Archive for the ‘Defense Science Board’ Category

Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies

January 29, 2014 Comments off

Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies (PDF)
Source: Defense Science Board

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Assessment of Nuclear Treaty Monitoring and Verification Technologies was established to examine a broad range of questions concerning the capability of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Intelligence Community (IC) to support future monitoring and verification of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control treaties. The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the study, found in Appendix B, state the tasking. Given the breadth of the topics of interest to our sponsoring leadership and the time and resources available, the Task Force determined to focus on those aspects of the TOR that address what it views as the priority issue––namely, monitoring for proliferation. Assessments of strategies for monitoring nuclear activities in both permissive and non‐permissive environments, and of our current technical capabilities and future requirements for successfully implementing those strategies, were made.

Task Force Report: Predicting Violent Behavior

October 11, 2012 Comments off

Task Force Report: Predicting Violent Behavior (PDF)

Source: Defense Science Board

This report conveys the findings and recommendations of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force (TF) on Predicting Violent Behavior. This study was chartered and co-sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

This DSB study is one of several reviews that resulted from the killings that took place on November 5, 2009 at the Fort Hood, Texas Soldier Readiness Center, and is submitted in response to the Terms of Reference (TOR) of May 21, 2011. A copy of the TOR is provided in Appendix 1 to this report and summarized in Table 1 below. Task 8 was added later as a result of the Fort Hood Independent Review Panel.

Hat tip: PW

DSB — Basic Research

February 27, 2012 Comments off
Source:  Defense Science Board
A significant handicap for conducting the study was the difficulty of getting data on the DOD basic research program. What should have been easily retrievable data required huge time-consuming, labor-intensive efforts to collect and assemble due to the lack of a modern management information system that would enable answering questions posed by DOD leadership. It is difficult to have management without management information.
Relative to the organizational structure of the DOD basic research program, over the years a number of alternatives have been considered for the conduct of basic research, in order to improve funding efficiency, coordination, or planning. Combining all basic research from across the Services into one organization is one such variant. The task force concludes that any potential savings, or other supposed benefits, that might accrue from such a restructuring would be far outweighed by distancing basic research from applied research and from the military operators. Furthermore, centralization would eliminate the diversity of views so important for the conduct of basic research.
In sum, the task force found the current DOD basic research program to be a very good one, comparable to others in the federal gove rnment and well-suited to DOD’s needs. While nothing is ever so good it cannot be improved, the only are a found where improvement would make a significant difference would be to reduce the unnecessary bureaucratic burden imposed at all levels of the basic research organization.

Independent assessment of the Air Force nuclear enterprise

June 10, 2011 Comments off

Independent assessment of the Air Force nuclear enterprise (PDF)
Source: Defense Science Board

The final report of the Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nucear Enterprise is attached.

The Air Force leadership implemented extraordinary measures following two serious incidents in 2007 and 2008. These measures included policy, inspection, organization, and leadership changes. The report finds that these measures have been effective in their intended purpose of re-establishing the professionalism expected of personnel in the nuclear enterprise. While these measures were appropriate and effective, some are not sustainable or desirable for the long term.

In addition to identifying the benefits of the extraordinary measures, the report provides a description of undesirable effects of contniuing the extraordinary measures for the long term and makes recommendations on the path to continued assured professionalism in the Air Force nuclear enterprise. More specifically, the report discusses and provides recommendations in the area of logistics, organization and guidance, the inspection regime, operations, personnel and morale, and the personnel reliability program.