Archive
CRS — U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
During the first Obama Administration, Congress reviewed the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2012 New START Treaty, and funding plans for the U.S. nuclear enterprise. Specifically, even though the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. The 113th Congress will continue to review these programs during the annual authorization and appropriations process.
During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. That number has declined to less than 2,000 warheads today, and is slated to decline to 1,550 warheads by the 2018, after the New START Treaty completes implementation.
At the present time, the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with between one and three warheads; they will all be reduced to only one warhead over the next few years, and the fleet will decline to, at most, 420 missiles. The Air Force is also modernizing the Minuteman missiles, replacing and upgrading their rocket motors, guidance systems, and other components. The Air Force had expected to begin replacing the Minuteman missiles around 2018, but decided, instead, to continue to modernize and maintain the existing missiles, so that they can remain in the force through 2030; it is, once again, considering what to do to sustain the missiles after 2030.
The U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident submarines; each carries 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles. The Navy converted 4 of the original 18 Trident submarines to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles. The remaining submarines currently carry around 1,000 warheads in total; that number will decline as the United States implements the New START Treaty. The Navy has shifted the basing of the submarines, so that nine are deployed in the Pacific Ocean and five are in the Atlantic, to better cover targets in and around Asia. It also has undertaken efforts to extend the life of the missiles and warheads so that they and the submarines can remain in the fleet past 2020, and to begin design work on a new submarine.
The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers includes 19 B-2 bombers and 94 B-52 bombers. The B-1 bomber is no longer equipped for nuclear missions. The fleet will decline to around 60 aircraft in coming years, as the United States implements New START. The Air Force has also begun to retire the nuclear-armed cruise missiles carried by B-52 bombers, leaving only about half the B- 52 fleet equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The Air Force plans to procure both a new long-range bomber and a new cruise missile over the next 20 years.
The Obama Administration is completing a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force, and a review of U.S. nuclear employment policy, as it implements the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. It is also implementing the New START Treaty with Russia that will limit the number of deployed missiles and warheads in the U.S. strategic force. Congress will review the Administration’s plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process, and as it assesses U.S. plans under New START and possible future arms control treaties with Russia. This report will be updated as needed.
CRS — Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress
Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. Congress may wish to assess the Administration’s plans to respond to possible scenarios involving the use, change of hands, or loss of control of Syrian chemical weapons.
Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical weapons, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad reportedly has stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles, and associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality. Little is known from open sources about the current size and condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, or are in the process of destroying them. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs.
While the United States and other governments have said they believe the Asad regime has kept its chemical weapons stocks secure, policymakers are concerned about what could happen to these weapons in the course of the civil war, such as diversion to terrorist groups or loss of control during a regime collapse.
Reports in early December 2012 quoted unnamed officials as saying intelligence showed possible preparations for use, but this was denied by the Syrian government. Since then, press reports have discussed several alleged incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria. A United Nations chemical weapons inspection team is negotiating with Syria on access to the sites to investigate. On June 13, 2013, the White House released a statement saying that following its investigation, “our intelligence community assesses that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year. Our intelligence community has high confidence in that assessment given multiple, independent streams of information.” The June 13 statement said that CW use had resulted in estimated 100-150 deaths in Syria.
President Obama and other world leaders have said that the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences, which could include the use of military force. There is also concern that Syria could transfer its chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Administration officials have stated that the United States has been working with regional allies to detect the movement of chemical weapons, prepare interdiction scenarios, and mitigate possible use against military or civilian populations. The June 13 White House statement said that in response to the Asad regime’s use of chemical weapons, the President has authorized the expansion of military assistance to the opposition forces in Syria.
During conflict, the intelligence community and Special Forces units would likely play a major role in locating and securing such weapons in a combat environment. The nature and recent course of the conflict in Syria suggests that rapid changes in control over critical military facilities may occur. U.S. government programs established to secure or remove chemical or other weapons of mass destruction through threat reduction or nonproliferation programs have focused on destruction or scientist redirection in an atmosphere of cooperation. At present, such programs are providing border security assistance to neighboring states. U.S. policymakers and Congress may wish to review and discuss authorities, funding, forces, and scenarios in advance.
For additional information on chemical weapons agents, see CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea. For a broader discussion of U.S. policy options, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.
CRS — Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response
Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion in Syria is in its third year, and seems poised to continue, with the government and a bewildering array of militias locked in a bloody struggle of attrition. The Obama Administration has signaled a pending expansion of U.S. civilian and military assistance to the opposition in the wake of the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion that President Bashar al Asad’s forces used chemical weapons in limited attacks in recent months. U.S. officials and many analysts have asserted that President Asad and his supporters will be forced from power, but few offer specific, credible timetables for a resolution to the crisis. Further escalation in fighting or swift regime change could jeopardize the security of chemical and conventional weapons stockpiles, threaten minority groups, or lead to wider regional conflict.
Opposition forces are formidable, but regime forces, backed by Hezbollah fighters and Iranian and Russian material support, have initiated successful tactical counteroffensives in recent weeks. The Syrian military continues to use air strikes, artillery, and pro-government militias in punishing attacks on areas where rebels operate. Some members of Syria’s Sunni Arab majority and of ethnic and sectarian minority groups view the conflict in communal, zero-sum terms. U.S. officials believe that fighting would likely continue even if Asad were toppled.
Amid extensive damage to major urban areas and reports attributing war crimes to government and opposition forces, the fighting has created a regional humanitarian emergency. Some estimates suggest more than 90,000 Syrians have been killed since unrest began in March 2011. As of June 14, more than 1,638,102 refugees had fled Syria amid United Nations projections the total may reach 3.5 million by years end. According to U.N. estimates, as many as 4.25 million Syrians may be internally displaced. U.N. agencies have launched their largest ever humanitarian assistance appeal– seeking $4.4 billion for the Syria crisis in 2013. The United States has provided more than $513 million in humanitarian assistance to date.
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August 2011, and have pressed the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Syrian government. The United States has recognized the National Coalition of Revolution and Opposition Forces (SC) as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and has provided nonlethal assistance to the Coalition and an affiliated Supreme Military Council (SMC). The Obama Administration believes that a negotiated political settlement is required and has prepared military plans to secure Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons, if necessary.
Some observers advocate for more robust civil and military aid to the SC and SMC as a means of forcing the Asad regime to the negotiating table. Opponents of this approach argue that making opposition groups more formidable could intensify the fighting and risks empowering extremists. Some armed opposition factions, including powerful Islamist coalitions, reject negotiation.
After two years of unrest and violence, the central question for policy makers remains how best to bring the conflict in Syria to a close before the crisis consigns the region to one of several destructive and destabilizing scenarios. The human toll of the fighting, and the resulting political, ethnic, and sectarian polarization, all but guarantee that political, security, humanitarian, and economic challenges will outlast Asad and keep Syria on the U.S. agenda for years to come.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
Reports
1. Defense Management: More Reliable Cost Estimates and Further Planning Needed to Inform the Marine Corps Realignment Initiatives in the Pacific. GAO-13-360, June 11.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-360
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655143.pdf
2. Medicare Program Integrity: Few Payments in 2011 Exceeded Limits under One Kind of Prepayment Control, but Reassessing Limits Could Be Helpful. GAO-13-430, May 9.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-430
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654475.pdf
Testimony
1. Information Technology: OMB and Agencies Need to Focus Continued Attention on Eliminating Duplicative Investments, by David A. Powner, director, information technology management issues, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. GAO-13-685T, June 11.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-685T
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655134.pdf
Malingering and PTSD: Detecting malingering and war related PTSD by Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST)
Source: BMC Psychiatry
Background
Malingering is prevalent in PTSD, especially in delayed-onset PTSD. Despite the attempts to detect it, indicators, tools and methods to accurately detect malingering need extensive scientific and clinical research. Therefore, this study was designed to validate a tool that can detect malingering of war-related PTSD by Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST).
Methods
In this blind clinical diagnosis study, one hundred and twenty veterans referred to War Related PTSD Diagnosis Committee in Iran in 2011 were enrolled. In the first step, the clients received Psychiatry diagnosis and were divided into two groups based on the DSM-IV-TR, and in the second step, the participants completed M-FAST.
Results
The t-test score within two groups by M-FAST Scale showed a significant difference (t = 14.058, P < 0.0001), and 92% of malingering war-related PTSD participants scored more than 6 and %87 of PTSD group scored less than 6 in M-FAST Scale.
Conclusions
M-FAST showed a significant difference between war-related PTSD and malingering participants. The >=6 score cutoff was suggested by M-FAST to detect malingering of war-related PTSD.
SIPRI Yearbook 2013
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
From press release:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) today launches the findings of SIPRI Yearbook 2013, which assesses the current state of international security, armaments and disarmament. Key findings include: (a) Alone among the five legally recognized nuclear weapon states, China expanded its nuclear arsenal in 2012; (b) The number of personnel deployed with peace operations worldwide is falling rapidly, due to the withdrawal from Afghanistan; (c) Progress towards a global ban on cluster munitions stalled in 2012.
2013 summary (PDF)
Full product available via subscription.
Key Trends That Will Shape Army Installations of Tomorrow
Key Trends That Will Shape Army Installations of Tomorrow
Source: RAND Corporation
Army installations of the future will most likely be shaped and influenced by trends and pressures external to the Army, such as technology changes and land-use pressures. RAND Arroyo Center conducted a study for the Army’s Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management to assess how trends external to Army installations out to 2025 may affect the Army’s ability to provide quality installation services and infrastructure. Trend areas examined include: loss of biodiversity, urbanization and sprawling communities, sustainable buildings, energy, sustainable transportation, water scarcity, sustainable communities, societal trends, sustainable agriculture, online communities, climate change, robotics, and pervasive computing. RAND researchers found that such trends have the potential to cause harm to installation operations including testing, training, and construction activities; to cost or save the Army significant amounts in the future; to hurt or improve Soldier and Family quality of life; to improve installation operations; to help meet future installation requirements; and to improve or hurt environmental conditions. This report provides the final study results, including findings about what the key trends are and how they are likely to affect installations, sources for tracking the trends, and the study team’s recommendations about Army actions to take advantage of positive trends and mitigate the impact of negative ones.
DoD, VA, and HHS Report on Improving Mental Health Services for Military, Veterans, and Families
DoD, VA, and HHS Report on Improving Mental Health Services for Military, Veterans, and Families
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
The Departments of Defense (DoD), Veterans Affairs (VA), and Health and Human Services (HHS) recently released the Interagency Task Force on Military and Veterans Mental Health 2013 Interim Report.
In response to President Obama’s August, 31, 2012 Executive Order, this progress report outlines advances made to date to expand the quality and availability of mental health care services for active military service members, veterans, and their families. Highlights of the report include:
- Increasing the capacity of the Veterans Crisis Line
- Building partnerships between the VA and community-based mental health providers
- Increasing the number of VA mental health providers and peer specialists
- Implementing a national suicide prevention campaign.
Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing — Pending Legislation Regarding Sexual Assaults in the Military
Oversight Hearing: Pending Legislation Regarding Sexual Assaults in the Military
Source: U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee
Webcast plus testimonies in PDF.
CRS — Women in Combat: Issues for Congress
Women in Combat: Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Over the last few years, women have become more involved in combat operations. Since September, 2001 (to February 28, 2013), 299,548 female service members have been deployed for contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In approximately 12 years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, over 800 women have been wounded and over 130 have died.
According to the Department of Defense (DOD), as of February 29, 2013, 16,407 female members were currently deployed in contingency operation. Women have been recognized for their heroism, two earning Silver Star medals.
The expansion of roles for women in the armed forces has evolved over decades. Women are not precluded from serving in any military unit by law today. DOD policy restricting women from serving in ground combat units was most recently modified in 1994 and 2013. Under the 1994 policy, women could not be assigned to units, below the brigade level, whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground. Primarily, this meant that women were barred from infantry, artillery, armor, combat engineers, and special operations units of battalion size or smaller. On January 24, 2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta rescinded the rule that restricted women from serving in combat units.
Various commissions and others have reviewed the issue of women in the military, in general, and women in combat units, at times at the direction of Congress. For example, the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act contained language establishing the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. Among its duties, the Commission was to conduct a study and report on the “establishment and maintenance of fair promotion and command opportunities for ethnic- and gender-specific members of the Armed Forces at the O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel for Army, Marine Corps and Air Force, and Commander for Navy and Coast Guard) grade level and above.” Among its recommendations, the Commission stated that DOD should take deliberate steps to open additional career fields and units involved in direct ground combat to women. The Ike Skelton National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2011 directed DOD to conduct a review to “ensure that female members have equitable opportunities to compete and excel in the Armed Forces.” [Emphasis added.]
With the repeal of the ban on women serving in combat units, some have questioned whether or if current standards should be kept in place, reviewed, modified, etc. Many women’s right supporters contend that the former exclusionary policy, or standards that, de facto, act in an exclusionary manner, prevents women from gaining leadership positions and view expanding the roles of women as a matter of civil rights. Critic s view such changes as potentially damaging to military readiness.
CRS — Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to upport Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Iss ues for Congress
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Throughout its history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on contractors to support a wide range of military operations. Operations over the last thirty years have highlighted the critical role that contractors play in supporting U.S. troops—both in terms of the number of contractors and the type of work being performed. Over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, and before that, in the Balkans, contractors accounted for 50% or more of the total military force.
Regardless of whether future operations are similar to−or significantly different from− those of the past decade most analysts and defense officials believe that contractors will continue to play a central role in overseas military operations. Consequently, these observers believe that DOD should be prepared to effectively award and manage contracts at a moment’s notice, anywhere in the world, in unknown environments, and on a scale that may exceed the total contract obligations of any other federal agency.
Contractors provide a wide range of services, from transportation, construction, and base support, to intelligence analysis and private security. The benefits of using contractors include freeing up uniformed personnel to conduct combat operations; providing expertise in specialized fields, such as linguistics or weapon systems maintenance; and providing a surge capability, quickly delivering critical support capabilities tailored to specific military needs. Because contractors can be hired when a particular need arises and released when their services are no longer needed, contractors can be less expensive in the long run than maintaining a permanent in-house capability.
Just as the effective use of contractors can augment military capabilities, the ineffective use of contractors can prevent troops from receiving what they need, when they need it, and can lead to the wasteful spending of billions of dollars. Contractors can also compromise the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. military and undermine operations, as many analysts believe have occurred in recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improved planning for and management of contractors may not eliminate all problems, but it could mitigate the risks of relying on contractors during overseas operations.
DOD’s use of contractors has been a significant oversight issue for Congress in recent years. With the help of Congress, DOD has made substantial progress to improve its use of operational contract support; however, many observers believe the military is not yet sufficiently prepared to use contractors in future operations. In their view, better planning, expanded educating and training, ensuring sufficient resources to effectively manage and oversee contractors, and providing operational commanders with more reliable data can help build the foundation for the more effective use of contractors. In light of current and future budget constraints, some observers are concerned that DOD may not be able to sufficiently fund efforts underway to effectively prepare for the use of contractors in future operations.
DOD’s extensive use of contractors poses several potential policy and oversight issues for the 113th Congress, including:
1. To what extent will potential budget cuts or force structure changes impact DOD reliance on contractors?
2. To what extent is DOD preparing for the role of contractors in future military operations?
3. To what extent is the use of contractors being incorporated into DOD education, training, and exercises?
4. What steps is DOD taking to ensure that sufficient resources will be dedicated to create and maintain the capabilities to ensure effective operational contract support in the future?
Congress’ decisions on these issues could substantially affect the extent to which DOD relies on contractors and is capable of planning for and overseeing contractors in future operations.
Beyond the Arab Awakening: A Strategic Assessment of the Middle East
Beyond the Arab Awakening: A Strategic Assessment of the Middle East
Source: Brookings Institution
On August 28-29, 2012, the Saban Center at Brookings and the United States Central Command brought together analysts, officers, and policymakers to discuss the new and enduring challenges facing the United States in the Middle East.
The conference, Beyond the Arab Awakening: A Strategic Assessment of the Middle East, explored security developments in key countries of the region, focusing on those issues where the risks and opportunities for the United States are the greatest.
General James N. Mattis, then CENTCOM’s commander, delivered opening remarks, and the Honorable Michèle Flournoy, formerly the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, deliver a keynote address. The conference also featured experts from the Middle East as well as senior American analysts and officials. Together, the speakers and conference participants offered insights that went well beyond conventional Washington wisdom and provided valuable lessons and ideas for the U.S. military and policy community.
The proceedings from this conference include summaries of the sessions and the full text of Dr. Flournoy’s keynote address.
Financial Management: Efforts To Minimize Improper Payments for the Shipment of Household Goods Were Generally Effective But Needed Improvement
Financial Management: Efforts To Minimize Improper Payments for the Shipment of Household Goods Were Generally Effective But Needed Improvement
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General
U.S. Transportation Command officials were taking action to minimize the number of overpayments made on the shipment of household goods by implementing the Defense Personal Property System. However, for the period July 2010 through March 2012, General Services Administration (GSA) post-payment audits identified 15,081 automated invoices and 1,313 paper invoices with potential overpayments that DoD had not detected. The Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) did not obtain information from GSA that could assist in identifying and preventing the improper payments. SDDC did not make system change requests to detect payment errors such as statute of limitations violations, duplicate payments, and inaccurate shipping weights. DFAS did not report the overpayments as required by improper payment guidance.
As a result, DoD lost use of $4.6 million of overpayments, and DFAS underreported the number of improper payments.
DFAS identified that 142,636 of 229,411 processed line items contained accounting errors related to shipments of household goods during FY 2012. DFAS accounting technicians manually corrected the errors at a cost of about $2.6 million to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. The accounting errors occurred primarily because DoD shipment counselors entered invalid accounting data into the Defense Personal Property System.
If the Department made needed improvements to prevent accounting errors within the first year of the 6-year Future Years Defense Program, $13 million of costs can be saved over the remaining 5 years.
Joint Warfighting and Readiness: Better Oversight and Accountability Needed for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command C-12 Aircraft
Joint Warfighting and Readiness: Better Oversight and Accountability Needed for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command C-12 Aircraft
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General
USSOCOM officials did not provide adequate oversight and accountability of the USASOC C-12 aircraft in accordance with DoD guidance. USSOCOM officials did not report the aircraft in their Operational Support Airlift inventory for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s FY 2012 review. In addition, USSOCOM officials did not make the aircraft visible for centralized scheduling. This occurred because USSOCOM, Army G-3/5/7, and USASOC officials expressed confusion about who was responsible for providing oversight and accountability of the aircraft. As a result, USASOC may be operating an underused aircraft in excess of the required Operational Support Airlift aircraft inventory. In addition, DoD is at an increased risk that misuse of the aircraft by senior officials may occur and go undetected.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Emergency Alerting: Capabilities Have Improved, but Additional Guidance and Testing Are Needed. GAO-13-375, April 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-375
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654136.pdf
2. Export-Import Bank: More Detailed Information about Its Jobs Calculation Methodology Could Improve Transparency. GAO-13-446, May 23.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-446
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654805.pdf
3. Defense Acquisitions: Continued Management Attention Needed to Enhance Use and Review of DOD’s Inventory of Contracted Services. GAO-13-491, May 23.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-491
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654816.pdf
4. Defense Infrastructure: Navy’s Analysis of Costs and Benefits Regarding Naval Station Mayport Demonstrated Some Best Practices and Minimally Addressed Other Requirements. GAO-13-501, May 23.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-501
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654821.pdf
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
Reports
1. VA Education Benefits: VA Needs to Improve Program Management and Provide More Timely Information to Students. GAO-13-338, May 22.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-338
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654793.pdf
2. Spectrum Management: Federal Relocation Costs and Auction Revenues. GAO-13-472, May 22.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-472
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654795.pdf
Testimonies
1. Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication through Enhanced Performance Management and Oversight, by Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
GAO-13-590T, May 22.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-590T
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654610.pdf
2. Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Observations on States’ Role, Liabilities at DOD and Hardrock Mining Sites, and Litigation Issues, by David Trimble, director, natural resources and environment, before the Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. GAO-13-633T, May 22.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-633T
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654791.pdf
Tentative Eligibility Determinations; Presumptive Eligibility for Psychosis and Other Mental Illness
Tentative Eligibility Determinations; Presumptive Eligibility for Psychosis and Other Mental Illness
Source: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (via Federal Register)
This document amends the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regulation authorizing tentative eligibility determinations to comply with amended statutory authority concerning minimum active-duty service requirements. This document also codifies in regulation statutory presumptions of medical care eligibility for veterans of certain wars and conflicts who developed psychosis within specified time periods and for Persian Gulf War veterans who developed a mental illness other than psychosis within 2 years after service and within 2 years after the end of the Persian Gulf War period.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimonies
Source: Government Accountability Office
Reports
1. Diversity Management: Trends and Practices in the Financial Services Industry and Agencies after the Recent Financial Crisis. GAO-13-238, April 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-238
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653815.pdf
2. Medicare: Legislative Modifications Have Resulted In Payment Adjustments for Most Hospitals. GAO-13-334, April 17.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-334
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653854.pdf
3. Defense Management: Additional Information Needed to Improve Military Departments’ Strategies for Corrosion Prevention and Control. GAO-13-379, May 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-379
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654676.pdf
4. K-12 Education: States’ Test Security Policies and Procedures Varied. GAO-13-495R, May 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-495R
Testimonies
1. Elder Justice: Federal Government Has Taken Some Steps but Could Do More to Combat Elder Financial Exploitation, by Kay E. Brown, director, education, workforce, and income security, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. GAO-13-626T, May 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-626T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654664.pdf
2. Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Strategies for Reducing Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieving Cost Savings, by Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, before the Senate Committee on the Budget. GAO-13-631T, May 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-631T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654669.pdf
3. Oil and Gas Management: Continued Attention to Interior’s Revenue Collection and Human Capital Challenges Is Needed, by Frank Rusco, director, natural resources and environment, before the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Health Care, and Entitlements, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. GAO-13-647T, May 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-647T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654668.pdf
Defense Officials Aim to Reduce Adverse Effects of Furloughs
Defense Officials Aim to Reduce Adverse Effects of Furloughs
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
Following Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s announcement yesterday that most Defense Department civilian employees will experience up to 11 furlough days from early July through September, senior defense officials emphasized their goal to reduce adverse effects on the workforce and the mission.
Speaking to Pentagon reporters on background, two senior defense officials discussed details of the furlough, exemptions and stressed their intent to lessen its effects.
One official said it appears that about 15 percent — 120,000 of the department’s roughly 800,000 civilian employees — will be exempt from the furlough, and that number could rise once issues involving intelligence personnel are resolved.
While the furloughs will save the Defense Department $1.8 billion, “it’s not something that we wanted to do,” the official said.
Part of the department’s plan to reduce the furlough’s effects is to ask Congress allow shifting funds from one account to another, the official said.
The services previously had taken steps in an attempt to avoid furlough, the official noted, with the Air Force stopping flights for 12 combat-coded squadrons and the Army canceling most of its combat training rotations.
While all the services will experience furloughs, the official said, the Navy is getting a critical exemption for its civilian employees that work in shipyards and do nuclear maintenance, citing long periods required for maintenance and very little ability to catch up with maintenance on submarines and carriers.
The official acknowledged furloughs will reduce efficiency across the department.
+ Furlough memorandum (PDF)
+ OPM Frequently Asked Questions: Furlough
+ Special Report: Sequestration
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and Testimony
Source: Government Accountability Office
Reports
1. Climate Change: Future Federal Adaptation Efforts Could Better Support Local Infrastructure Decision Makers. GAO-13-242, April 12.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-242
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653740.pdf
2. Data Center Consolidation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Achieve Cost Savings Goal. GAO-13-378, April 23.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-378
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654091.pdf
3. Defense Infrastructure: Communities Need Additional Guidance and Information to Improve Their Ability to Adjust to DOD Installation Closure or Growth. GAO-13-436, May 14.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-436
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654598.pdf
Testimony
1. Data Center Consolidation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Achieve Billions of Dollars in Savings, by David A. Powner, director, information technology management issues, before the Subcommittee on Government Operations, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. GAO-13-627T, May 14.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-627T
Highlights –
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654606.pdf
