011 talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no progress was reported at any of these meetings. However, since the beginning of 2012, as significant multilateral sanctions have been added on Iran’s oil exports—including an oil purchase embargo by the European Union to go into full effect by July 1, 2012—there are growing indications that the regime feels economic pressure. Iran’s leaders have responded not only with threats to commerce in the Strait of Hormuz, but also stated a willingness to enter into new nuclear talks without preconditions. At the same time, it has begun uranium enrichment at a deep underground facility near Qom. The Administration uses indicators such as Iran’s economic deterioration and its willingness to engage in new talks as evidence that policy is starting to work and should be given more time before any consideration of U.S. or other country military options.
The Administration also perceives that the legitimacy and popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, although not to the point where the perceived threat from Iran is likely to end in the near future. The regime has sought to parry the perception that it is increasingly isolated—a perception that might color the outcome of March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections. In advance of the vote, the regime arrested activists whom they suspect might try to spark unrest during the election campaign—a fear heightened by the boycott of the poll by reformist groups. Over the past two years, the United States has increased public criticism of Iran’s human rights record, an effort broadly supported in the international community. Some in the 112th Congress, aside from supporting additional economic sanctions against Iran, believe the United States should provide additional vocal and material support to the democracy movement in Iran, despite the relative quiescence of the opposition “Green Movement” since early 2010. The Administration argues that it has supported the opposition through civil society and other programs, and by using recent authorities to sanction Iranian officials who suppress human rights in Iran and help Syria repress human rights. For further information, including pending Iran sanctions legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.
CRS — Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The issue of Iran and its nuclear program has emerged as a top priority for the Obama Administration. The sense of impending crisis is generated by growing suspicions in the international community that Iran’s nuclear program is not for purely peaceful purposes, and the determination of the government of Israel, in particular, that it might take unilateral military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities if its progress is not soon halted. The United States also sees a threat to U.S. interests posed by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. Tensions have been particularly elevated since Iran’s late-December 2011 threat to try to choke off much of the world’s oil supplies by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz—a reaction to the imposition of significant sanctions against Iran’s vital exports of oil.
The heightened tensions follow three years in which the Obama Administration has assembled a broad international coalition to pressure Iran through economic sanctions while also offering sustained engagement with Iran if it verifiably assures the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful. None of the pressure has, to date, altered Iran’s pursuit of its nuclear program: Iran attended December 2010 and January 2011 talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no progress was reported at any of these meetings. In early 2012, Iran began uranium enrichment at a deep underground facility near Qom to a level of 20% enrichment. However, since the beginning of 2012, as significant multilateral sanctions have been added on Iran’s oil exports—including an oil purchase embargo by the European Union to go into full effect by July 1, 2012—there are growing indications that the regime feels economic pressure. Iran’s leaders have responded not only with threats to commerce in the Strait of Hormuz, but an acceptance of new nuclear talks without preconditions. The Administration uses indicators such as Iran’s economic deterioration and its willingness to engage in new talks as evidence that policy is starting to work and should be given more time before any consideration of U.S. or other country military options.
The Administration also perceives that the legitimacy and popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, although not to the point where the regime’s grip on power is threatened. The regime has sought to use the international pressure to rally the public to its side, playing on nationalist sentiment to encourage high turnout in the March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections. The boycott of the poll by reformist groups rendered the election a contest between factions supporting either President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i. Khamene’i supporters were elected overwhelmingly, helping the Supreme Leader solidify his control over day-to-day governance. Over the past two years, the United States has increased public criticism of Iran’s human rights record, an effort broadly supported in the international community. Some in the 112th Congress, aside from supporting additional economic sanctions against Iran, believe the United States should provide additional political support to the democracy movement in Iran, despite the relative quiescence of the opposition since early 2010. The Administration argues that it has supported the opposition through civil society and other programs, and by using recent authorities to sanction Iranian officials who suppress human rights in Iran and help Syria repress human rights. For further information, including pending Iran sanctions legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.
CRS — Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decisionmakers now are seriously considering whether to order a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel’s history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying what Israeli policymakers believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern state—destroying Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under construction in Syria in 2007. Today, Israeli officials generally view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an unacceptable threat to Israeli security—with some viewing it as an existential threat.
This report analyzes key factors that may influence current Israeli political decisions relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views of and relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the Israeli public; U.S., regional, and international stances and responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates of the potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and responses Israeli leaders anticipate from Iran and Iranian-allied actors—including Hezbollah and Hamas—regionally and internationally.
For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. By all accounts, such an attack could have considerable regional and global security, political, and economic repercussions, not least for the United States, Israel, and their bilateral relationship. It is unclear what the ultimate effect of a strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Israeli government, President Barack Obama, and many Members of Congress have shared concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. They appear to have a range of views on how best to address those shared concerns. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy purposes, and U.S. intelligence assessments say that Iran has not made a decision to build nuclear weapons. However, Iran continues to enrich uranium in militarily hardened sites and questions remain about its nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions.
Short- and long-term questions for Members of Congress to consider regarding a possible Israeli decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities militarily might include, but are not limited to, the following:
- How might an Israeli strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and other regional countries?
- Would an Israeli strike be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way?
- How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject?
- How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide oversight with respect to various political and military options?
This report has many aspects that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim to independently confirm any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to various U.S. and Israeli officials.
Using US Strategic Reserves to Moderate Potential Oil Price Increases from Sanctions on Iran
Using US Strategic Reserves to Moderate Potential Oil Price Increases from Sanctions on Iran
Source: Peterson Institute for International Economics
The new, draconian sanctions introduced by the United States and the European Union to prevent Iran from earning money from its crude oil exports could pose a serious economic threat to oil-importing countries that also trade heavily with the US and EU economies. Nations such as China, South Korea, and Japan, which obtain significant amount of oil from Iran while enjoying large trade surpluses with the United States, are justifiably anxious. These countries and others worry that by pushing Iran from the global crude market, the new US and EU sanctions will disrupt oil markets, increase crude prices, and further slow global economic growth, which, at a minimum, would cut their export revenues. Saudi Arabia and other members of the Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have indicated they would replace oil previously purchased from Iran, but these offers have done little to allay the apprehensions.
Verleger suggests a way to put real pressure on Iran while moderating or eliminating economic fallout for the US and EU economies and those of their trading partners: selling oil from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which now holds far more oil than required by treaty obligations—more than 280 million surplus barrels. This strategic use of the SPR will increase the effectiveness of sanctions on Iran and ease the adjustment difficulties that confront US allies. The sales might also reduce any price pressure caused by removal of light Iranian crude from the market.
+ Full Paper (PDF)
CRS — Iran Sanctions
The international coalition that is imposing progressively strict economic sanctions on Iran is broadening and deepening, with increasingly significant effect on Iran’s economy. The objective, not achieved to date, remains to try to compel Iran to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. As 2012 begins, Iran sees newly-imposed multilateral sanctions against its oil exports as a severe threat – to the point where Iran is threatening to risk armed conflict. Iran also has indicated receptivity to new nuclear talks in the hopes of reversing or slowing the implementation of the oil export-related sanctions. The energy sector provides nearly 70% of Iran’s government revenues. Iran’s alarm stems from the potential loss of oil sales as a result of:• A decision by the European Union on January 23, 2012, to wind down purchases of Iranian crude oil by July 1, 2012. EU countries buy about 20% of Iran’s oil exports. This action took into consideration an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s possible efforts to design a nuclear explosive device, and diplomatic and financial rifts with Britain, which caused the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran on November 30, 2011.• Decisions by other Iranian oil purchasers, particularly Japan and South Korea, to reduce purchases of Iranian oil. Those decisions are intended to comply with a provision of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81, signed December 31, 2011) that prevents the opening of U.S. accounts by foreign banks that conduct transactions with Iran’s Central Bank—unless the parent country reduces substantially its purchases of Iranian oil.• The willingness of other oil producers with spare capacity, particularly Saudi Arabia, a strategic rival, to sell additional oil to countries cutting Iranian oil buys.• This confluence of policies has already begun to reduce Iran’s oil sales and might reduce them by as much as 40% (1 million barrels per day reduction out of 2.5 million barrels per day of sales). Iran is widely assessed as unable to economically sustain that level of lost oil sales.The signs of economic pressure on Iran are multiplying. The value of Iran’s rial has dropped precipitously since December 2011. Iranian leaders have admitted that Iran is virtually cut off from the international banking system and is increasingly trading through barter arrangements rather than hard currency exchange. The pullout from Iran by major international firms have slowed Iran’s efforts to modernize its energy sector and other sectors, rendering Iran unable to increase its oil production above 4.1 million barrels per day. Still, Iran has small amounts of natural gas exports; it had none at all before Iran opened its fields to foreign investment in 1996. Iran’s overall ability to limit the effects of sanctions has, until now, been aided by relatively high oil prices—prices that tend to increase as Iran threatens conflict in the Persian Gulf region. Iran also has used various innovations to work around some of the growing international restrictions. The United States and its partners are attempting to implement the 2012 sanctions so as not to raise world oil prices any further.In the 112 th Congress, legislation, such as S. 1048, H.R. 1905, and a Senate Banking Committee bill reported out on February 2, 2012, would enhance both the economic sanctions and human rights-related provisions of CISADA and other laws. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
“We Are Ordered to Crush You”: Expanding Repression of Dissent in Iran
“We Are Ordered to Crush You”: Expanding Repression of Dissent in Iran
Source: Amnesty International
The net of repression is widening in Iran. The authorities are arresting filmmakers, bloggers, human rights defenders, women’s rights activists, lawyers, students, journalists, political activists, religious and ethnic minorities — simply for speaking out against the government or expressing views with which the authorities do not agree. This report shows the lengths to which the Iranian authorities are prepared to go to isolate people in Iran from the rest of the world, and to try to hide information on human rights violations.
+ Full Report (PDF)
Treasury Issues Guidance Concerning National Defense Authorization Act Sanctions on Iran
Treasury Issues Guidance Concerning National Defense Authorization Act Sanctions on Iran
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury
Today the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued guidance concerning the implementation of section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The guidance clarifies a number of issues related to the implementation of the NDAA provision as it relates to foreign governments, financial institutions, and other interested parties. Among other topics, the guidance addresses the scope of institutions that may be subject to sanctions under the NDAA, the nature of the transactions that are covered, and how the Administration will approach the determination of what qualifies as a “significant reduction” in a country’s purchases of crude oil from Iran.
Executive Order 13599 delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, authority to determine whether a foreign financial institution has engaged in significant transactions of the type that trigger sanctions under the Act. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, is delegated authority to determine whether any country has significantly reduced the volume of its crude oil purchases from Iran.
CRS — Iran Sanctions
Iran Sanctions (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
There is broad international support for imposing progressively strict economic sanctions on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. During 2011, there was broad agreement that sanctions had not hurt Iran’s economy to the point at which the Iranian leadership feels pressured to accommodate core Western goals on Iran’s nuclear program. However, as 2012 begins, Iran is indicating it perceives new U.S. and other sanctions affecting its vital oil export lifeline as a severe threat – to the point where Iran might threaten armed conflict in the Strait of Hormuz. It also has offered new nuclear talks in the hopes of heading off some of the oil export- related sanctions under consideration. The energy sector provides nearly 70% of Iran’s government revenues.
The signs of effectiveness of sanctions mounted throughout 2011. The value of Iran’s rial has dropped dramatically over the past two years. Iranian leaders have admitted that Iran is virtually cut off from the international banking system. There have been a stream of announcements by major international firms since early 2010 that they are exiting or declining to undertake further work in the Iranian market, particularly the energy sector, taking with them often irreplaceable expertise. Partly as a result, Iran’s oil production has remained relatively steady at about 4.1 million barrels per day, defying Iranian efforts to increase production. Iran has small amounts of natural gas exports; it had none at all before Iran opened its fields to foreign investment in 1996. Even before the United States and several other countries moved to cut off Iran’s Central Bank in late 2011, several countries, particularly India, had delayed billions of dollars in oil payments for Iran because payments mechanisms had been disrupted by sanctions. However, Iran’s overall ability to limit the effects of sanctions has been aided by relatively high oil prices – prices that tend to increase as Iran threatens conflict in the Persian Gulf region.
What has caused sanctions to start to affect Iranian calculations has been the broadening of international support for and compliance with them. Using the authorities of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted June 9, 2010, measures adopted since mid-2010 by the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and several other countries target the key energy and financial sectors of Iran. These measures complement the numerous U.S. laws and regulations that have long sought to try to pressure Iran, particularly the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)—a 1996 U.S. law that mandates U.S. penalties against foreign companies that invest in Iran’s energy sector. The application of that law was broadened by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) as well as by Executive Order 13590 issued November 21, 2011. The issuing of that Order was accompanied by a Treasury Department determination, under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, that the Iranian financial system constitutes an entity of primary money laundering concern. These measures have been joined by several other countries, who took into consideration an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s possible efforts to design a nuclear explosive device, and diplomatic and financial rifts with Britain, which caused the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran on November 30, 2011.
In the 112th Congress, legislation, such as S. 1048 and H.R. 1905, would enhance both the economic sanctions and human rights-related provisions of CISADA and other laws. A provision of the FY2012 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1540) sanctions foreign banks that do business with Iran’s Central Bank. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (PDF)
Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (James R. Clapper)
This statement provides extensive detail about numerous state and nonstate actors, crosscutting political, economic, and military developments and transnational trends, all of which constitute our nation‟s strategic and tactical landscape. Although I believe that counterterrorism, counterproliferation, cybersecurity, and counterintelligence are at the immediate forefront of our security concerns, it is virtually impossible to rank—in terms of long-term importance—the numerous, potential threats to US national security. The United States no longer faces—as in the Cold War—one dominant threat. Rather, it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats—and the actors behind them—that constitute our biggest challenge. Indeed, even the four categories noted above are also inextricably linked, reflecting a quickly changing international environment of rising new powers, rapid diffusion of power to nonstate actors and ever greater access by individuals and small groups to lethal technologies. We in the Intelligence Community believe it is our duty to work together as an integrated team to understand and master this complexity. By providing better strategic and tactical intelligence, we can partner more effectively with other Government officials at home and abroad to protect our vital national interests.
Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry
Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry
Source: RAND Corporation
From press release:
While Israel and Iran once were de facto allies, the two nations have come to view each other as direct rivals for power and influence in the Middle East, increasing the risk for a possible military conflict, according to a new RAND Corporation study.
“The Iranian regime views Israel as a regional competitor bent on undermining its revolutionary system,” said Dalia Dassa Kaye, co-author of the study and a senior political scientist with RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “Israel, on the other hand, views Iran as its main security challenge, posing serious strategic and ideological challenges to the Jewish state, particularly as Iran continues its pursuit of nuclear capabilities.”
In order to prevent the current rivalry from escalating toward conflict, the study suggests U.S. leaders should continue to bolster security cooperation and intelligence-sharing with Israel, making such efforts visible to the Israeli public, while quietly counseling against unilateral action and continuing to focus on steps to further isolate, penalize and weaken Iran’s capacity to project power and influence throughout the region.
The United States should engage in activities that increase understanding about how a deterrence relationship between Israel and Iran may evolve, and encourage direct communication between Israelis and Iranians through informal diplomatic channels. The United States also should continue both engagement and sanction policies that may affect the internal debate in Iran on nuclear weaponization.
Despite the current animosity, Israel and Iran have not always been rivals, nor are they natural competitors, researchers say. Arab governments tend to regard both nations with suspicion, and Israel and Iran do not have territorial disputes or compete economically. The two nations cooperated together for years before and after Iran’s 1979 revolution, based on shared geopolitical interests.
Only in the last decade have the countries begun to see each other as rivals. As late as the 1990s, Israel’s security establishment did not consider Iran as its predominant security challenge. However, Iran’s expanding missile capabilities, nuclear advances and the rise of fundamentalist leaders with vitriolic anti-Israel rhetoric have fueled anxiety. This is particularly the case as Israel perceives Iranian influence on the rise.
CRS — Iran Sanctions (12/2/11)
Iran Sanctions (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
There is broad international support for imposing progressively strict economic sanctions on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. Many U.S. and international officials appear to agree that the sanctions have not, to date, hurt Iran’s economy to the point at which the Iranian leadership feels pressured to accommodate core Western goals on Iran’s nuclear program. As of September 2011, Iran’s leaders have stated interest in new proposals that could form the basis of revived nuclear talks, although prospects for new talks have been set back by diplomatic rifts between Iran and several European countries in November 2011.
Whether or not core goals have yet been accomplished, the United States and its allies appear to agree that sanctions might yet succeed and that pressure should be added to further weaken Iran’s energy sector and isolate Iran from the international financial system. The energy sector provides nearly 70% of government revenues. Iran’s large trading community needs financing to buy goods from the West and sell them inside Iran. There have been a stream of announcements by major international firms since early 2010 that they are exiting or declining to undertake further work in the Iranian market, particularly the energy sector, taking with them often irreplaceable expertise. Partly as a result, Iran’s oil production has remained relatively steady at about 4.1 million barrels per day, defying Iranian efforts to increase production. Iran has small amounts of natural gas exports; it had none at all before Iran opened its fields to foreign investment in 1996. Several countries, particularly India, have delayed billions of dollars in oil payments for Iran because payments mechanisms have been disrupted by sanctions. However, Iran’s overall ability to limit the effects of sanctions has been aided by relatively high oil prices in 2011.
What has generated U.S. optimism about the eventual success of sanctions has been the broadening of international support for and compliance with them. Using the authorities of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, adopted June 9, 2010, measures adopted since mid-2010 by the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and several other countries target the key energy and financial sectors of Iran. These measures complement the numerous U.S. laws and regulations that have long sought to try to pressure Iran, particularly the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)—a 1996 U.S. law that mandates U.S. penalties against foreign companies that invest in Iran’s energy sector. The application of that law was broadened by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) as well as by Executive Order 13590 issued November 21, 2011. The issuing of that Order was accompanied by a Treasury Department warning, under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, that conducting transactions with the Iranian financial system constitutes a risk of facilitating Iranian proliferation and terrorism financing activity.
The prospects for additional international sanctions have been heightened in late 2011 by U.S. revelations in October 2011 of a purported Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s possible efforts to design a nuclear explosive device, and diplomatic and financial rifts with Britain, which caused the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran on November 30, 2011. In the 112th Congress, legislation, such as S. 1048 and H.R. 1905, would enhance both the economic sanctions and human rights-related provisions of CISADA and other laws. An amendment to a Senate FY2012 defense authorization bill would sanction foreign banks that do business with Iran’s Central Bank. Some countries and experts also seek a broad or partial embargo on Iran’s sale of oil, to reinforce the sanctions effects discussed above. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
CRS — Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (12/15/11)
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The Obama Administration identifies Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests. This perception is generated by suspicions of Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program – heightened by a November 8, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report – as well as by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. In October 2011, U.S. officials accused Iran of plotting to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.
The Obama Administration initially offered Iran’s leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West in exchange for limits to its nuclear program. After observing a crackdown on peaceful protests in Iran in 2009, and failing to obtain Iran’s agreement to implement any nuclear compromise, the Administration has worked since early 2010 on a “two-track strategy” to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran while maintaining offers of further engagement. Significant additional sanctions were imposed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related “national measures” by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Further measures intended to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195). In concert, the Administration has stepped up arms sales to regional states that share the U.S. suspicions of Iran’s intentions.
Perhaps hoping to avoid additional sanctions, Iran attended December 2010 and January 2011 talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no substantive progress was reported at any of these meetings. The prospects for new talks seemed to increase in August 2011 as a result of Iran- Russia discussions of new formulas for compromise, supplemented by Iranian official statements suggesting potential acceptance of some widely discussed international proposals. However, no date for new talks was arranged and the November 2011 IAEA report reduced the prospect for new talks and increased international support for additional sanctions. This tend has been accelerated by a row between Iran and Britain that included the ransacking of Britain’s embassy in Tehran on November 29 by youths tacitly backed by Iran’s security forces—an action that has furthered Tehran’s isolation.
In 2011, in the context of the popular uprisings throughout the Middle East, and perhaps addressing criticism that it did not sufficiently support the popular uprising in Iran in 2009, the Administration has increased its public criticism of Iran’s human rights record. That effort has been broadly supported in the international community. Some in the 112th Congress, aside from supporting additional economic sanctions against Iran, believe the United States should provide additional vocal and material support to the democracy movement in Iran, despite its outward quiescence in most of 2011. The Administration argues that it has supported the opposition through civil society and other programs, and by using recent authorities to sanction Iranian officials who suppress human rights in Iran and help Syria repress human rights. For further information, including pending Iran sanctions legislation, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions; and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status.
A Cyberworm that Knows No Boundaries
A Cyberworm that Knows No Boundaries
Source: RAND Corporation
Iran’s announcement that a computer worm called Stuxnet had infected computers that controlled one of its nuclear processing facilities marked a signal event in cyber attacks. Although such attacks were known to be theoretically possible, the incident proved that a cyberworm could successfully infiltrate a system and produce physical damage. Furthermore, the sophisticated nature of the worm and the resources that would have been required to design, produce, and implant it strongly suggest a state-sponsored effort. It has become clear that Stuxnet-like worms pose a serious threat even to infrastructure and computer systems that are not connected to the Internet. However, defending against such attacks is an increasingly complex prospect. The nature of cyberspace ensures that the attacker has the upper hand and can move about with impunity and relative anonymity. The sophistication of virulent malware has also made it difficult to detect whether an intrusion has occurred, and attackers have a wide range of means at their disposal to gain access to networks, even those that are closed. Finally, bureaucratic and legal barriers can hinder the ability to mount a successful defense. Under the current framework, different organizations have different responsibilities and different levels of authority when it comes to investigating or defending against intrusions, depending on the nature of the attack, its geographic origin, and the systems it targets. In addition, there is a need to protect critical government and private-sector infrastructure in a way that does not infringe on civil liberties or proprietary data. The authors argue that new legislation is needed to establish a more efficient assignment of responsibilities, and a revised legal code may be required to successfully defend against the ever-evolving cyber threat.
