Archive
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM
Status of the Program and Financial Health of Remaining Participants
GAO-13-458, May 7, 2013
PAKISTAN
Reporting on Visa Delays That Disrupt U.S. Assistance Could Be Improved
GAO-13-427, May 7, 2013
VA CONSTRUCTION
Additional Actions Needed to Decrease Delays and Lower Costs of Major Medical-Facility Projects
GAO-13-556T, May 7, 2013
2012 Global multichannel consumer survey
2012 Global multichannel consumer survey
Source: PriceWaterhouse Coopers
The 2012 global multichannel retail consumer survey was completed by more than 11,000 respondents from 11 different countries. For PwC, this is our most comprehensive research to date on multichannel retailing. In order to truly understand the trends and spot the patterns in multichannel shopping, we surveyed only those consumers who self-identified as online shoppers.
The 11 countries covered in the survey were:
- Brazil
- Canada
- China
- France
- Germany
- Netherlands
- Russia
- Switzerland
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
- United States
Report on North Korea’s Military and Security Developments
Report on North Korea’s Military and Security Developments (PDF)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges in Northeast Asia. North Korea remains a security threat because of its willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of its international agreements and United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (PDF)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) continues to pursue a long – term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional military conflict . Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain the principal focus and primary driver of China’s military investment. However, as China’s interests have grown and as it has gained greater influence in the international system, its military modernization has also become increasingly focus ed on investments in military capabilities to conduct a wider range of missions beyond its immediate territorial concerns, including counter – piracy, peace keeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and regional military operations. Some of these missions and capabilities can address international security challenges, while other s could serve more narrowly-defined PRC interests and objectives, including advancing territorial claims and building influence abroad.
MPI Issues Final Report on Advancing Regional Competitiveness in the United States, Mexico, and Central America
MPI Issues Final Report on Advancing Regional Competitiveness in the United States, Mexico, and Central America (PDF)
Source: Migration Policy Institute
The final report of the Regional Migration Study Group, Thinking Regionally to Compete Globally: Leveraging Migration & Human Capital in the U.S., Mexico, and Central America, outlines the powerful demographic, economic, and social forces reshaping Mexico and much of Central America and changing longstanding migration dynamics with the United States. The Study Group, co-chaired by former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, former US Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, and former Guatemalan Vice President and Foreign Minister Eduardo Stein, offers a forward-looking, pragmatic agenda for the United States, Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras — focusing on new collaborative approaches on migration and human-capital development to strengthen regional competitiveness.
Targets, Interest Rates, and Household Saving in Urban China
Targets, Interest Rates, and Household Saving in Urban China
Source: International Monetary Fund
This paper studies a panel of China’s provinces over the period 1996-2009 during which urban household saving rates increased from 19 percent of disposable income to 30 percent. It finds that the increase in urban saving rates is negatively associated with the decline in real interest rates over this period. This negative association suggests that Chinese households save with a target level of saving in mind. When the return to saving declines (increases), it becomes more difficult (easier) to meet a target and households increase (lower) their saving out of current disposable income to compensate. The results are robust across specifications and to the inclusion of additional variables. A main policy implication is that an increase in real deposit rates may help lower household saving and boost domestic consumption.
CRS — U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 113th Congress
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 113th Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
U.S. policy towards Burma has undergone a discernible shift in its approach since a quasi-civilian government was established in March 2011. While the overall objectives of U.S. policy towards the country remain in place—the establishment of civilian democratic government based on the rule of law and the protection of basic human rights—the Obama Administration has moved from a more reactive, “action-for-action” strategy and a skeptical and cautious attitude towards the newly created Union Government and Union Parliament to a more proactive mode. The new approach is designed to foster further reforms based on some form of partnership with the Union Government, headed by President Thein Sein.
During the last two years, the Obama Administration has conducted much of its policy towards Burma using existing constitutional and legal authority, while regularly consulting with Congress about the actions taken. The 112th Congress passed five laws containing provisions related to U.S. policy in Burma. Three laws—P.L. 112-33, P.L. 112-36, and P.L. 112-163—extended the general import ban contained in Section 3 of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (2003 BFDA, P.L. 108-61) which is subject to annual renewal. P.L. 112-74 placed restrictions on the use in Burma of appropriated funds for certain Defense and State Department programs. P.L. 112-192 granted the Secretary of the Treasury the option of instructing the U.S. Executive Director at any international financial institution to “vote in favor of the provision of assistance for Burma by the institution, notwithstanding any other provision of law” if the President has determined that to do so is in the national interest of the United States. The 113th Congress will have the opportunity to decide what role it will play in the future course of U.S. policy in Burma.
The Administration’s Burma policy in 2011 and 2012 may be characterized as the combination of increasing engagement with Burma’s Union Government, Union Parliament, and selected opposition groups, and the waiving or easing of many of the existing economic sanctions imposed on Burma by various laws, including the 2003 BFDA and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-286). However, the Administration may decide that it is approaching the limit of actions it can take with regard to easing of sanctions without Congress passing new legislation.
Some critics of the Obama Administration say that it has moved too fast and too far in easing the existing sanctions, given the continued reports of serious human rights violations and significant restrictions on civil liberties. Other critics think the Administration has moved too slowly and cautiously in waiving sanctions, hindering the reform process in Burma and blocking greater U.S. participation in Burma’s economic development.
Certain key issues with regard to Burma’s political situation may be important to the future course of U.S. policy in Burma. First, President Thein Sein’s vision for Burma’s “disciplined democracy” has not been clearly elaborated, and his commitment to further reforms remains untested. Second, the view of Burma’s military leadership on political reforms is uncertain. Third, the path for possible reconciliation between the country’s Burman majority and various ethnic minorities is unclear.
USCIRF’s 2013 Annual Report on the State of International Religious Freedom Identifies World’s Worst Violato rs
Source: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an independent federal advisory body created by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) to monitor religious freedom abuses abroad, today released its 2013 Annual Report. The Report highlights the status of religious freedom globally and identifies those governments that are the most egregious violators.
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The 2013 Annual Report recommends that the Secretary of State re-designate the following eight nations as “countries of particular concern” or CPCs: Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan. USCIRF finds that seven other countries meet the CPC threshold and should be so designated: Egypt, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam.
Canada’s Red Tape Report with U.S. Comparisons
Canada’s Red Tape Report with U.S. Comparisons
Source: Canadian Federation of Independent Business
Most Canadian small businesses pay much more than their U.S. counterparts to comply with regulatory requirements, according to CFIB’s 2013 version of Canada’s Red Tape Report.
The report coincides with the launch of Red Tape Awareness Week™, and provides a first-ever direct comparison of regulatory compliance costs in the U.S. and Canada.
The U.S. comparison was sponsored by KPMG Enterprise™.
The smallest businesses in Canada (fewer than five employees) pay 45% more per employee ($5,942) to comply with government regulation than their U.S counterparts ($4,084).
The total cost of regulation to Canadian businesses is $31 billion a year.
On both sides of the border, business owners say that regulatory costs could be reduced by about 30% while upholding the important health and safety objectives of regulation. This would mean a $9 billion yearly stimulus to the Canadian economy.
Pathways to achieve universal household access to modern energy by 2030
Pathways to achieve universal household access to modern energy by 2030
Source: Environmental Research Letters
A lack of access to modern energy impacts health and welfare and impedes development for billions of people. Growing concern about these impacts has mobilized the international community to set new targets for universal modern energy access. However, analyses exploring pathways to achieve these targets and quantifying the potential costs and benefits are limited. Here, we use two modelling frameworks to analyse investments and consequences of achieving total rural electrification and universal access to clean-combusting cooking fuels and stoves by 2030. Our analysis indicates that these targets can be achieved with additional investment of US$65–86 billion per year until 2030 combined with dedicated policies. Only a combination of policies that lowers costs for modern cooking fuels and stoves, along with more rapid electrification, can enable the realization of these goals. Our results demonstrate the critical importance of accounting for varying demands and affordability across heterogeneous household groups in both analysis and policy setting. While the investments required are significant, improved access to modern cooking fuels alone can avert between 0.6 and 1.8 million premature deaths annually in 2030 and enhance wellbeing substantially.
CRS — Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Kuwait was pivotal to two decades of U.S. efforts to end a strategic threat posed by Iraq, because of its location, its role as the object of past Iraqi aggression, and its close cooperation with the United States. Kuwait is a key to the U.S. ability to act militarily, if necessary, in the northern Persian Gulf region now that all U.S. forces have left Iraq. Kuwait’s relations with the postSaddam government in Iraq have been hampered by long-standing territorial, economic, and political issues unresolved from the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but those issues have been narrowed significantly since 2011. Kuwait is increasingly suspicious of Iranian intentions in the Gulf, aligning Kuwait with U.S. efforts to contain Iranian power in the Gulf and prevent Iran from exerting undue influence in post-withdrawal Iraq. Still, Kuwait maintains relatively normal economic and political relations with Iran so as not to provoke Iran militarily or prompt it to try to empower pro-Iranian elements in Kuwait.
Although Kuwait’s foreign policy fluctuates little, its political system has been in turmoil since 2006, and has deteriorated significantly since late 2012. Previously, political disputes in Kuwait had consisted of opposition within the elected National Assembly to the political dominance of the Al Sabah family. These disputes aggravated—and been aggravated by—schisms within rival branches of the ruling Al Sabah. The disputes produced five dissolutions of the National Assembly and new elections since 2006, the latest of which occurred on October 8, 2012, requiring new elections that were held on December 1, 2012.
During 2011-2012, there were relatively small demonstrations in Kuwait by opposition groups over official corruption, security force brutality, citizenship eligibility, and other issues. However, protests expanded significantly in late 2012 to challenge Sabah regime efforts to shape the December 1, 2012 elections to its advantage. Most oppositionists boycotted the December 1 elections, lowering the turnout but producing an overwhelmingly pro-government Assembly. Since the election, the opposition has continued its battle to reduce Sabah power through public protests, but the demonstrations sometimes are suspended after compromises with the government.
Even though opposition to Sabah rule has grown, the opposition still largely confines its demands to limiting Sabah power rather than ending the family’s rule. And, Kuwait remains a relatively wealthy society where most citizens do not want to risk their economic well-being to try to bring about the downfall of Al Sabah rule through violence. To try to contain the unrest, the government has used financial largesse—budgets loaded with subsidies and salary increases—as well as some repressive measures, including beatings and imprisonments. But, the many years of political paralysis have led to some economic stagnation as well, because parliamentary approval for several major investment projects, such as development of major oil fields in northern Kuwait, has been held up due to the infighting. The lack of economic vibrancy led to strikes in several economic sectors in 2012.
On other regional issues, in part because of its leadership turmoil, Kuwait tends to defer to consensus positions within the Gulf Cooperation Council; this deference is evident in Kuwait’s stances on the Israel-Palestinian dispute as well as on the uprisings in Yemen and Syria. On the uprising in Bahrain, in March 2011, Kuwait joined a Gulf Cooperation Council intervention on the side of the government, but unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Kuwait sent naval and not ground forces.
AU: Prime Minister and Minister for Defence – Joint Media Release – Release of the 2013 Defence White Paper
Prime Minister and Minister for Defence – Joint Media Release – Release of the 2013 Defence White Paper
Source: Australian Government, Department of Defence
Prime Minister Julia Gillard and Defence Minister Stephen Smith today released the 2013 Defence White Paper.
The 2013 Defence White Paper complements the National Security Strategy released on 23 January 2013, and the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper released on 28 October 2012.
These three documents are a statement of the priority the Government places on Australia’s security and prosperity, and on maintaining a strong Australian Defence Force to meet Australia’s national security challenges.
The White Paper addresses the range of significant international and domestic developments since 2009, which influence Australia’s national security and defence settings, including their impact on force posture, future force structure and the Defence budget.
These developments include:
- the ongoing economic strategic and military shift to the Indo-Pacific;
- the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) operational drawdown from Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands;
- the United States’ re-balance to the Asia-Pacific;
- Australia’s substantially enhanced practical cooperation with the United States pursuant to our Alliance relationship; and
- the ongoing adverse effects of the Global Financial Crisis, which have continued to have a significant deleterious impact on the global economy, domestic fiscal circumstances and Defence funding.
The White Paper outlines the Government’s judgement that the strategic shift to the Indo-Pacific means growing prosperity, but also brings some uncertainty and risk.
Regional military modernisation is increasing the ability of nations to exert military power.
South American Immigrants in the United States
South American Immigrants in the United States
Source: Migration Policy Institute
Compared to other regions of origin in Latin America and around the world, South America has always had relatively few immigrants living in the United States. While the overall population remains lower than those from Mexico, Central America, or the Caribbean, South America’s immigrant population grew faster between 2000 and 2010 than all regions but Central America. South American immigrants’ share of the overall immigrant population in the United States has also been growing steadily for the past 50 years, from less than 1 percent in 1960 to almost 7 percent in 2011.
As a group, South American immigrants are better educated, less likely to enter the United States as refugees, and more likely to enter as immediate family members than the overall foreign-born population. Despite some differences, South Americans closely mirrored many trends in the overall foreign-born population, including age, arrival period, naturalization rates, and occupations. A closer examination of South American immigrants, however, reveals a great deal of variation by country of birth.
This article focuses on South American immigrants residing in the United States, examining the population’s size, geographic distribution, admission categories, and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Data are from the US Census Bureau’s 2011 American Community Survey (ACS), the 2000 Decennial Census (as well as earlier censuses), and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS).
Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits
Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits
Source: RAND Corporation
Section 347 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act called on the Department of Defense to commission an independent assessment of the overseas basing presence of U.S. military forces. As the recipient of that commission, RAND’s National Defense Research Institute conducted an independent assessment of the advisability of changes in the overseas basing presence of U.S. forces based on an evaluation of strategic benefits, risks, and costs. The report characterizes how overseas presence contributes to assurance of allies, deterrence, contingency responsiveness, and security cooperation, along with the risks involved with investing in facilities overseas. It breaks new ground in the understanding of the costs associated with overseas presence, including how permanent and rotational presence costs compare, and provides cost models for policymakers to weigh alternative posture options. To support this understanding of costs the report also lays out the conditions of U.S. installations and levels of host nation support.
The report concludes that there are certain minimum requirements necessary to carry out the current national security strategy, but it is prudent, based upon the net value produced, to maintain an overseas posture that goes beyond these minimums. Additionally, it combines benefit, cost, and risk considerations to distill a number of strategic judgments that have implications for the advisability of considering identified posture changes.
A Demographic Portrait of Mexican-Origin Hispanics in the United States
A Demographic Portrait of Mexican-Origin Hispanics in the United States
Source: Pew Hispanic Center
A record 33.7 million Hispanics of Mexican origin resided in the United States in 2012, according to an analysis of Census Bureau data by Pew Research Center. This estimate includes 11.4 million immigrants born in Mexico and 22.3 million born in the U.S. who self-identified as Hispanics of Mexican origin.
Mexicans are by far the largest Hispanic-origin population in the U.S., accounting for nearly two-thirds (64%) of the U.S. Hispanic population in 2012.1 Hispanics of Mexican origin are also a significant portion of the U.S. population, accounting for 11% overall.
The size of the Mexican-origin population in the U.S. has risen dramatically over the past four decades as a result of one of the largest mass migrations in modern history. In 1970, fewer than 1 million Mexican immigrants lived in the U.S. By 2000, that number had grown to 9.8 million, and by 2007 it reached a peak of 12.5 million (Pew Hispanic Center, 2011). Since then, the Mexican-born population has declined as the arrival of new Mexican immigrants has slowed significantly (Passel et al., 2012). Today, 35% of Hispanics of Mexican origin were born in Mexico. And while the remaining two-thirds (65%) were born in the U.S., half (52%) of them have at least one immigrant parent.
Prior to the 1980s, most of the growth in the nation’s Mexican-origin population came from Hispanics of Mexican origin born in the U.S. However, since the 1980s—a decade after the current wave of Mexican migration took off—and up until 2000, more growth in the Mexican-origin population in the U.S. could be attributed to the arrival of Mexican immigrants. In the decade from 2000 to 2010, that pattern reversed—births surpassed immigration as the main driver of the dynamic growth in the U.S. Mexican-origin population.
Characterizing scientific production and consumption in Physics
Characterizing scientific production and consumption in Physics
Source: Scientific Reports
We analyze the entire publication database of the American Physical Society generating longitudinal (50 years) citation networks geolocalized at the level of single urban areas. We define the knowledge diffusion proxy, and scientific production ranking algorithms to capture the spatio-temporal dynamics of Physics knowledge worldwide. By using the knowledge diffusion proxy we identify the key cities in the production and consumption of knowledge in Physics as a function of time. The results from the scientific production ranking algorithm allow us to characterize the top cities for scholarly research in Physics. Although we focus on a single dataset concerning a specific field, the methodology presented here opens the path to comparative studies of the dynamics of knowledge across disciplines and research areas.
CRS — Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress
Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In February 2013, Castro was reappointed to a second five-year term as president (until 2018, when he would be 86 years old), and selected a 52-year old former Education Minister Miguel Díaz-Canel as his First Vice President, making him the official successor in the event that Castro cannot serve out his term. Raúl Castro has implemented a number of gradual economic policy changes over the past several years, including an expansion of self-employment. A party congress held in April 2011 laid out numerous economic goals that, if implemented, could significantly alter Cuba’s state-dominated economic model. Few observers, however, expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system. While the government reduced the number of political prisoners in 2010-2011, the number increased in 2012; moreover, short-term detentions and harassment have increased significantly.
Widespread Middle East Fears that Syrian Violence Will Spread
Widespread Middle East Fears that Syrian Violence Will Spread
Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project
As concern mounts about the Syrian government’s possible use of chemical weapons against its own people, publics in the Middle East – especially the Lebanese – are extremely worried about violence spreading to neighboring countries. Nonetheless, a new survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted before news emerged of alleged use of chemical agents by the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, found little regional support for Western or Arab countries sending arms and military supplies to anti-government groups in Syria. And there is even greater opposition among American and European publics to such indirect Syrian involvement by their governments. A more recent Pew Research nationwide U.S. poll finds that hard evidence that Damascus has engaged in chemical warfare would only lead to a modest increase in American public support for an allied military effort in Syria.
Meanwhile, Assad is very unpopular throughout the region, except among Shia Muslims in Lebanon. In turn, Lebanese Muslims are divided over aid to the rebels. Most Sunnis back such assistance, while Shia overwhelmingly oppose it.
These are the key findings from a new survey by the Pew Research Center of 11,771 people in 12 countries from March 3 to April 7, 2013. Surveyed countries include Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian territories and Tunisia in the Middle East; Germany, France and Britain in Europe; and the United States and Russia.
CRS — Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, at the outbreak of the uprisings that swept several Middle Eastern leaders from power, has not come close to changing Bahrain’s regime into a constitutional monarchy. However, the mostly Shiite opposition shows no signs of ending its campaign to achieve that goal or, at the very least greatly increased political influence and rights. The crisis has demonstrated that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by reform efforts instituted since 1999.
Even though demonstrations against the government continue, the two sides have engaged in dialogue as well. A “national dialogue” held in July 2011 reached consensus on a few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest. The government asserts it implemented most of the 26 BICI recommendations, but outside human rights groups assessed that overall implementation was modest and incomplete. In January 2013, the perception within the government and the opposition that the political system could split apart entirely caused both sides to restart that dialogue. The two sides remain far apart, but the new, ongoing dialogue could produce some additional modest reforms and potentially represent incremental progress toward a solution to the crisis.
The Obama Administration has not called for an end to the Al Khalifa regime, but it has criticized the regime’s human rights abuses, urged it to undertake further political reform, and advanced ideas to narrow government-opposition differences. The U.S. criticism has angered some Al Khalifa officials but it has also been insufficient for human rights activists who assert that the United States is downplaying regime abuses because of U.S. dependence on the security relationship with Bahrain. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests—particularly the containment of Iran—by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years. The United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the Administration announced a resumption of other arms sales to Bahrain that it can potentially use to protect itself and support any military effort against Iran. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve political crises in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies and therefore lacks the resources to significantly improve Shiite standards of living. In 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained Bahrain’s economy.
CRS — North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons production capabilities, warhead sophistication, the scope and success of its uranium enrichment program, or extent of its proliferation activities. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons. North Korea’s plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon has been shuttered since its cooling tower was destroyed under international agreement in June 2008. However, on April 1, 2013, North Korea said it would resume operation of its plutonium production reactor. Experts estimate it will take approximately six months to restart. This would provide North Korea with approximately one bomb’s worth of plutonium per year.
While North Korea’s weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, in the past decade, intelligence emerged pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium. North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment program in 2009, but has said its purpose is the production of fuel for nuclear power. In November 2010, North Korea showed visiting American experts early construction of a 100 MWT light-water reactor and a newly built gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, both at the Yongbyon site. The North Koreans claimed the enrichment plant was operational, but this has not been independently confirmed. U.S. officials have said that it is likely other, clandestine enrichment facilities exist. Enrichment (as well as reprocessing) technology can be used to produce material for nuclear weapons or fuel for power reactors. An enrichment capability could potentially provide North Korea with a faster way of making nuclear material for weapons and therefore is of great concern to policymakers.
North Korea has made multiple policy statements in the past year asserting its nuclear weapons status: in May 2012, North Korea changed its constitution to say that it was a “nuclear-armed state.” In January 2013, North Korea said that no dialogue on denuclearization “would be possible” and it would only disarm when all the other nuclear weapon states also disarm. In March 2013, North Korea stated its goal of expanding its nuclear weapons program.
Many experts believe that the prime objective of North Korea’s nuclear program is to develop a nuclear warhead that could be mounted on North Korea’s intermediate-range and long-range missiles. This was confirmed by North Korean official statements in late March 2013.
Miniaturization of a nuclear warhead would likely require additional nuclear and missile tests. In January 2013, a North Korean statement said that it would respond with a nuclear test “of higher level.” On February 12, 2013, the North Korean official news agency announced a “successful” underground nuclear detonation, and seismic monitoring systems measured a resulting earthquake that was 5.1 in magnitude. This is magnitude is slightly higher than past tests, but yield estimates are still uncertain. The South Korean Ministry of Defense estimated that the test yield was between 6 and 7 kilotons, while the U.S. Director of National Intelligence so far has said “approximately several kilotons.” North Korea claimed that the February 12, 2013, nuclear test was to develop a “smaller and light” warhead. At a minimum, the test would likely contribute to North Korea’s ability to develop a warhead that could be mounted on a long-range missile. To date, no open source date on test emissions is available that might show whether the North Koreans tested a uranium or plutonium device. This information could help determine the type and sophistication of the North Korean nuclear warhead design, about which little is known.
