Archive
CRS — Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather Than Treaties
Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather Than Treaties (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
U.S. trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), World Trade Organization agreements, and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have been approved by majority vote of each house rather than by two-thirds vote of the Senate—that is, they have been treated as congressional-executive agreements rather than as treaties. The congressional-executive agreement has been the vehicle for implementing Congress’s long-standing policy of seeking trade benefits for the United States through reciprocal trade negotiations. In a succession of statutes, Congress has authorized the President to negotiate and enter into tariff and nontariff barrier (NTB) agreements for limited periods, while permitting NTB and free trade agreements negotiated under this authority to enter into force for the United States only if they are approved by both houses in a bill enacted into public law and other statutory conditions are met; implementing bills are also accorded expedited consideration under the scheme. This negotiating authority and expedited procedures are commonly known as Trade Promotion Authority (TPA).
Congress most recently granted the President tempor ary trade negotiating authority utilizing this approach in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Au thority Act of 2002 (BTPAA), contained in Title XXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210. Although the authority expired during the 110th Congress, agreements entered into before July 1, 2007, remained eligible for congressional consideration under the expedited procedure. The President had entered into free trade agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama before this date, each of which awaited congressional approval at the time. In Oct ober 2011, Congress approved the three pending agreements, making a total of 11 free trade agreements approved under the BTPAA process.
In addition, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), on behalf of the President, notified the House and Senate in December 2009 by letter that the President intended to enter into negotiations aimed at a regional, Asia-Pacific trade agreement, called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Notwithstanding the expiration of BTPAA authorities, the USTR stated that the Obama Administration would be observing the relevant procedures of the act with respect to notifying and consulting with Congress regarding these negotiations. Notably, discussions to reinstate TPA through legislation have recently gained attention. In March 2013, the Acting U.S. Trade Representative, Demetrios Marantis, stated that the Obama Administration will work with Congress to enact new TPA legislation.
CRS — International Trade and Finance: Key Policy Issues for the 113th Congress
International Trade and Finance: Key Policy Issues for the 113th Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
The U.S. Constitution grants authority over the regulation of foreign commerce to Congress, which it exercises in a variety of ways. These include the oversight of trade policy generally, and more particularly, the consideration of legislation to approve trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy issues cover such areas as: U.S. trade negotiations; tariffs; nontariff barriers; worker dislocation from trade liberalization, trade remedy laws; import and export policies; international investment, economic sanctions; and the trade policy functions of the federal government. Congress also has an important role in international finance. It has the authority over U.S. financial commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and finance-related agencies of the U.S. Government.
The 112 th Congress approved U.S. bilateral free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, extended the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs through December 31, 2013, and reauthorized the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) through July 31, 2013. In addition, Congress authorized permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status for Russia and Moldova, reauthorized the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and approved full U.S. participation in general capital increases for the World Bank and four regional development banks.
The 113th Congress may revisit many of these issues and address new ones. Among the more potentially prominent issues are:
1. Negotiations for comprehensive reciprocal trade agreements with major trading partners, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 countries from the Western Hemisphere and Asia, and new negotiations with the European Union for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement;
2. Possible renewal of Trade Promotion Author ity (TPA), allowing the President to enter into reciprocal trade agreements, and providing trade negotiating objectives and expedited legislative procedures to consider trade agreement implementing bills; and the possible related issue of TAA program reauthorization;
3. U.S.-China trade relations including investment, intellectual property rights protection, currency reform, and market access liberalization;
4. International finance issues including implications of the ongoing Eurozone debt crisis for the U.S. economy, oversight of international financial institutions, and negotiations to conclude new bilateral investment treaties (BITs);
5. Oversight of the stalemated World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round negotiations and separate new trade negotiations (e.g. services) that some members of the WTO have undertaken;
6. Review of the President’s export control reform initiative and possible renewal of the Export Control Act (EAA), and review of trade sanctions;
7. Oversight of the President’s request for new authority to reorganize and consolidate the business- and trade-related functions of six federal entities; the Export-Import Bank, and the Administration’s National Export Initiative;
8. Reauthorization of U.S. Customs and Bord er Protection (CBP) and expiring trade preference programs (e.g., the GSP and the Andean Trade Preference Act).
A list of CRS reports covering these issues is provided at the end of the report.
CRS — International Climate Change Financing: The Green Climate Fund (GCF)
International Climate Change Financing: The Green Climate Fund (GCF) (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. State Department Foreign Press Center)
Over the past several decades, the United States has delivered financial and technical assistance for climate change activities in the developing world through a variety of bilateral and multilateral programs. The United States and other industrialized countries committed to such assistance through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, Treaty Number: 102-38, 1992), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), and the UNFCCC Cancun Agreements (2010), wherein the higher-income c ountries pledged jointly up to $30 billion of “fast start” climate financing for lower-income countries for the period 2010-2012, and a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion annually by 2020. The Cancun Agreements also proposed that the pledged funds are to be new, additional to previous flows, adequate, predictable, and sustained, and are to come from a wide variety of sources, bo th public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.
One potential mechanism for mobilizing a share of the proposed international climate financing is the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund (GCF), proposed in the Cancun Agreements and accepted by Parties during the December 2011 conference in Durban, South Africa. The fund aims to assist developing countries in their efforts to combat climate change through the provision of grants and other concessional financing for mitigation and adaptation projects, programs, policies, and activities. The GCF is to be capitalized by contributions from donor countries and other sources, including both innovative mechanisms and the private sector. Currently, the GCF complements many of the existing multilateral climate change funds (e.g., the Global Environment Facility, the Climate Investment Funds, and the Adaptation Fund); however, as the official financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, some Parties believe that it may eventually replace or subsume the other funds. While many Parties expect capitalization and operation of the GCF to begin shortly after the November 2013 conference in Warsaw, Poland, many issues remain to be clarified, and some involve long-standing and contentious debate . They include what role the CGF would play in providing sustained finance at scale, how it would fit into the existing development assistance and climate financing architecture, how it would be capitalized, and how it would allocate and deliver assistance efficiently and effectively to developing countries.
The U.S. Congress—through its role in authorizations, appropriations, and oversight—would have significant input on U.S. participation in the GCF. Congress regularly determines and gives guidance to the allocation of foreign aid between bilateral and multilateral assistance as well as among the variety of multilateral mechanisms. In the past, Congress has raised concerns regarding the cost, purpose, direction, efficiency, and effectiveness of the UNFCCC and existing international institutions of climate financing. Potential authorizations and appropriations for the GCF would rest with several committees, including the U.S. House of Representatives Committees on Foreign Affairs (various subcommittees); Financial Services (Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade); and Appropriations (Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs); and the U.S. Senate Committees on Foreign Relations (Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection); and Appropriations (Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs). As of April 2013, the U.S. Administration—through its State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 150 account—has made no specific budget request for appropriated funds to be contributed to the GCF.
CRS — The United Kingsom and U.S.-UK Relations
The United Kingsom and U.S.-UK Relations (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center)
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom (UK) as the United States’ closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a combination of factors, including a sense of shared history, values, and culture, as well as extensive and long-established cooperation on a wide range of foreign policy and security issues. In the minds of many Americans, the UK’s strong role in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past decade reinforced an impression of closeness and solidarity.
The 2010 UK election resulted in the country’s first coalition government since the Second World War. The Conservative Party won the most votes in the election, and Conservative leader David Cameron became prime minister. To command a parliamentary majority, however, the Conservatives were compelled to partner with the Liberal Democrats, who came in third place, and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg became deputy prime minister. The Labour Party, now led by Ed Miliband, moved into opposition after leading the UK government since 1997.
Economic and fiscal issues have been the central domestic challenge facing the coalition thus far.
Seeking to reduce the country’s budget deficit and national debt, the coalition adopted a five-year austerity program early in its tenure. With a double-dip recession in 2012 and low growth forecasts, the government has been maintaining its austerity strategy under considerable pressure and criticism. Austerity has also heightened social tensions and contributed to rising political friction between the coalition partners. Although the coalition arrangement went smoothly during its first year, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats have subsequently disagreed about a series of domestic issues, including a number of proposed changes to the country’s political system.
Europe has been another source of tension. The UK has long been one of the most skeptical and ambivalent members of the 27-country European Union (EU). While the Conservative Party remains a stronghold of “euro-skeptics,” the Liberal Democrats are the UK’s most pro-EU political party. The Eurozone crisis has deepened British antipathy toward the EU, fueling calls to reclaim national sovereignty over issues where decision-making has been pooled and integrated in Brussels. Some analysts believe that a British departure from the EU is a growing possibility; Prime Minister Cameron intends to renegotiate some of the terms of membership and put the UK’s relationship with the EU to a national referendum in 2017. Adding another note of uncertainty to the British political landscape, Scotland plans to hold a referendum in September 2014 on whether to separate from the UK and become an independent country.
In recent years, some observers have suggested that the U.S.-UK relationship is losing relevance due to changing U.S. foreign policy priorities and shifting global dynamics. An imbalance of power in favor of the United States has occasionally led some British observers to call for a reassessment of their country’s approach to the relationship. Despite such anxieties, most analysts believe that the two countries will remain close allies that choose to cooperate on many important global issues such as counterterrorism, the NATO mission in Afghanistan, efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear activities, and global economic challenges.
Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in the UK and its relations with the United States are of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress. This report provides an overview and assessment of some of the main dimensions of these topics. For a broader analysis of transatlantic relations, see CRS Report RS22163, The United States and Europe: Current Issues , by Derek E. Mix.
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012
Source: U.S. Department of State
I am proud to present the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for the first time as Secretary of State. When I served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, my colleagues and I depended on these reports for an accurate assessment of human rights conditions around the world. I know how valuable they are to those in the State Department and other federal agencies who carry out U.S. foreign policy as well as to members of Congress, the academic community, activists, students, journalists, lawyers, judges, foreign governments, and concerned citizens everywhere.
The pages that follow document the often difficult march forward of human freedom around the world. Significant progress is being made in some places, but in far too many others governments fall short of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ vision of a world where people live “free and equal in dignity and rights.”
We report on the world’s newest country, South Sudan, and its efforts to ensure a peaceful future for its people. We cover the horrifying violence in Syria, historic elections in Egypt, Georgia, and Libya, and the promising democratic opening in Burma. The reports also reveal the courage of individuals, including netizens, activists, workers, and journalists who advocate for universal human rights. The reports make clear that many of our most pressing foreign policy challenges are, at their core, about the universal and undeniable human quest for freedom and dignity.
Our world is complex and increasingly influenced by non-state actors – brave civil society activists and advocates, but also violent extremists, transnational criminals, and other malevolent actors. In those places where human rights and fundamental freedoms are denied, it is far easier for these negative destabilizing influences to take hold, threatening international stability and our own national security.
It is in our interest to promote the universal rights of all persons. Governments that respect human rights are more peaceful and more prosperous. They are better neighbors, stronger allies, and better economic partners. Governments that enforce safe workplaces, prohibit exploitative child and forced labor, and educate their citizens create a more level playing field and broader customer base for the global marketplace. Conversely, governments that threaten regional and global peace, from Iran to North Korea, are also egregious human rights abusers, with citizens trapped in the grip of domestic repression, economic deprivation, and international isolation.
The United States stands with people and governments that aspire to freedom and democracy, mindful from our own experience that the work of building a more perfect union – a sustainable and durable democracy – will never be complete. As part of this commitment, we advocate around the world for governments to adopt policies and practices that respect human rights regardless of ethnicity, religion, gender, race, sexual orientation, or disability; that allow for and honor the results of free and fair elections; that ensure safe and healthy workplaces; and that respect peaceful protests and other forms of dissent. The United States continues to speak out unequivocally on behalf of the fundamental dignity and equality of all persons.
I hereby transmit the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012 to the United States Congress.
John F. Kerry
Secretary of State
Twelve Ways to Build Trust in the ICT Global Supply Chain
Twelve Ways to Build Trust in the ICT Global Supply Chain
Source: Brookings Institution
The globalization of commerce and trade has created many benefits. Supply costs have been reduced for many products. Computers and other items can be made of parts from a number of different locales. Countries can specialize in particular goods and companies can focus on the things they do best. Raw materials may come from one area, while manufacturing and production lie elsewhere, and sales and marketing take place in still another place. In this as well as other examples, contemporary commerce involves a complex interchange of hundreds or thousands of individuals, organizations, technologies, and processes across a variety of different continents.
But long supply chains and inadequate or nonexistent product evaluation before deployment, create a situation where widespread vulnerabilities exist in products and networks that can be exploited by others during design, production, delivery, and post-installation servicing. There are industry-wide risks associated with procurement, transportation, and management. Everything from raw materials and natural disasters to market forces, national laws, and political conflict can be problematic. Problems in one area can cascade elsewhere and magnify risks dramatically for the system as a whole.
In this paper, West discusses twelve ways to build trust in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) global supply chain. With the assistance of a group of leading experts brought together at the Brookings Institution in February, 2013 plus follow-up interviews, he explores the operational threats and technological vulnerabilities that we face, and makes recommendations to identify best practices, standards, and third-party assessment for supply chain assurance.
West argues that vulnerabilities in the supply chain and product development, generally, facilitate a myriad of attack and exploitation techniques, such as unauthorized remote access after product deployment for many malicious activities, degradation of ICT networks, and damage to critical infrastructures. West suggests that developing agreed-upon standards, using independent evaluators, setting up systems for certification and accreditation, and having trusted delivery systems will build confidence in the global supply chain as well as the public and private sector networks that sustain them. These and other types of evaluations make information available to purchasers and therefore give them a firmer basis for product selection.
New From the GAO
New GAO Reports
Source: Government Accountability Office
1. Securities And Exchange Commission: Continued Management Attention Would Strengthen Internal Supervisory Controls. GAO-13-314, April 18.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-314
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653956.pdf
2. Defense Infrastructure: Improved Guidance Needed for Estimating Alternatively Financed Project Liabilities. GAO-13-337, April 18.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-337
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653911.pdf
3. 911 Services: Most States Used 911 Funds for Intended Purposes, but FCC Could Improve Its Reporting on States’ Use of Funds. GAO-13-376, April 18.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-376
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653930.pdf
4. Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operation. GAO-13-315, April 18.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-315
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654010.pdf
5. Workplace Safety and Health: OSHA Can Better Respond to State-Run Programs Facing Challenges. GAO-13-320, April 16.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-320
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653800.pdf
6. Status of Funding, Equipment, and Training for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. GAO-13-367R, March 20.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-367R
When Armies Divide: The Security of Nuclear Arsenals During Revolts, Coups, and Civil Wars
When Armies Divide: The Security of Nuclear Arsenals During Revolts, Coups, and Civil Wars
Source: RAND Corporation
This work examines what happened in April of 1961, when the French government was about to conduct the fourth of a series of nuclear tests in the Sahara. Four French Army generals, unhappy that de Gaulle was willing to support Algerian independence, staged a coup to keep Algeria as a French colony. The nuclear test was conducted a few days ahead of schedule — it was not successful — and speculation ever since has been that the test was moved up to keep the weapon out of the rebel generals’ hands.
While there is evidence that one of the generals contacted the officer who was in charge of the tests to try to delay them, Jenkins concludes that the generals really never had a plan in place to seize the weapon and that the French government didn’t want to delay the test. At the time it happened, the world viewed it as an internal, French problem.
The second, shorter part of the book compares the 1961 events to what might happen today if the military in Pakistan or North Korea splintered, and a rebel group got their hands on those countries’ nuclear materials. Jenkins contends that such a scenario today would clearly be an international incident, that neither Pakistan nor North Korea would want any foreign intervention, and that the United States "might not be the only first responder."
Two additional short essays by Dr. Stephen J. Lukasik and Constantin Melnik, a security assistant to the French prime minister in 1961, also review what happened in 1961.
Review of Think Tank publications on EU affairs
Review of Think Tank publications on EU affairs (PDF)
Source: European Commission
Welcome to issue 1 of the Review of Think Tank publications on EU affairs, compiled by the Central Library of the General Secretariat of the Council. The review provides abstracts and links to papers published in the previous month by think tanks in Brussels and elsewhere. It will be issued monthly and will be available on paper at the Central Library and online on our Intranet and Internet. It can be disseminated freely – the usual disclaimers apply.
Think tank publications in the first section deal with EU institutions and politics, with a focus on the crisis and its impact on European societies, and with perspectives from Brussels, Barcelona, Kiel, London, Davos, Prague and Rome. The UK relationship with the EU also attracted a lot of attention from the think tank community in January. Some see a connection between the UK-EU relationship and the role of Ireland, which recently took over the 6-month Presidency of the EU Council.
In the second section of this issue we present papers on external relations, with general reviews of the current state of EU foreign policy and specific views on the Arab Spring, Asia, Turkey, Russia, energy policy and others. With a view to the EU-Ukraine summit on 25 February, we devote this issue’s Special Focus to relations between the EU and Ukraine, gathering publications from the last 3-5 months.
A regular feature of the Review will be the Regards croisés section, where we highlight how a think tank in a Member State approaches developments in another Member State. This month, we look at how a Czech think tank assessed public discourse on the crisis in Poland and the Czech Republic.
In every issue we will draw a short profile of a think tank: this month we feature the Polish Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich (OSW), with its coverage of the Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.
Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should Be a Priority for the United States
Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should Be a Priority for the United States
Source: Brookings Institution
For over a decade now, the continent of Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, has undergone a major transformation. In 2000, The Economist referred to Africa as the “Hopeless Continent.” This nickname was based on an evaluation of the many disadvantages that characterized the continent: poverty and disease, cycles of conflict, military and dictatorial one-party states, etc. Despite large endowments of natural resources, the continent’s economic performance was dismal as a result of poor macroeconomic management and a hostile environment for doing business.
In 2011, The Economist referred to Africa as the “Rising Continent” and a March 2013 issue of the magazine contained a special report referring to Africa as the “Hopeful Continent.” These days, Africa is variously referred to in positive terms such as emerging, rising and hopeful. This positive view of Africa is justified—sub-Saharan Africa is the host of some of the fastest growing economies in the world. This growth is not just due to rising commodity prices but is also driven by a more vibrant private sector supported by an improved business climate. There have also been dramatic improvements in governance and economic management. The region has seen major improvements in various sectors of the economy, especially in services. The information technology revolution has become an important aspect of the new Africa, particularly in terms of mobile technologies. As a result of these developments, Africa’s middle class is now growing rapidly, and the continent has become a major market for consumer goods. While sub-Saharan Africa still faces many development challenges, it is a far cry from the one described by The Economist in 2000. Africa is indeed on the path to claiming the 21st century.
CRS — U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress
U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
This CRS report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration re-engaged with the top PRC leadership, including China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive maritime confrontations (including in 2009).
Issues for Congress include whether the Obama Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursued contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts have achieved results in U.S. objectives and whether the contacts have contributed to the PLA’s warfighting capabilities that might harm U.S. security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include conflict avoidance/crisis management; military/civilian coordination; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; nuclear/missile/space/cyber talks; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA accounting.
In 2010 and 2011, the PLA criticized U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and claimed to “suspend” U.S.- PRC military contacts. Then, in 2011, the PLA hosted the Defense Secretary in January, and the PLA Chief of General Staff visited in May. In May 2012, General Liang Guanglie visited as the first PRC Defense Minister to do so since 2003. Defense Secretary Panetta visited in September and invited the PLA Navy to participate in the U.S.-led maritime exercise, RIMPAC, in 2014. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, plans to visit in April.
Policymakers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about crises. U.S. officials have faced challenges in cooperation from the PLA. The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S. “obstacles” (including arms sales to Taiwan, legal restrictions on contacts, and the Pentagon’s reports to Congress on the PLA). The PRC’s harassment of U.S. surveillance ships (in 2009) and increasing assertiveness in maritime areas have shown the limits to mil-to-mil talks and PLA restraint. Still, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July 2009, President Obama called for military contacts to diminish disputes with China. The U.S. military seeks to expand cooperation with the PLA. The NDAA for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) amended P.L. 106-65 for the annual report on PRC military power to expand the focus to security developments involving the PRC, add cooperative elements, and fold in another report on mil-to-mil contacts. However, the Administration was late in submitting this report in 2010, 2011, and 2012. The NDAA for FY2013 (P.L. 112-239) adds additional requirements to strengthen the annual reporting on military and security challenges from China.
Aid to poor countries slips further as governments tighten budgets
Aid to poor countries slips further as governments tighten budgets
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Development aid fell by 4% in real terms in 2012, following a 2% fall in 2011. The continuing financial crisis and euro zone turmoil has led several governments to tighten their budgets, which has had a direct impact on development aid. There is also a noticeable shift in aid allocations away from the poorest countries and towards middle-income countries. However, on the basis of the DAC Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans, a moderate recovery in aid levels is expected in 2013.
…
Key aid totals in 2012In 2012, members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD provided USD 125.6 billion in net official development assistance (ODA), representing 0.29 per cent of their combined gross national income (GNI), a -4.0% drop in real terms compared to 2011 (see Table 1 and Chart 1*).
Since 2010, the year it reached its peak, ODA has fallen by -6.0% in real terms. Excluding 2007, which saw the end of exceptional debt relief operations, the fall in 2012 is the largest since 1997. This is also the first time since 1996-97 that aid has fallen in two successive years.
The financial crisis and euro zone turmoil led many governments to implement austerity measures and reduce their aid budgets. However, despite the current fiscal pressures, some countries have maintained or increased their ODA budgets in order to reach the targets they have set.
CRS — The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed regional free trade agreement (FTA) being negotiated among the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. On March 15, 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that Japan would seek to participate in the TPP negotiations. U.S. negotiators and others describe and envision the TPP as a “comprehensive and high-standard” FTA that aims to liberalize trade in nearly all goods and services and include commitments beyond those currently established in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The broad outline of an agreement was announced on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial in November 2011, in Honolulu, HI. If concluded as envisioned, the TPP potentially could eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment among the parties and could serve as a template for a future trade pact among APEC members and potentially other countries. Congress has a direct interest in the negotiations, both through influencing U.S. negotiating positions with the executive branch, and by passing legislation to implement any resulting agreement.
The 16th round of negotiations concluded in Singapore on March 14, 2013, and the 17th round is scheduled to be held in Lima, Peru in May 2013. The current goal is to reach an agreement in time for the October 2013 APEC summit in Indonesia. For this deadline to be achieved, outstanding negotiating positions may need to be tabled soon in order for political decisions to be made. The negotiating dynamic itself is complex: decisions on key market access issues such as dairy, sugar, and textiles and apparel may be dependent on the outcome of controversial rules negotiations such as intellectual property rights or state-owned enterprises.
Twenty-nine chapters in the agreement are under discussion. The United States is negotiating market access for goods, services, and agriculture with countries with which it does not currently have FTAs: Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam. Negotiations are also being conducted on disciplines to intellectual property rights, trade in services, government procurement, investment, rules of origin, competition, labor, and environmental standards and other issues. In many cases, the rules being negotiated are intended to be more rigorous than comparable rules found in the WTO. Some topics, such as state-owned enterprises, regulatory coherence, and supply chain competitiveness, break new ground in FTA negotiations. As the countries that make up the TPP negotiating partners include advanced industrialized, middle income, and developing economies, the TPP, if implemented, may involve substantial restructuring of the economies of some participants.
The TPP serves several strategic goals in U.S. trade policy. First, it is the leading trade policy initiative of the Obama Administration, and is a manifestation of the Administration’s “pivot” to Asia. If concluded, it may serve to shape the economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region by harmonizing existing agreements with U.S. FTA partners, attracting new participants, and establishing regional rules on new policy issues facing the global economy—possibly providing impetus to future multilateral liberalization under the WTO.
As the negotiations proceed, a number of issues important to Congress are emerging. One is whether the United States can balance its vision of creating a “comprehensive and high standard” agreement with a large and expanding group of countries, while not insisting on terms that other countries will reject. Another issue is how Congress will consider the TPP, if concluded. The present negotiations are not being conducted under the auspices of formal trade promotion authority (TPA)—the latest TPA expired on July 1, 2007—although the Administration informally
CRS — Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform in Mexico: The U.S. Role
Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform in Mexico: The U.S. Role (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Fostering security, stability, and democracy in neighboring Mexico is seen by analysts to be in the U.S. national security and economic interest. Reforming Mexico’s often corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system is widely regarded as crucial for combating criminality, strengthening the rule of law, and better protecting citizen security and human rights in the country. Congress has provided significant support to help Mexico reform its justice system in order to make current anticrime efforts more effective and to strengthen the system over the long term.
U.S. and Mexican officials assert that fully implementing judicial reforms enacted through constitutional changes in June 2008 is a key goal. Under the reforms, Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a closed-door process based on written arguments presented to a judge to an adversarial public trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. These changes are expected to help make the system less prone to corruption and more transparent and impartial. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are expected to adopt means of alternative dispute resolution, which should help them be more flexible and efficient, thereby ensuring that cases that go to trial involve serious crimes.
More than halfway into the reform process, judicial reform efforts in Mexico are at a critical juncture. As of December 2012, 22 of Mexico’s 32 states had enacted new criminal procedure codes (67%), but only 12 states (36%) had begun operating at least partially under the new system. Reform states have seen positive initial results as compared to non-reform states: faster case resolution times, less pre-trial detention, and tougher sentences for cases that go to trial. Daunting challenges remain, however, including counter-reform efforts and opposition from some key justice sector operators (including judges). Although reform efforts have lagged at the federal level, President Enrique Peña Nieto, inaugurated in December 2012 to a six-year term, has said that advancing judicial reform will be a top priority. U.S. policymakers are likely to follow how the Peña Nieto government moves to enact a unified penal code and code of criminal procedure to hasten reform at the federal level and to increase support to states transitioning to the new system.
The United States has been supporting judicial reform efforts in Mexico since the late 1990s, with assistance accelerating since the implementation of the Mérida Initiative in FY2008, an anticrime assistance program for which Congress has provided $1.9 billion. While the Mérida Initiative initially focused on training and equipping Mexican security forces, it now emphasizes providing training and technical assistance to help reform Mexico’s justice sector institutions. Funding for “Institutionalizing the Rule of Law” now dwarfs other types of U.S. assistance to Mexico.
This report provides an overview of Mexico’s historic 2008 judicial reforms and an assessment of how those reforms have been implemented thus far. It then analyzes U.S. support for judicial reform efforts in Mexico and raises issues for Congress to consider as it oversees current U.S. justice sector programs and considers future support to Mexico. Also see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.
New From the GAO
New GAO Report
Source: Government Accountability Office
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
State Department and Commission Are Implementing Responsibilities but Need to Improve Interaction
GAO-13-196
Syria at the Crossroads: United States Policy and Recommendations for the Way Forward
Syria at the Crossroads: United States Policy and Recommendations for the Way Forward (PDF)
Source: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (Rice University)
From press release (EurekAlert!):
As Syria’s raging civil war approaches the two-year mark, the United States should prepare a more focused strategy that strengthens the moderate political forces in Syria and engages Syria’s regional and international stakeholders, according to a new special report from Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The report also recommends that U.S. strategy should buttress Syria’s neighbors, address the deepening humanitarian crisis and plans for a post-Assad Syria.
The special report, "Syria at the Crossroads: United States Policy and Recommendations for the Way Forward," was co-authored by Edward Djerejian, founding director of the Baker Institute and a former U.S. ambassador to Syria and Israel, and Andrew Bowen, the Baker Institute’s scholar for the Middle East. It highlights the deepening challenges Syria faces and provides substantive policy recommendations for the U.S. government in securing a multi-ethnic, democratic Syria.
"Given the absence of a negotiated political settlement and the prolonged military stalemate on the ground, the U.S., engaging its partners in the international community, should act to preserve the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of the Syrian state and help the Syrian people transition to a broadly representative government and a country at peace with its neighbors," Djerejian said. "While a renewed U.S. and EU engagement with Russia is needed to help reach a political solution in Syria, immediate steps should be taken to support and to buttress both the moderate forces in Syria and Syria’s neighbors, who are vulnerable to the continued crisis."
The special report recommends that the U.S. should consider supplying military assistance to vetted leaders of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in an effort to support the moderate opposition, protect Syrian civilians and abate extremists. In addition, the U.S., in conjunction with NATO, should form a joint special operations command in Turkey to monitor the distribution of this assistance and provide logistical support, communications and training to vetted commanders. "What is needed is to combine military assistance with a coordinated strategy of capacity building within the opposition, which can then have measurable results and importantly, not lead the U.S. into any overextended commitment," Bowen said.
CRS — Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 113th Congress
Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 113th Congress (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
This report examines human rights issues in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including ongoing rights abuses, legal reforms, and the development of civil society. Major events of the past year include the PRC leadership transition, the Wukan protests over land expropriation, the negotiations that allowed legal advocate Chen Guangcheng to leave China, and the Tibetan selfimmolations. Ongoing human rights problems include excessive use of force by public security forces, unlawful detention, torture of detainees, arbitrary use of state security laws against political dissidents and ethnic groups, coercive family planning practices, persecution of unsanctioned religious activity, state control of information, and mistreatment of North Korean refugees. Tibetans, Uighur Muslims, and Falun Gong adherents continue to receive especially harsh treatment. For additional information and policy options, see CRS Report R41007, Understanding China’s Political System, by Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, and the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011.
China’s leadership transition has so far provided few indications of a fundamental policy shift on human rights. Nonetheless, many analysts refer to a legitimacy crisis and possible “turning point” after three decades of rapid but uneven economic growth. Some observers sense a shift in public attitudes from an emphasis on economic development and social stability to an eagerness for political reform that would have implications for human rights in China.
Although the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) opposes political pluralism, Chinese society has become more diverse and assertive. Non-governmental organizations are playing a larger role in providing social services and policy input. Social protests are frequent, numerous, and widespread. Economic, social, and demographic changes have given rise to labor unrest. PRC citizens have become increasingly aware of their legal rights, while emerging networks of lawyers, journalists, and activists have advanced the causes of many aggrieved individuals and groups. The media continues to push the boundaries of officially approved discourse, and the Internet has made it impossible for the government to restrict information as fully as before. Some Chinese refer to microblog (weibo) sites as the most important public sphere for free speech.
The PRC government has attempted to respond to some popular grievances, develop the legal system, and cautiously support the expansion of civil society. However, it continues to suppress many activists who try to organize mass protests and dissidents who openly question sensitive policies or call for fundamental political change. Many lawyers who take on politically sensitive cases face government reprisals.
Some notable changes to the PRC criminal justice system were announced in the past year. Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law, which are to go into effect in 2013, reportedly provide for greater protections against torture and coerced confessions, expanded access to legal defense, longer trial deliberations, mandatory appellate hearings, more rigorous judicial review, and greater government oversight of the legal process. In January 2013, the government stated that it planned reforms related to the notorious Re-education Through Labor camps, which hold citizens without trial for non-criminal offenses. Some experts caution that, given China’s weak legal system, it is too early to predict whether these reforms will result in significant improvements in rights protections in these areas.
CRS — Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification
Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Europe as a major energy consumer faces a number of challenges when addressing future energy needs. Among these challenges are rapidly rising global demand and competition for energy resources from emerging economies such as China and India, persistent instability in energy producing regions such as the Middle East, a fragmented internal European energy market, and a growing need to shift fuels in order to address climate change policy. As a result, energy supply security has become a key concern for European nations and the European Union (EU).
A key element of the EU’s energy supply strategy has been to shift to a greater use of natural gas. Europe as a whole is a major importer of natural gas. Russia is Europe’s most important natural gas supplier, accounting for 36% of Europe’s natural gas imports. Europe’s natural gas consumption is projected to grow while its own domestic natural gas production continues to decline. If trends continue as projected, Europe’s dependence on Russia as a supplier is likely to grow. And, while it could be in Europe’s interest to explore alternative sources for its natural gas needs, it is uncertain whether Europe as a whole can, or is willing to, replace a significant level of imports of Russian natural gas. Some European countries that feel vulnerable to potential Russian energy supply manipulation may work harder to achieve diversification than others.
Russia has not been idle when it comes to protecting its share of the European natural gas market. Moscow, including the state-controlled company Gazprom, has attempted to stymie Europeanbacked alternatives to pipelines it controls by proposing competing pipeline projects and attempting to co-opt European companies by offering them stakes in those and other projects. It has attempted to dissuade potential suppliers (especially those in Central Asia) from participating in European-supported plans. Moscow has also raised environmental concerns in an apparent effort to hinder other alternatives to its supplies, such as unconventional natural gas.
Successive U.S. administrations and Congresses have viewed European energy security as a U.S. national interest. Promoting diversification of Europe’s natural gas supplies, especially in recent years through the development of a southern corridor of gas from the Caspian region as an alternative to Russian natural gas, has been a focal point of U.S. energy policy in Europe and Eurasia. The George W. Bush Administration viewed the issue in geopolitical terms and sharply criticized Russia for using energy supplies as a political tool to influence other countries. The Obama Administration has also called for diversification, but has refrained from openly expressing concerns about Russia’s regional energy policy, perhaps in order to avoid jeopardizing the “reset” of ties with Moscow. Nevertheless, although supplying natural gas to Europe from the Caspian Region and Central Asia has been a goal of multiple U.S. administrations and the EU, it is far from being achieved in volumes significant to counter Russian exports.
This report focuses on potential approaches that Europe might employ to diversify its sources of natural gas supply, Russia’s role in Europe’s natural gas policies, and key factors that could hinder efforts to develop alternative suppliers of natural gas. The report assesses the potential suppliers of natural gas to Europe and the short- to medium-term hurdles needed to be overcome for those suppliers to be credible, long-term providers of natural gas to Europe. The report looks at North Africa, potentially the most realistic supply alternative in the near-term, but notes that the region will have to resolve its current political, economic, and security instability as well as the internal structural changes to the natural gas industry. Central Asia, which may have the greatest amounts of natural gas, would need to construct lengthy pipelines through multiple countries to move its natural gas to Europe.
CRS — New Zealand: U.S. Security Cooperation and the U.S. Rebalancing to Asia Strategy
New Zealand: U.S. Security Cooperation and the U.S. Rebalancing to Asia Strategy (PDF)
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
As part of its strategy to rebalance toward Asia the Obama Administration has greatly expanded cooperation and reestablished close ties with New Zealand. Changes in the security realm have been particularly notable as the two sides have restored close defense cooperation, which was suspended in the mid-1980s due to differences over nuclear policy. The two nations are now working together increasingly closely in the area of defense and security cooperation while also seeking to coordinate efforts in the South Pacific. The United States and New Zealand are also working together to help shape emerging architectures in the Asia-Pacific such as the 11-nation Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement negotiation in which New Zealand has played a key role.
Members of Congress interested in oversight of the Obama Administration’s rebalancing to Asia strategy and the United States’ presence in the South Pacific as well as Members associated with the Friends of New Zealand Congressional Caucus may be interested in these new developments in the bilateral relationship. Congressional interest has also been demonstrated through Members’ participation in the Pacific Partnership Forum with New Zealand.
In discussing how the United States is updating alliances to address new demands and “building new partnerships,” then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton cited in November 2011 the outreach effort to New Zealand, among other countries, as “part of a broader effort to ensure a more comprehensive approach to American strategy and engagement in the region.” She added that “We are asking these emerging partners to join us in shaping and participating in a rulesbased regional and global order.” It is of interest to note that New Zealand, a nation that like Australia has fought alongside the United States in most of its wars, is now being reconceived as a “new” partner.
While the current right-of-center government of Prime Minister John Key has moved forward in restoring bilateral ties with the United States, some analysts in New Zealand are concerned that if this trend is taken too far it may threaten New Zealand’s trade interests with China. Others in New Zealand are also concerned that moving too far too fast with the United States may jeopardize New Zealand’s independence in foreign policy.
The Obama Administration’s move away from old restrictions on bilateral ties, as demonstrated by the opening of U.S. naval ports to New Zealand ships, will likely continue to move bilateral ties forward. This desire on both sides to continue to strengthen relations was demonstrated by the 2010 Wellington Declaration and the 2012 Washington Declaration. In the view of many, the improvement in bilateral relations marked by these two agreements will better enable both nations to navigate the shifting geopolitical dynamics of both the South Pacific and the larger the Asia Pacific region, including the rise of China. New Zealand’s national identity, values, and economic interests will all likely influence its external engagement in the years ahead. Values, as well as interests, have played a role in explaining past differences between the United States and New Zealand and why the two nations are once again close Pacific partners.
CRS — The Budget Control Act, Sequestration, and the Foreign Affairs Budget: Background and Possible Impacts
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
Congress has an interest in the cost and effectiveness of foreign affairs activities that promote U.S. interests overseas. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25), as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240/H.R. 8, signed into law on January 2, 2013), requires across-the-board reductions (sequestration) in most federal defense and nondefense discretionary programs, projects, and activities, including those in foreign affairs. These automatic cuts went into effect on March 1, 2013. Of ongoing interest will be the impact of these cuts on State Department operations, foreign aid programs, and their ability to protect Americans and promote U.S. interests overseas.
According to a February 22, 2013, Pew Research Center survey, Americans surveyed support cuts in foreign aid spending more than any other government activity mentioned. Although still not the majority, 48% of those polled prefer a decrease in foreign aid, while 49% prefer it remains at the current level or is increased. When asked about the Department of State, 34% said they prefer the Department of State funding be decreased, while 60% support maintaining current State Department funding or increasing it.
At the same time that sequestration is being implemented, Congress is also working on continuing government funding through the remainder of the fiscal year. Currently, the government is operating under a continuing resolution (CR, P.L. 112-175) that provides stop-gap funding through March 27, 2013. Some believe that Congress might pass a CR that provides more flexibility for implementing the sequestration law. Whether or not a CR amends the acrossthe-board cuts, many expect the new CR funding levels to change the baseline of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) calculations and, thus, change the current estimates of sequestration cuts, including for foreign affairs spending accounts.
In addition, the Administration has indicated that it intends to submit its FY2014 budget request to Congress in April. It will identify President Obama’s priorities and plans for meeting the BCA caps in the next fiscal year.
This report discusses current OMB estimates of foreign affairs accounts sequestration amounts. For background on the current foreign affairs budget, see CRS Report R42621, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2013 Budget and Appropriations. This report will be updated as changes occur.
