Archive
CRS — Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan.
Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclearrelated technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s security situation in recent years.
However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.
This report updates a previous version published November 30, 2011.
CRS — U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India’s test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India” and would “also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,” in the context of a broader partnership with India.
U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (P.L. 95-242). However, P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, allows the President to waive several provisions of the AEA. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress, in addition to other required documents, a written determination that P.L. 109-401’s requirements for U.S. nuclear cooperation with India to proceed had been met. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369, which approved the agreement, into law October 8, 2008. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India’s then-External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement two days later, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. Additionally, the United States and India signed a subsequent arrangement in July 2010 which governs “arrangements and procedures under which” India may reprocess U.S.- origin nuclear fuel in two new national reprocessing facilities, which New Delhi has not yet constructed.
The NSG, at the behest of the Bush Administration, agreed in September 2008 to exempt India from some of its export guidelines. That decision has effectively left decisions regarding nuclear commerce with India almost entirely up to individual governments. Since the NSG decision, India has concluded numerous nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign suppliers. However, U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India and may be reluctant to do so if New Delhi does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. Taking a step to resolve such concerns, India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that Indian nuclear liability legislation adopted in August 2010 is inconsistent with the Convention.
The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration’s policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States “intends to support India’s full membership” in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes.
CRS — Foreign Assistance to North Korea
Foreign Assistance to North Korea (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Should the United States resume food, energy, and/or denuclearization assistance to North Korea? This is the major issue facing Congress in considering the provision of aid to Pyongyang. Between 1995 and 2008, the United States provided North Korea with over $1.3 billion in assistance: just over 50% for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. Since early 2009, the United States has provided virtually no aid to North Korea. On February 29, 2012, after bilateral talks with the United States, North Korea announced a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests, and nuclear activities (including uranium enrichment) at its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. It also said it would allow international nuclear inspectors to return to North Korea. The United States announced it would provide North Korea with 240,000 metric tons (MT) of food aid. However, the so-called “Leap Day deal” unraveled after North Korea on April 13, 2012, launched, in defiance of United Nations resolutions, a rocket to place an “earth observation satellite” into orbit. U.S. officials say that during bilateral negotiations they warned their counterparts that any rocket launch using ballistic missile technology would jeopardize the agreement.
Food Aid. North Korea has suffered from chronic, massive food shortages since the mid-1990s. Food aid–largely from China, South Korea, and the United States–has been essential in filling the gap. In 2011, in response to continued food shortages, Pyongyang reportedly asked the United States, South Korea, and other countries to provide large-scale food aid. The United Nations has issued an appeal for assistance. In 2008 and 2009, the United States shipped about a third of a planned 500,000 MT food aid pledge before disagreements with the North Korean government led to the program’s cessation.
Providing food to North Korea would pose a number of dilemmas for the United States. Pyongyang has resisted reforms that would allow the equitable distribution of food and help pay for food imports. Additionally, the North Korean government restricts the ability of donors to operate in the country. Multiple sources have asserted that some of the food assistance going to North Korea is routinely diverted for resale in private markets or other uses. However, it is likely that food aid has helped feed millions of North Koreans, possibly staving off a repeat of the famine conditions that existed in North Korea in the mid-late 1990s, when 5%-10% of the population died due to particularly severe food shortages.
In deciding how to respond to North Korea’s current request, the Obama Administration and Congress face a number of decisions, including whether to resume food aid; if so, whether to condition food aid on progress in security and/or human rights matters; whether to link assistance to Pyongyang easing its restrictions on monitoring; and whether to pressure China to monitor its own food aid. In 2011, many Members of Congress tried to prohibit food aid to North Korea.
Energy Assistance. Between 1995 and 2009, the United States provided around $600 million in energy assistance to North Korea. The aid was given over two time periods–1995-2003 and 2007-2009–in exchange for North Korea freezing its plutonium-based nuclear facilities. In 2008 and 2009, North Korea also took steps to disable these facilities. However, no additional energy assistance has been provided since 2009, when Pyongyang withdrew from the Six-Party Talks– involving North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia–over North Korea’s nuclear program. The move followed condemnation and sanctions by the U.N. Security Council for North Korea’s April 2009 launch of a suspected long-range missile and May 2009 test of a nuclear device.
In 2007 and 2008, the United States also provided technical assistance to help in North Korea’s nuclear disablement process. In 2008, Congress took steps to legally enable the President to give expanded assistance for this purpose. However, following North Korea’s actions in the spring of 2009, Congress rejected the Obama Administration’s requests for funds to supplement existing resources in the event of a breakthrough. Congress did approve monies for the State Department’s general emergency nonproliferation fund that the Administration could use in North Korea. The Obama Administration, along with the South Korean government, has said that it would be willing to provide large-scale development aid if North Korea takes steps to irreversibly dismantle its nuclear program.
This report will be updated periodically to track changes in U.S. provision of aid to North Korea.
New From the GAO
New GAO ReportsSource: Government Accountability Office
1. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Government’s Exposure to AIG Lessens as Equity Investments Are Sold. GAO-12-574, May 07.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-574
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590676.pdf
2. Nuclear Regulation: NRC’s Oversight of Nuclear Power Reactors’ Decommissioning Funds Could Be Further Strengthened. GAO-12-258, April 05.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-258
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589924.pdf
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and TestimoniesSource: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Federal Protective Service: Better Data on Facility Jurisdictions Needed to Enhance Collaboration with State and Local Law Enforcement. GAO-12-434, March 27.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-434
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589629.pdf
2. Private Health Insurance: Estimates of Individuals with Pre-Existing Conditions Range from 36 Million to 122 Million. GAO-12-439, March 27.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-439
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589619.pdf
Podcast – http://www.gao.gov/multimedia/podcasts/590482
3. Community Development Financial Institutions and New Markets Tax Credit Programs in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas. GAO-12-547R, April 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-547R
4. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Workforce Planning and Training Could Be Enhanced by Incorporating Strategic Management Principles. GAO-12-487, April 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-487
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590477.pdf
5. Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Strategies and Challenges in Sustaining Critical Skills in Federal and Contractor Workforces. GAO-12-468, April 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-468
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590487.pdf
+ Testimonies
1. Internal Revenue Service: Opportunities to Improve the Taxpayer Experience and Voluntary Compliance, by James R. White, director, strategic issues, before the Senate Committee on Finance. GAO-12-652T, April 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-652T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590426.pdf
2. Financial Literacy: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Federal Government’s Role, by Alicia Puente Cackley, director, financial markets and community investment, before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. GAO-12-636T, April 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-636T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590441.pdf
CRS — Renewable Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, Fossil Energy, and Energy Efficiency R&D
Renewable Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, Fossil Energy, and Energy Efficiency R&D(PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Energy-related research and development (R&D)—on coal-based synthetic petroleum and on atomic power—played an important role in the successful outcome of World War II. In the post- war era, the federal government conducted R&D on fossil fuel and nuclear energy sources to support peacetime economic growth. The energy crises of the 1970s spurred the government to broaden the focus to include renewable energy and energy efficiency. Over the 35-year period from the Department of Energy’s inception at the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 1978 through FY2012, federal funding for renewable energy R&D amounted to about 17% of the energy R&D total, compared with 15% for energy efficiency, 25% for fossil, and 37% for nuclear. For the 65- year period from 1948 through 2012, nearly 12% went to renewables, compared with 10% for efficiency, 25% for fossil, and 49% for nuclear.
Analysis of Cancer Risks in Populations near Nuclear Facilities: Phase 1 (2012)
Analysis of Cancer Risks in Populations near Nuclear Facilities: Phase 1 (2012)
The question of whether there are cancer risks associated with living near a nuclear facility is of great interest to the public, especially those living closest to the facilities. Airborne and waterborne emissions of radioactive materials from the facilities’ normal operations (called effluents) can expose nearby populations to ionizing radiation, which could elevate the risk of cancer in the exposed populations. The first phase of a two-phase project, this report identifies scientific approaches for carrying out an assessment of cancer risks for populations near the 104 nuclear reactors and 13 fuel cycle facilities that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses across the United States, as well as for people who have lived close to former sites.Studies of health effects in populations (epidemiologic studies) could provide clues for a potential association between living near nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities and risk of cancer. However, such studies are challenging because of incomplete data on occurrences of cancer and cancer deaths in geographic areas of interest (i.e., smaller than the county level), incomplete information on radioactive releases from nuclear facilities during early years of operation, and other factors. Moreover, because radioactive releases are generally low, any risks would be expected to be small and difficult to detect with statistical certainty. This report identifies two health study designs deemed suitable for assessing cancer risks in populations near nuclear facilities, having both scientific merit and the ability to address some public concerns. A pilot study would be needed to determine whether either or both of the two recommended study designs are feasible to implement on a large scale and to assess the required time and resources. Communicating with and involving the public and other stakeholders is an essential element in the study process.
CRS — Effects of Radiation from Fukushima Dai-ichi on the U.S. Marine Environment
Effects of Radiation from Fukushima Dai-ichi on the U.S. Marine Environment
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The massive Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011, caused extensive damage in northeastern Japan, including damage to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power installation, which resulted in the release of radiation. Some have called this incident the biggest manmade release ever of radioactive material into the oceans. Concerns arose about the potential effects of this released radiation on the U.S. marine environment and resources.
Both ocean currents and atmospheric winds have the potential to transport radiation over and into marine waters under U.S. jurisdiction. It is unknown whether marine organisms that migrate through or near Japanese waters to locations where they might subsequently be harvested by U.S. fishermen (possibly some albacore tuna or salmon in the North Pacific) might have been exposed to radiation in or near Japanese waters, or might have consumed prey with accumulated radioactive contaminants.
High levels of radioactive iodine-131 (with a half-life of about 8 days), cesium-137 (with a halflife of about 30 years), and cesium-134 (with a half-life of about 2 years) were measured in seawater adjacent to the Fukushima Dai-ichi site after the March 2011 events. EPA rainfall monitors in California, Idaho, and Minnesota detected trace amounts of radioactive iodine, cesium, and tellurium consistent with the Japanese nuclear incident, at concentrations below any level of concern. It is uncertain how precipitation of radioactive elements from the atmosphere may have affected radiation levels in the marine environment.
Scientists have stated that radiation in the ocean very quickly becomes diluted and would not be a problem beyond the coast of Japan. The same is true of radiation carried by winds. Barring another unanticipated release, radioactive contaminants from Fukushima Dai-ichi should be sufficiently dispersed over time that they will not prove to be a serious health threat elsewhere, unless they bioaccumulate in migratory fish or find their way directly to another part of the world through food or other commercial products.
Radioactive contamination of seafood from the nuclear disaster in Japan has not emerged as a food safety problem for consumers in the United States. According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the damage to infrastructure in Japan limited food production and associated exports from areas near the Fukushima nuclear facility. FDA and Customs and Border Protection continue to screen imported foods from Japan, including seafood, before they can enter the U.S. food supply.
Based on computer modeling of ocean currents, debris from the tsunami produced by the Tohoku earthquake was projected to spread eastward from Japan in the North Pacific Subtropical Gyre. Approximately two to three years after the event, the debris plume likely will reach the U.S. West Coast, dumping debris on California beaches and the beaches of British Columbia, Alaska, and Baja California. Although much of the radioactive release from Fukushima Dai-ichi is believed to have occurred after the tsunami, there is the possibility that some of the tsunami debris might also be contaminated with radiation.
CRS — Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decisionmakers now are seriously considering whether to order a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel’s history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying what Israeli policymakers believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern state—destroying Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under construction in Syria in 2007. Today, Israeli officials generally view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an unacceptable threat to Israeli security—with some viewing it as an existential threat.
This report analyzes key factors that may influence current Israeli political decisions relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views of and relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the Israeli public; U.S., regional, and international stances and responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates of the potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and responses Israeli leaders anticipate from Iran and Iranian-allied actors—including Hezbollah and Hamas—regionally and internationally.
For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. By all accounts, such an attack could have considerable regional and global security, political, and economic repercussions, not least for the United States, Israel, and their bilateral relationship. It is unclear what the ultimate effect of a strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Israeli government, President Barack Obama, and many Members of Congress have shared concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. They appear to have a range of views on how best to address those shared concerns. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy purposes, and U.S. intelligence assessments say that Iran has not made a decision to build nuclear weapons. However, Iran continues to enrich uranium in militarily hardened sites and questions remain about its nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions.
Short- and long-term questions for Members of Congress to consider regarding a possible Israeli decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities militarily might include, but are not limited to, the following:
- How might an Israeli strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and other regional countries?
- Would an Israeli strike be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way?
- How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject?
- How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide oversight with respect to various political and military options?
This report has many aspects that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim to independently confirm any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to various U.S. and Israeli officials.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and TestimonySource: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Federal Statistical System: Agencies Can Make Greater Use of Existing Data, but Continued Progress is Needed on Access and Quality Issues. GAO-12-54, February 24.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-54
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588855.pdf
2. DOD Supply Chain: Suspect Counterfeit Electronic Parts Can Be Found on Internet Purchasing Platforms. GAO-12-375, February 21.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-375
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588737.pdf
3. Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: New Plutonium Research Facility at Los Alamos May Not Meet All Mission Needs. GAO-12-337, March 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-337
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589581.pdf
http://www.gao.gov/multimedia/podcasts/589067
4. KC-46 Tanker Aircraft: Acquisition Plans Have Good Features but Contain Schedule Risk. GAO-12-366, March 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-366
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589591.pdf
5. Force Structure: Assessment of Army Report on Fiscal Year 2011 Progress in Modular Restructuring. GAO-12-527R, March 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-527R
+ Testimony
1. Transportation Security Administration: Progress and Challenges Faced in Strengthening three Key Security Programs by Stephen M. Lord, director, homeland security and justice issues, before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the House Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure. GAO-12-541T, March 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-541T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589611.pdf
CRS — U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
During discussions about the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, Congress reviewed and discussed the plans for maintaining and modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Although the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. As a result, the 112 th Congress will continue to review these programs during the annual authorization and appropriations process.
During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. That number has declined to less than 6,000 warheads today, and is slated to decline to 1,550 warheads by the year 2017 if the New START Treaty enters into force.
At the present time, the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with between one and three warheads; they will all be reduced to only one warhead over the next few years. The Air Force has deactivated all 50 of the 10-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs and 50 Minuteman III missiles. The Air Force is also modernizing the Minuteman missiles, replacing and upgrading their rocket motors, guidance systems, and other components. The Air Force had expected to begin replacing the Minuteman missiles around 2018, but has decided, instead, to continue to modernize and maintain the existing missiles, so that they can remain in the force through 2030.
The U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident submarines; each carries 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles. The Navy converted 4 of the original 18 Trident submarines to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles. The remaining submarines currently carry around 1,200 warheads in total; that number will decline as the United States implements the New START Treaty. The Navy has shifted the basing of the submarines, so that nine are deployed in the Pacific Ocean and five are in the Atlantic, to better cover targets in and around Asia. It also has undertaken efforts to extend the life of the missiles and warheads so that they and the submarines can remain in the fleet past 2020, and to begin design work on a new submarine.
The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers includes 19 B-2 bombers and 94 B-52 bombers. The B-1 bomber is no longer equipped for nuclear missions. The fleet will decline to around 60 aircraft in coming years, as the United States implements New START. The Air Force has also begun to retire the nuclear-armed cruise missiles carried by B-52 bombers, leaving only about half the B- 52 fleet equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The Air Force plans to procure both a new long-range bomber and a new cruise missile over the next 20 years.
The Obama Administration is completing a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force, and a review of U.S. nuclear employment policy, as it implements the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. It is also implementing the New START Treaty with Russia that will limit the number of deployed missiles and warheads in the U.S. strategic force. Congress will review the Administration’s plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process, and as it assesses U.S. plans under New START and possible future arms control treaties with Russia. This report will be updated as needed.
New From the GAO
New GAO TestimonySource: Government Accountability Office
1. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Further Actions Needed by U.S. Agencies to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear and Radiological Materials, by Gene Aloise, director, natural resources and environment, before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs. GAO-12-512T, March 14.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-512T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589346.pdf
NRC Needs a More Comprehensive Approach to Post-Fukushima Nuclear Safety, Report Finds
NRC Needs a More Comprehensive Approach to Post-Fukushima Nuclear Safety, Report Finds
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is jeopardizing reform by failing to heed its post-Fukushima task force’s top recommendation to clarify its “patchwork” of regulations for “beyond-design-basis” events that reactors are not intended to withstand, according to a report released today by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). The report, “U.S. Nuclear Power Safety One Year After Fukushima,” also found that the nuclear industry is moving ahead with its own post-Fukushima initiative before the NRC has had time to determine whether it will adequately protect the public.
…
For example, one of the other task force recommendations called on the NRC to require plant owners to implement measures enabling workers to better cope with a loss of off-site and on-site emergency backup electric power—a “station blackout.” The precedent comes from the NRC’s post-9/11 requirement that plant owners install portable diesel-fueled pumps and generators to protect their facilities from a prolonged station blackout caused by an aircraft attack. However, because the NRC defines an aircraft attack as a beyond-design-basis event, it did not require this equipment to meet high quality and reliability standards or be hardened to withstand other potential events, such as natural disasters. Indeed, post-Fukushima inspections have confirmed that at many plants some of the equipment would not survive earthquakes or floods.Meanwhile, the nuclear industry is already making changes on the ground in response to Fukushima, the report found. Under an initiative the industry calls the Diverse and Flexible Coping Capability program, or FLEX, plant owners are beginning to supplement and relocate the post-9/11 equipment, ostensibly to better respond to severe natural disasters. Plant owners are dispersing it in numerous locations on and near reactor sites, but are not planning to harden it against natural disasters. The industry is banking on there being enough equipment available so that at least some of it would be usable in the event of a catastrophe.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports and TestimoniesSource: Government Accountability Office
+ Reports
1. Workforce Investment Act: Innovative Collaborations between Workforce Boards and Employers Helped Meet Local Needs. GAO-12-97, January 19.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-97
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587810.pdf
2. Air Traffic Control Modernization: Management Challenges Associated with Program Costs and Schedules Could Hinder NextGen Implementation. GAO-12-223, February 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-223
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588626.pdf
3. Senate Preservation Fund: Audit of Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 Transactions. GAO-12-271R, February 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-271R
4. Safety Effects of Less Prescriptive Requirements for Low-Stress Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines Are Uncertain. GAO-12-389R, February 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-389R
+ Testimonies
1. Workforce Investment Act: Innovative Collaborations between Workforce Boards and Employers Helped Meet Urgent Local Workforce Needs by Andy Sherrill, director, education, workforce, and income security, before the Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety, Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, And Pensions. GAO-12-419T, February 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-419T
2. National Nuclear Security Administration: Observations on NNSA’s Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, by Gene Aloise, Natural Resources and Environment, before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, House Committee on Armed Services. GAO-12-473T, February 16
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-473T
Highlights – http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588647.pdf
Nuclear Power Plants Threaten Drinking Water for 49 Million Americans
The drinking water for 49 million Americans could be at risk of radioactive contamination from a leak or accident at a local nuclear power plant, according to a new study released today by Environment America Research & Policy Center and the US Public Interest Research Group Education Fund.…The nuclear meltdown in Fukushima, Japan last year drew a spotlight on the many risks associated with nuclear power. After the disaster, airborne radiation left areas around the plant uninhabitable, and even contaminated drinking water sources near Tokyo, 130 miles from the plant.According to the new report, “Too Close to Home: Nuclear Power and the Threat to Drinking Water,” the drinking water for 49 million Americans is within 50 miles of an active nuclear power plant – the distance the Nuclear Regulatory Commission uses to measure risk to food and water supplies. Major cities, including New York, Boston, Philadelphia, San Diego, Cleveland and Detroit receive their drinking water from sources within 50 miles of a nuclear plant.Radiation from a disaster like the one in Fukushima can contaminate drinking water and food supplies, as well as harm our health. But disaster or no disaster, a common leak at a nuclear power plant can also threaten the drinking water for millions of people, and as our nuclear facilities get older, leaks are more common. In fact, 75 percent of U.S. nuclear plants have leaked tritium, a radioactive form of hydrogen that can cause cancer and genetic defects.
CRS — Nuclear Power Plant Design and Seismic Safety Considerations
Nuclear Power Plant Design and Seismic Safety Considerations (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The earthquake and subsequent tsunami that devastated Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and the earthquake that forced the North Anna, VA, nuclear power plant’s temporary shutdown have focused attention on the seismic criteria applied to siting and designing commercial nuclear power plants. Some Members of Congress have questioned whether U.S nuclear plants are more vulnerable to seismic threats than previously assessed, particularly given the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) ongoing reassessment of seismic risks at certain plant sites.
The design and operation of commercial nuclear power plants operating in the United States vary considerably because most were custom-designed and custom-built. Boiling water reactors (BWRs) directly generate steam inside the reactor vessel. Pressurized water reactors (PWRs) use heat exchangers to convert the heat generated by the reactor core into steam outside of the reactor vessel. U.S. utilities currently operate 104 nuclear power reactors at 65 sites in 31 states; 69 are PWR designs and the 35 are BWR designs.One of the most severe operating conditions a reactor may face is a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), which can lead to a reactor core meltdown. The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) provides core cooling to minimize fuel damage by injecting large amounts of cool water containing boron (borated water slows the fission process) into the reactor coolant system following a pipe rupture or other water loss. The ECCS must be sized to provide adequate make- up water to compensate for a break of the largest diameter pipe in the primary system (i.e., the so- called “double-ended guillotine break” (DEGB)). The NRC considers the DEGB to be an extremely unlikely event; however, even unlikely events can occur, as the magnitude 9.0 earthquake and resulting tsunami that struck Fukushima Daiichi proves.
U.S. nuclear power plants designed in the 1960s and 1970s used a deterministic statistical approach to addressing the risk of damage from shaking caused by a large earthquake (termed Deterministic Seismic Hazard Analysis, or DSHA). Since then, engineers have adopted a more comprehensive approach to design known as Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA). PSHA estimates the likelihood that various levels of ground motion will be exceeded at a given location in a given future time period. New nuclear plant designs will apply PSHA.
In 2008, the U.S Geological Survey (USGS) updated the National Seismic Hazard Maps (NSHM) that were last revised in 2002. USGS notes that the 2008 hazard maps differ significantly from the 2002 maps in many parts of the United States, and generally show 10%-15% reductions in spectral and peak ground acceleration across much of the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS), and about 10% reductions for spectral and peak horizontal ground acceleration in the Western United States (WUS). Spectral acceleration refers to ground motion over a range, or spectra, of frequencies. Seismic hazards are greatest in the WUS, particularly in California, Oregon, and Washington, as well as Alaska and Hawaii.
In 2010, the NRC examined the implications of the updated NSHM for nuclear power plants operating in the CEUS, and concluded that NSHM data suggest that the probability for earthquake ground motions may be above the seismic design basis for some nuclear plants in the CEUS. In late March 2011, NRC announced that it had identified 27 nuclear reactors operating in the CEUS that would receive priority earthquake safety reviews.
CRS — U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India’s test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India” and would “also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,” in the context of a broader partnership with India.
U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (P.L. 95-242). However, P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, allows the President to waive several provisions of the AEA. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress, in addition to other required documents, a written determination that P.L. 109-401’s requirements for U.S. nuclear cooperation with India to proceed had been met. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369, which approved the agreement, into law October 8, 2008. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India’s then-External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement two days later, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. Additionally, the United States and India signed a subsequent arrangement in July 2010 which governs “arrangements and procedures under which” India may reprocess U.S.- origin nuclear fuel in two new national reprocessing facilities, which New Delhi has not yet constructed.
The NSG, at the behest of the Bush Administration, agreed in September 2008 to exempt India from some of its export guidelines. That decision has effectively left decisions regarding nuclear commerce with India almost entirely up to individual governments. Since the NSG decision, India has concluded numerous nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign suppliers. However, U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India and may be reluctant to do so if New Delhi does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. Taking a step to resolve such concerns, India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that Indian nuclear liability legislation adopted in August 2010 is inconsistent with the Convention.
The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration’s policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States “intends to support India’s full membership” in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes.
Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.
The study team has been conducting an extensive analysis of the economics of both gigawatt (GW)-scale reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs). This technical paper provides results to date regarding the SMRs. Topics covered include the safety case; economics; the business case and a business plan; government incentives; licensing, design, and engineering; and future research. Capital cost estimates cover a range of categories, including the plant capital costs for the nuclear steam supply system, turbine building, and balance of plant; costs for engineering and construction services; owner’s costs and contingencies; and escalation and financing costs. Ongoing research is focusing on the learning process for SMRs. The study team is also releasing a companion paper on a review of overnight cost estimates for GW-level reactors.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports (PDFs)
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Child Welfare: More Information and Collaboration Could Promote Ties Between Foster Care Children and Their Incarcerated Parents. GAO-11-863, September 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-863
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11863high.pdf
2. Prescription Drug Control: DEA Has Enhanced Efforts to Combat Diversion, but Could Better Assess and Report Program Results. GAO-11-744, August 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-744
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11744high.pdf
3. Organizational Transformation: Military Departments Can Improve Their Enterprise Architecture Programs. GAO-11-902, September 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-902
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11902high.pdf
4. Excess Uranium Inventories: Clarifying DOE’s Disposition Options Could Help Avoid Further Legal Violations. GAO-11-846, September 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-846
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11846high.pdf
5. Defense Health Care: Cost Impact of Health Care Reform and the Extension of Dependent Coverage. GAO-11-837R, September 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-837R
6. DOD Met Statutory Reporting Requirements on Public-Private Competitions. GAO-11-923R, September 26.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-923R
CRS — Financing Recovery After a Catastrophic Earthquake or Nuclear Power Incident
Financing Recovery After a Catastrophic Earthquake or Nuclear Power Incident (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
On August 23, 2011, a rare, powerful magnitude 5.8 earthquake and aftershocks hit Mineral, VA, shutting down two North Anna Power Plants located about 7 miles from the earthquake’s epicenter. The earthquake was felt from Georgia to southeast Canada. Other earthquakes have also occurred in the area, as well as in surrounding areas. For example, on July 16, 2010, a 3.6 magnitude earthquake occurred in Gaithersburg, MD, about 110 miles from the epicenter. Seismologists report that although Virginia is classified as a “moderate” seismic risk zone, since 1977, the state has experienced 160 earthquakes, of which just 16% were felt. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), this earthquake was the strongest earthquake to hit the entire states since the 5.8 magnitude tremor in 1897.
Separately, on March 11, 2011, a massive 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Honshu, Japan. It was the most severe and likely the costliest earthquake to hit Japan in the 130 years of recorded history. The Japan earthquake and tsunami caused more than 10,000 casualties, widespread property and infrastructure damage, blackouts, fire, and nuclear meltdowns. The nuclear crisis has compounded the challenges faced by a nation struggling to clean up and recover from the earthquake and tsunami. Two weeks later, the disaster triggered a crisis at the nuclear power facility; Japan’s government said there was a leaking reactor core at the Fukushima Dai- ichi nuclear reactor complex, releasing radioactive contamination into the atmosphere and groundwater.
In the aftermath of the recent East Coast earthquake (and shut down of the North Anna nuclear power plants) and Japan’s technological and natural disaster, U.S. policymakers are asking if it could happen here and, if so, how associated costs would be financed. In the event of a major natural disaster, several catastrophe risk financing and insurance issues could arise, including (1) the need to revisit the nature, extent, and timing of potential earthquake and tsunami hazards in the United States; (2) the adequacy of nuclear third-party liability insurance capacity; and (3) the challenges of financing recovery from natural disasters and making earthquake insurance more affordable. The latter challenge is largely a function of the national financial markets’ capacity to absorb the cost and economic burden of a devastating mega-earthquake.
Given the economic devastation in Japan, there is heightened congressional interest in finding ways to reduce disaster risk for homeowners, insurance companies, financial firms, and both federal and state governments. This report examines earthquake catastrophe risk and insurance in the United States in light of recent developments. It examines both traditional and non-traditional approaches for financing recovery from earthquake losses as well as challenges in financing catastrophe losses with insurance. The report also explores the feasibility of a federal residential earthquake insurance mechanism and assesses policy implications of such a program. Finally, the report examines legislation introduced in the 112th Congress that addresses issues related to earthquakes, including S. 637, the Earthquake Insurance Affordability Act. S. 637 would authorize the U.S. Treasury to guarantee up to $5 billion in bonds available to certified public entities, like the California Earthquake Authority (CEA), following a catastrophic seismic event. The entity would have to exhaust its claims-paying ability before the federal guarantee becomes available. The measure is designed to reduce earthquake insurance rates by reducing the need to purchase reinsurance. The bonds would be repaid with premiums.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
